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The 7 March 2012 program will be presented by Christian M. McBurney, author of The Rhode Island Campaign: The First French and American Operation of the Revolutionary War, published in September 2011 by Westholme.
The speaker will address themes from his book, which is a detailed history of the French and American joint operation in 1778 to try to capture Newport when the town was occupied by a British army. Mr. McBurney's book ends with a complete description of the 1778 ‘Battle of Rhode Island'. Participants included the Count D'Estaing, Lafayette, Nathaniel Greene, Paul Revere, John Hancock and John Sullivan. This book is the first major work on this topic in more than 100 years.
Dennis Conrad, editor of the "Naval Documents of the American Revolution" and "Papers of General Nathaniel Greene," has reviewed Mr. McBurney's The Rhode Island Campaign and wrote that the book provides "a fresh, nuance, and compelling reinterpretation of the United States' first joint operation. Moreover, [the author] does it with readable style. This work will be the standard for years to come."
Christian M. McBurney, a graduate of Brown University, is a partner in a Washington, DC, law firm. He is the author of several books and articles on early Rhode Island history, including "A History of Kingston, Rhode Island, 1700–1900" and "British Treatment of Prisoners During the Occupation of Newport, 1776–1779."
Mr. McBurney is a member of the ARRT of DC and participated in a joint presentation of the 4 May 2011 program.
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RECENT, PAST PROGRAMS
OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION ROUND TABLE:
2 November 2011, "The Continental Marines in the American Revolution." The program was presented by Charles Neimeyer (Ph.D), Director and Chief of U.S. Marine Corps History at Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. Dr. Neimeyer's presentation was scheduled to coincide with the 230th anniversary of the founding of the United States Marine Corps [USMC], and provided an overview on the US Marine Corps' creation and contribution during the American Revolution.
Dr. Neimeyer , described the creation and experiences of the Continental Marines during the American War for Independence. Like with other Continental war fighting structures, the Marines were patterned along traditions developed in the British armed forces, with which the rebellious colonists were most familiar. In this respect the Continental Marines shared with their model – the ‘Royal Marines' – an ambiguous status as to its ‘rolls and missions' [in modern jargon]. There was little question that the Marines would be part of the naval arm – in this case the Continental Navy that was founded by the Second Continental Congress on 13 October 1775. The Continental Marines were established 10 November 1775. In the eighteenth century, the Marines were seen as a special ‘maritime infantry' contingent directly under the control of the naval organization. Many of the duties of the marines were aboard ships – to keep order among the shipboard crews, to participate in firing firearms against crews of enemy ships, and to participate in hand-to-hand combat when boarding enemy ships. However, on occasions, such ‘maritime infantry' were deployed from ships and sent ashore to operate as land troops raiding enemy posts or guarding naval facilities. Continental Army leaders were aprehensive that the Marines presented competiiton, but the Congressional leaders recognized the need for an elite military contingent, conditioned [trained and motivated] to be deployed quickly, to adapt to a variety of tactical situations. The necessity to excite recruitment and to inspire morale encouraged the promotion of colorful legends and myths associated with the Corps. An example is that the first Marines were probably not recruited at the famous [but long extinct] ‘Tun Tavern' in Philadelphia. However, the Corp's first commander had owned a tavern in the city. The Continental Marines were disbanded at the end of the war in April 1783. The Corps was re-formed on July 11, 1798, and continued to celebrate its birthday as the tenth of November 1775.
Dr. Charles Neimeyer was the former Dean of Academics at the Naval War College and Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy in Newport, RI, and a former Vice President of Academic Affairs at Valley Forge Military Academy and College. He has served as Academic Dean at the Naval War College, and was a full time professor of National Security Affairs from 1997-2002. Dr. Neimeyer's 20 year career as a Marine Corps officer, included tours in all three active Marine Divisions and service at the White House. While on active duty, he earned a Masters Degree and Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University.
