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3 September 2008, " The Peace Treaties of 3 September 1783.". The program was presented by Albert D. McJoynt, a military historian and member of the ARRT. It was noted that this program concluded a series of ARRT programs commemorating the 225th Anniversary of the American War for Independence, and that our ARRT program was being conducted on the very date the anniversary of these definitive treaties was being celebrated in Paris. Great Britain signed two separate treaties that essentially ended the War for American Independence. One treaty, signed in Paris, was with the new American Republic; the treaty, signed at nearby Versailles, was with the Kingdom of France -- the American's only official (by the treaty of 1778) wartime ally. Mr McJoynt announced that his focus would be on the negotiations associated with the 1783 Treaty of Paris both in terms as the events unfolded and as some controversial aspects of the peace negotiations are presented in many popular narrative American histories.
The speaker's opening remarks explained that the general public appears to have a vague understanding of the treaties that ended this epic struggle, and this may be in part due to misunderstanding when and how the war ended and American Independence was acknowledged by Great Britain. The audience was reminded of a recent TV miniseries on John Adams, wherein two scenes expressed prevailing misunderstandings about the war's end. One scene has John Adam's wife learning of the British surrender at Yorktown on October 1781 and immediately announces to her family that the ‘war is over'. The miniseries follows with some brief scenes of Adams' only successful initiative as a diplomat in Europe in The Netherlands during 1780-1782. Then in a remarkable truncating of time, Adam's wife joins him and Thomas Jefferson in Paris in 1784, and the script allows a brief reference to a peace treaty having been negotiated. The speaker observed that is was unfortunate that highly publicized TV production – proclaiming association with some popular historians – should contribute to further promotion of this myth, and ignore a critical phase in the American winning of Independence.
Of course the war did not end with, nor was American Independence achieved at Yorktown 1781. George Washington and other leaders at the time certainly knew otherwise, given that New York City and Charleston remained occupied by a British army that still outnumbered the allied American and French armies in North America. It would not be until late in 1782 before serious peace talks began and a formal peace that acknowledged American Independence was signed in Paris on 3 September 1783. The speaker believed that it was important for the general American public to be reminded of critical military/naval campaigns and diplomatic actions during the last years of the American War for Independence. The ARRT has committed two presentations to cover these topics as part of commemorating the 225th Anniversary of the war. The description of the global military and naval aspects of the American War for Independence form 1781 to 1783 were addressed in Mr. McJoynt's 4 April 2007 presentation to the ARRT: "After Yorktown, 1781: The 'War Beyond the Horizon'". Understanding any serious consideration of peace had to await until Britain, France, and Spain had exhausted themselves in the Caribbean, the western Mediterranean, and India before they were ready to end the conflict.
During 1782, Britain gained temporary relief in successfully warding off major assaults on Jamaica and Gibraltar, but these were tenuous outcomes if the war were to linger. Often misunderstood is that the British Parliament's vote in February 1782 against "further ... offensive" warfare in North America was not a recognition of American Independence – the fundamental objective of the Franco American Alliance of 1778. May British leaders envisioned some political accommodation whereby the colonies remained part of the Empire – somewhat as was done with Ireland. While many British histories of the war emphasize a few military and naval victories in 1782, the fact is that their empire was on the global strategic defensive and risked losing some possessions considered more valuable than the 13 colonies if the war continued. Britain not only failed to gain alliances (an essential element in her previous war with France), but witnessed even Holland (generally an historic ally of England) recognizing the United States in October 1782.
Mr McJoynt's talk for this September program took up the efforts when serious peace negotiations began in 1782 and then completed in 1783. His approach was to review the sequence of key events as outlined in his handout packet [listed below review]. Important issues affecting the negotiations were introduced during the presentation. The negotiations were complicated. There were complex challenges to resolve old boundary disputes as to what geographic limits defined the new American Republic (where to draw the lines between British Canada to the north, and Spanish possessions to the south and west?). Further, the Americans wanted rights to the Mississippi and fishing off Newfoundland. The British wanted Loyalists and English merchants re-compensated. The French had to persuade Spain to accept Minorca in place of Gibraltar, and to be satisfied with re-gaining Florida in place of Jamaica. While fundamentally tied [by the 1778 alliance] to obtain American Independence from England, the French aims [as specified in their 1778 alliance treaty] were to maintain their prewar positions in the West Indies and fishing rights off Newfoundland.
Equally as important as these negotiating issues were controversial personality conflicts among the negotiators. The British Government experienced forced turnovers in ministerial leaders from March to July of 1782, and then in April 1783. The internal British political discord was certainly no less disturbing than the questionable personality characteristics of the American negotiators – factors often omitted in popular historical narratives. In contrast to summary remarks addressing the treaty in popular American narrative histories, less widely read scholarly publications introduce an array of controversial initiatives injected in the negotiations by a jealous John Adams and a suspicious John Jay.
Adams' resented Franklin's success in obtaining and smoothly maintaining the French alliance, and sought to have himself be acclaimed as ‘the George Washington of diplomacy'. Jay's entrenched anti-Catholic bias was re enforced by his failed mission to obtain either recognition or meaningful money directly from the Spanish Government after two years in Madrid. When Jay joined the ill Franklin in Paris, he was predisposed to suspect deceit on the part of the French. Jay falsely – as historical records show – suspected the French were undercutting the American's claims in the forthcoming negotiations. Jay easily succumbed to British negotiators suggestions to break the alliance with France. Jay even invited the British to use their army in North America to retake Florida before the final peace was signed. Fortunately neither gambit succeeded. To a large degree, a special relationship between the two more skilled diplomats – Vergennes for France and Franklin for the Americans – managed to overcome the negative encumbrances injected by the other American negotiators. Controversy about the treaty negotiations continues as found expressed by modern biographers and historians who report on the peace negotiations of 1782-1783. While they may agree as to dates of specific events, historians seem to lean toward different ‘spins' as to what was really unfolding. Perceptions and delusions entered in the memoirs and biographies of some icons among the American Founders have been used by many modern editors and authors to suggest that the ‘militia diplomacy' conducted by Jay and Adams in 1782-1783 was "a kind of Yankee morality play." The speaker did not proceed into the debate further, but called attention to the list of ‘sources' in the handout package [see below]. For this last controversy one can examine: The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787. By Jonathan R. Dull. (Princeton University Press); and Lawrence S. Kaplan's review of Professor Dull's work in "Diplomacy of the American Revolution: the Perspective from France" printed in Reviews in American History (September 1976, The Johns Hopkins University Press).
Unfortunately, many modern authors leave unexamined the contemporary writings of the negotiators and diplomats which distort the actual motives and intentions of diplomats. Contrary to Adams' claims that the French wanted the war to continue, Vergennes was doing all he could to bring and end to the conflict. French communications that expressed reservations in supporting some of the American geographical border delineations were due to the French minister's doubts that the British would agree, and the dispute would only prolong the war. The French minister never faltered in supporting American Independence. When he learned of the separate preliminary articles of treaty signed between the British with the Americans in November 1782, Vergennes expressed his disappointment with the American negotiators furtiveness but complimented the Americans on acquiring far better arrangements with the British than he had thought possible. The French Diplomat's real sentiments were reflected in forwarding the Americans another large loan.
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