Dr. Neimeyer authored a variety of history and national security affairs articles. In 1996, he published the widely acclaimed monograph, "America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army, 1775 – 1783," by the New York University Press. He published a second monograph, "The Revolutionary War," (Greenwood Press, 2007) and recently edited a volume titled, On the Corps: USMC Wisdom: from the pages of Leatherneck, Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings; published by the Naval Institute in 2008.
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7 September 2011, ARRT of DC program consisted of several announcements as the scheduled speaker was unable to attend. In spite of the exceptionally bad weather, there was a robust number of attendees. Some of the ARRT members took the opportunity to make expanded announcements.
Glenn Williams, President of the ARRT, announced the Fifteenth annual National Symposium of the War of 1812 to be held in Baltimore. Sponsored by the War of 1812 Consortium and the Council on America's Military Past, this year's symposium will be held on Saturday, 1 October, at the Reginald F. Lewis Museum of African-American History and Culture near the Inner Harbor in Baltimore. This year's theme is "The Civil War of 1812," which is the title of the recently published book by one of the featured speakers, Alan Taylor, Ph.D., professor of history at University of California, Davis. More information is at the web page: http://starspangled200.org/Events/Pages/Symposium.aspx
Glenn also mentioned the Napoleonic Historical Society's 2011 Napoleonic Conference. Also to be held in Baltimore at the Admiral Fell Inn at Fells Point, the weekend of 16-18 September. More information is at the web site:
http://www.napoleonichistoricalsociety.com/Conferences/2011_Baltimore.htm
Albert McJoynt, ARRT Secretary, made an announcement about the weekend of 10-11 September, when MountVernon will host the 230th commemoration of General Comte de Rochambeau's visit with Washington in 1781. This marked a special moment during the dramatic strategic movement of the American and French Allied forces from New York to Yorktown, Virginia, in September 1781. The only previous commemoration of this event was the bicentennial Mount Vernon gala in 1981. This historic occasion was Washington's first visit home after six years of war, and special occasion where Washington and Rochambeau would remain overnight in the same dwelling. The September 2011 Mount Vernon commemoration will involve hundreds of Revolutionary War re-enactors conducting military demonstrations. Part of the program includes "General Washington" and "General Rochambeau" describing the unique challenges facing the Allied Commanders during this critical phase initiating the Yorktown Campaign of 1781. More information is at:
"The 230th Anniversary of Washington and Rochambeau 2 Days at Mount Vernon".
Glenn offered a rejoinder to emphasize a significant aspect of the Washington-Rochambeau event at Mount Vernon, which was part the largest strategic redeployment of the Revolutionary War field armies in the critical North American theater. The daring venture to march the combined Franco-American army from New York to Yorktown was a tribute to Washington's ability as a strategic thinker and decisive decision maker. Remembering that General Washington's focus had been a planned attack to recapture New York City, even against Rochambeau's advice, but waiting on word if the French fleet would cooperate in such a challenging siege. When Rochambeau received a communication in early August from Admiral DeGrasse that the French fleet was heading to the Chesapeake, and would remain on station for only a matter of weeks, Washington shifted the focus of operations to Virginia. Within 72 hours of being notified of DeGrasse's destination, Washington had the first elements of the Continental Army on the march, with the rest of combined forces following in the now famous "March to Victory at Yorktown." Glenn likened it to the scene in the movie "Patton," when as the Battle of the Bulge was nearing its critical stage, and allied commanders were at a loss for actions to contain the German penetration and also relieve the besieged 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne; Lt. Gen. Patton announced to the meeting of allied commanders that his Third U.S. Army could change operations, and attack north with two corps toward Bastogne within 48 hours.
Mark Whatford, a new ARRT member and Librarian & Archivist at Gunston Hall [historic home of George Mason], took the opportunity to announce that The Gunston Hall Library & Archives has recently updated their website to include an index of research files available to patrons covering many aspects of colonial life. See http://www.gunstonhall.org/
Gunston Hall Library & Archives are also working with Mt. Vernon to make available a complete listing of their collections including rare books and
documents available for researchers, this should be launched in the next few weeks. In February 2012 Gunston Hall will have their annual Liberty Lecture
series and will keep the ARRT of DC updated on the speakers, dates and topics.
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4 May 2011, "British Treatment of American Prisoners in the Revolutionary War." The program was a joint presentation by Christian McBurney [ARRT of DC member] and guest David Swain. Mr. McBurney recently published an article, "British Treatment of Prisoners During the Occupation of Newport, 1776-1779: Disease, Starvation and Death Stalk the Prison Ships," Newport History, vol. 79, No. 263, 1-41 (Fall 2010). David Swain edited the recently-published Recollections of Life on the Prison Ship Jersey (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2010). Their dual presentation provided a summarization of the horrible treatment of American prisoners of war in New York City prisons as addressed in Edwin G. Burroughs' book Forgotten Patriots, the Untold Story of American Prisoners During the Revolutionary War (2008). Taking turns the podium, the speakers, the speakers offered their own observations based upon their recently published research.
Mr McBurney's personal view, expressed at the outset, was that nations can be judged by how they treat wartime captives. He provided a quick comparison of the number of prisoners' deaths over various past wars. Mr McBurney noted the historically low survival rates of Arnerican prisoners on the British prison ships -- especially the ships in New York Harbor where disease, starvation, unsanitary conditions produced a shocking number of deaths. To some extent, such factors also afffected attrition in the military camps of the time, but the American prisoners were especially subjected to harsh treatment by British authorities, who looked upon the rebels with special disdain.
Mr. Swain's theme was an analytical assessment of a written account by one of the prisoners -- a twice captured Newport based privateer, Thomas Dring. Mr. Swain's Recollections of Life on the Prison Ship Jersey contains for the first time in print the complete text of Dring's handwritten journal. Mr. Swain found that Dring's written account appeared accurate when cross checked with other accounts and records. However there is the question as to why Dring took so long -- 42 years -- to write it? Mr. Swain theses is that the author felt a need to keep the memory alive. Such a motive might explain why -- as Mr. Swain surprisingly discovered -- Mr. Dring resorted to considerable plagiarism in his journal, and borrowed a number of narrative passages from writings of others.
Christian McBurney is an attorney at a Washington, D.C. law firm and has written several books and articles on early Rhode Island history. David Swain received degrees in history from Oberlin College and the University of Michigan, and is currently a research assistant at the David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania.
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2 March 2011, "Lafayette: The Idealist General." The program was presented by Mr. Marc Leepson who described Lafayette in context of
producing a volume [published this March] to go with the Macmillan publisher's series on "World Generals." Mr. Leepson explained that his research led "to one year with Lafayette." He was pleased to find not only many quality historical biographies on the marquis, but particularly welcomed the existence of a large repository of personal correspondence that permitted a deep examination into the marquis' character. The challenge in research was to take in the long involvement Lafayette had in great political movements of late 18th and early 19th century Western world. Any speaking presentation is further challenged to capture a life that spanned three revolutions in a concise talk.
As described in the publisher's advance description of Mr. Leepson's book, Lafayette's life story is the stuff of legend. Born into an aristocratic French family of warriors. As his father was killed in the Seven Years' War when Lafayette was 2 years old, the young marquis spent his formative years in an idyllic setting and under the supervision of strong willed women, his mother, his grand mother and an aunt. His mother's moved with her son to Paris and entered Lafayette into the most prestigious schools and social strata. Through his mother's side, he eventually inherit enormous wealth. He was made lieutenant in the French Royal Guard at age 14, at 16 he married the daughter of another high noble family. At 19 he volunteered at his own expense to fight in the American Revolution. His first real test was being a military leader in the American Continental Army – as a 20 year old Major General with no prior combat experience.
However, Lafayette came to America with some unusual attributes not held by the usual military volunteers from Europe. The 19 year old Lafayette had not formed strong social prejudices, and he foresaw his inevitable military career as an opportunity to seek an honorable role in life – military glory was not in conquest but in service to king and family, and nation. His young impressionable mind and aspirations were conditioned by legendary military heroic narratives and excited by the humanistic goals espoused in the Enlightenment rhetoric circulating in eighteenth century Western Europe. This unusual background contributed to the young French aristocrat's winning the personal acceptance among many American colonial leaders in the War for Independence and later leaders in the new Republic. Lafayette's favor among Americans benefitted considerably by France's increasingly more active support that enable the startling success of the American revolt. Lafayette was fortunate to win the respect and trust of General George Washington that provided the Marquis the opportunity to distinguish himself successfully leading an independent command during the Virginia Campaign of 1781, and participation in the climatic Yorktown Victory at the end of the year.
Unfortunately, Lafayette's idealism that was so suited to the American fight for Independence was not able to master the complexities of the French Revolution and subsequent political turmoil that followed in his native country at the end of the eighteenth and very early nineteenth centuries. History respectively recognizes Lafayette's brave attempts to serve his own nation, but it was in the American struggle where he uniquely won his ‘glory'.
Mr. Leepson did not ‘idealize' Lafayette – pointing out moments when the marquis exhibited some vanity and naivete. However, Lafayette's idealism was consistent and frequently tested by many trials. Lafayette's historical fame has grown as the marquis' idealism inspired him to champion values that sparked the struggles of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These values of democratic representative government, individual freedom, religious toleration and eradication of slavery are now recognized fundamentals in most of the modern Western Civilization.
Marc Leepson is a historian, journalist, and author of seven books, including Lafayette: Lessons in Leadership from the Idealist General. A former staff writer for Congressional Quarterly in Washington, D.C., his work has appeared in many magazines and newspapers, including Civil War Times, America's Civil War, Vietnam, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New York Times Book Review, The Wall Street Journal, The Baltimore Sun, the Chicago Tribune, and USA Today. He lives in Middleburg, Virginia.
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3 November 2010, "Braddock's March." The program was presented by Mr.Thomas E. Crocker who described the highlights and offered his assessment of the ill-starred expedition led by the British Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock in 1755. The basis for Mr. Crocker's talk was his research leading to the recent publication of his book Braddock's March: How the Man Sent to Seize a Continent Changed American History.
Mr. Crocker began his talk by explaining that General Braddock was sent by the British government with the largest army in North America up to that time. This was in response to counter a series of French successes to establish their claims in the disputed Ohio Valley following the 3 July 1754 expulsion of British colonial forces from ‘Fort Necessity' – a briefly erected open stockade commanded by the Virginia militia colonel George Washington. That engagement was one of the first battles of the ‘French and Indian War', that within a year merged into the global Seven Years' War.
General Braddock came to North America with 2,000 British Regulars in March 1755. In June, General Braddock, accompanied by Colonel Washington met with representatives from the British colonies in Alexandria, Virginia, to plan an ambitious campaign to capture French held Fort Duquesne . This was part of a larger strategic British offensive to seize Fort Niagara, Crown Point and Nova Scotia. It is surprising that such a command was awarded to Braddock, whose high rank was achieved largely through patronage and family connections; he had never served in combat – as no other high ranking officers willing to take the job. Braddock appeared to show some awareness of his shortcomings in selecting Washington as his aide. The two seemed to have developed a close friendship though Braddock remained dismissive of any suggestions to respect some of the unique challenges presented in North American warfare – particularly in the wilderness contending with Indian tactics as well as the need to control a large, stretched out column of troops. Conditions were made worse by the approaching rainy season and the unreliable support of various separate colonies. In May 1755, the expedition began from Alexandria on its nearly 250-mile trek, heroically cutting through dense wilderness, fording rivers, and scaling mountains, while hauling heavy artillery across the Appalachian Mountains. As it developed Braddock plunged it into the wilderness with barely adequate supplies, inaccurate maps and little up-to-date intelligence on his French and Indian foes.
The climatic moment of the expedition was the battle ‘Battle of the Monongahela', also known as the ‘Battle of the Wilderness', that occurred on 9 July 1755. It was not so much an ambush as a ‘meeting engagement'. The French and Indians [Native Americans] were not waiting for the British, but rather advancing to meet them encamped in the vicinity of the old Fort Necessity [still to the east of where the battle occurred]. Meanwhile Braddock was pushing his advance with the intent of being able to besiege Fort Duquesne [still a good distance to the west]. The unplanned engagement threw the British leadership off guard. Their inexperienced troops and commander suffered under the frustrating withering snipping of the French – and especially Indians who were adapt at taking advantage of concealment in the woods. Enduring heavy casualties and harried by multi directional attacks the British column was thrown in disarray. The French and Indians took to the high ground, while the British column remained confined to the trail. Confusion compounded the problem. When, Braddock was mortarly wounded Washington took control and directed a reasonably controlled retreat.
Mr. Crocker is an attorney with a Washington, D.C. firm. Reviews of his book have praised his thorough research and frest writing style
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1 September 2010 , "John Barry: An American Hero in the Age of Sail." The program was presented by Mr. Tim McGrath who gave a summary review of the amazing early American naval leader and subject of his 2009 published book of the same title. Mr. McGrath described the many impressive accomplishments of John Barry that would challenge most fictional naval hero narratives. Barry was still a young boy when he was able to escape his father's fate as a poor, Catholic farmer in British ruled Ireland. A family connection allowed him to become a ship's cabin boy, from which he rapidly advanced as a seaman and led to his arriving in Philadelphia a decade before the American Revolution. In Philadelphia, Barry found the freedom to practice his religion and the opportunity to advance in the emerging maritime trade opportunities, particularly with the West Indies. Barry's first command came in 1766 aboard the schooner, Barbados. By 1772, Barry's shipmaster skills drew the attention of Philadelphia's leading mercantile entrepreneurs, such as Robert Morris. Just as the war was beginning, Barry set a record, sailing the farthest-distance in a 24-hour period, commanding his merchant ship the Black Prince between England and Philadelphia. His wartime record can be anchored between having successfully fought 'the first' and 'last' sea engagements fought by the Continental Navy during the Revolution.
During the winter of 1776-77, Barry volunteered in the Philadelphia militia that joined Washington's army. He served as an aide to general Cadwalader at the Battle of Princeton. Late in 1777, Barry was in the struggle to defend Philadelphia, but had to scuttle his ship, the Effingham as the British seized the city. Commanding a small fleet of small water craft, Barry continued to harass British shipping in the Lower Delaware. Barry was in the struggle to defend Philadelphia, but had to scuttle his ship, the Effingham, as the British seized the city. Commanding a small fleet of barges, Barry continued to harass British shipping in the Lower Delaware. On 8 March 1778, Barry led this "fleet" to surprise and capture an armed schooner and two transports on the Delaware. The action yielded needed supplies for the Continental Army and elicited a written letter (12 March 1778) of commendation from General Washington.
Barry was assigned the frigate Raleigh in May 1778. In September of that year, Barry led his ship in a long, running battle against the British frigate Unicorn and the ship-of-the-line Experiment. The encounter took place near Maine's Penobscot Bay. Barry attempted to burn his severely damaged ship to prevent British capture. Unfortunately, a traitorous American midshipman of English ancestry prevented the destruction of the Raleigh and the complete escape of all hands. Barry managed to lead two-thirds of his crew to safety. However, the Continental Navy's court of inquiry praised Barry's "spirited and gallant behavior" during the ordeal. The episode re-enforced Barry's reputation as a commander concerned for the welfare of his crew and determined to fight to the end. As Congress had no ship to give him, Barry entered the service of his adopted State, Pennsylvania, as a "privateer" and commanded the privately owned brig Delaware during most of 1779 and early 1780.
In September 1780, the Continental Marine Committee appointed Barry to the command of the frigate Alliance being readied in the port of Boston. The Alliance was the finest vessel built for the Continental Navy. In February 1781, Barry took the Alliance from Boston on a mission to transport important individuals to France, taking several prizes along the way. Barry's returning cruise to America was a little more challenging. A mutiny plot was successfully foiled, and a heavily laden supply ship the Alliance was escorting drifted away from the formation during a gale, and was eventually seized by the British. Before reaching the West Indies, Barry engaged two British armed cruisers at the same time, and seized them both after an exchange of broadsides.
The Alliance proved its mettle on 28 May 1781 in engaging on two British sloops, Atlanta and Trespassy. . Unfortunately the becalmed weather allowed the smaller British ships to man their sweeps to deliver close powerful discharges that damaged the Alliance's rigging. Barry directed a relentless defense from the quarterdeck until wounded, and was taken below deck for medical care. The struggle increased in intensity: the Alliance's colors were shot away, but a new flag was quickly raised again. Fortunately a gust of wind arose, filling the Alliance's sails. The battered Alliance swung about firing its 12-pound cannons with decisive effect. After two successful broadsides, both the Atlanta and the Trepassey struck their colors. The one surviving British captain appeared on the deck of the Alliance for the customary surrender ceremony. Barry received and returned the British officer's sword, stating: "I return it to you, Sir. You have merited it, and your King ought to give you a better ship. Here is my cabin, at your service. Use it as your own." In early June 1781, the wounded Barry brought Alliance into Boston. The ship's shattered masts, sails and rigging needed extensive overhaul.
Barry's final battle of the Revolution was on 10 March 1783, as he was returning from Havana aboard the Alliance, escorting the Duc de Lauzon, a transport carrying Spanish silver dollars destined for the Continental Congress. Off Cape Canaveral, the Alliance fell in with the British frigate, Sybil. After almost an hour exchange of gunfire between the two ships, the British vessel sheared off.
After the War for Independence and the dissolution of the Continental Navy, Barry re-entered the maritime trade. Between the years 1787-89, Barry helped to open commerce with China and the Orient while captaining the merchant ship, Asia. In the 1790s, the Navy was revived as a permanent entity in response to Barbary Pirate depredations on American merchantmen and strained relations with France brought about by perceived American support for Britain in a renewed Anglo-French war. In February, 1797, President Washington commissioned Barry to lead the a new navy. Barry supervised the construction of the first frigates built under the Naval Act of 27 March 1794. This included his own forty-four gun frigate the USS United States, which was to serve as his flagship when launched in May 1797. Holding a courtesy title of Commodore, Barry commanded the American navy during the undeclared naval ‘Quasi War' with France (1798-1800), during which he personally captured several French merchantmen and privateers. Barry finished his active career as commander of the United States Naval Station in the West Indies at Guadeloupe, bringing the USS United States into port on 6 March 1801. He remained head of the Navy until his death on 13 September 1803; and was buried in Philadelphia's Old St. Mary's Churchyard.
Many naval historians believe that Commodore Barry deserves to be called 'Father of the American Navy'. John Barry was a mentor for many
future heroes of the country's professional naval officer corps — like Stephen Decatur, Richard Somers, and Charles Stewart, who would distinguish themselves in the Barbary Wars (1801–1805 and 1815) and the War of 1812 with Britain. Mr. McGrath explained that Barry was a man of action who, unfortunately, left a minimal paper trail for future historians and biographers. Whereas, the eloquent, prolific and unabashedly self-promoting letter writer John Paul Jones has more easily been made the subject of biographies published in modern times.
Tim McGrath is an executive who lives outside of Philadelphia. An avid sailor, he has been published in Naval History magazine. More on his book can be viewed at the publisher's website:
http://www.westholmepublishing.com/johnbarry.html
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5 May 2010, "Flight from Monticello: Thomas Jefferson at War." The program was presented by Michael Kranish who discussed the background in his writing his critically acclaimed and recently published book Flight from Monticello: Thomas Jefferson at War.
As a visiting fellow at Monticello's Robert H. Smith International Center for Jefferson Studies in 2008, Mr. Kranish became interested in examining Jefferson much as a reporter of today would approach understanding a modern president.
As a reporter who covers the White House, Mr. Kranish reasoned that presidents are often defined by how they perform during their most challenging times. Such experiences usually influence these individuals in their later years when they become leaders of the Nation. Staying for a period at Monticello made it easy to see Jefferson's dramatic challenge occurring in 1781, when Benedict Arnold led a British force to invade Virginia, of which Jefferson had just been made governor.
Certain facts surfaced that stirred Mr. Kranish's investigative reporter's instincts and curiosity. For example, earlier in the war Jefferson had praised Arnold's conduct. Also, a British prisoner of war, William Phillips, who had once been in Charlottesville [as part of the Army of the Convention] and had even been entertained by Jefferson at Monticello, was part of Arnold force as a general officer. Mr. Kranish found little in the narrative histories that explained why and how this climactic moment evolved in Virginia in 1781, and he wanted to understand more on how the revolution developed in Virginia and how Jefferson interacted not only with the British adversaries, but in dealing with serious confrontations with fellow patriot Virginians like Patrick Henry. To find new insights, Mr. Kranish compiled a list of ships commanded by Arnold during the invasion. Using ship logs, he obtained names of some lower ranking officers in the British force. Some of these documents provided descriptions of the invasion that have never been published. One Hessian officer's diary -- not discovered until after World War II -- conveys a contrary view to that reported by Arnold of the joyous reactions expressed by the residents of Portsmouth when pledging their oath of loyalty to the king. Most all historical accounts clearly describe Jefferson as an ineffectual leader in attempting to deal with the British invasion. In part, this was due to Jefferson's lack of interest in military matters, his preconceived idealism about citizen militias, and his aversion to strong executive powers. Such perceptions were significantly altered when Jefferson became President of the United States many years later. While Jefferson may have been inept in directing military and naval defenses in 1781, he was not, as some have charged, a coward. His letters and memorandum book clearly record how he rode for days around Richmond trying to organize resistance while many other officials fled. There is adequate evidence that Jefferson was deeply affected by the danger posed to his family, taking them to different hiding places as the British advanced.
Mr. Kranish lives in Silver Spring, Maryland, and is a Washington correspondent for the Boston Globe, and is the co-author of John F. Kerry: The Complete Biography.
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3 March 2010, "The True Story of a Citizen-Soldier Who fought from Quebec to Yorktown." The program was presented by Robert A. Mayers, who gave an interesting talk as to what motivated him to write his recently published book The War Man; and highlighted his discoveries about the American Revolution as experience by the common soldier. The book's central subject – Corporal John Allison, a soldier who served in New York regiments of the Continental Army for the entire eight years of the American Revolution – provides a rare opportunity to see the events from the perspective of the simple man-in-the-ranks. While researching his family history, Mr. Mayers became aware that John Allison was his ancestor. Drawing upon family oral tradition, our speaker delved into the usual archival sources, such as retirement pension applications, military unit records and journals of contemporaries. From his research, Mr. Mayers reconstructed the "War Man's" life of campaigning from the Canadian freezing wilderness, through the battle of Fort Montgomery and the Sullivan-Clinton campaign against the Iroquois, to the bitter winter at Morristown, and the climatic American victory at Yorktown. During his eight-year military career, John Allison survived numerous skirmishes and battles. He was promoted to the rank of corporal before returning home a local hero.
Mr. Mayer shared some of his observations. Particularly disturbing was the lack of training and equipment provided the Continental troops in 1776, and during much of the early years of the war. Many officers left their units during the severe winter encampments, leaving the common soldiers – many of whom had no alternative but to remain. Mr. Mayer described the Jockey Hollow encampment, near Morristown, during the hard winter of 1779-1780 as particularly trying. Besides the severe winter storms and inadequate food supplies, the Continental Army was disintegrating as many soldiers – who were not otherwise dying or were too sick to leave – were surprised to find that those who had enlisted in early 1777 "for three years, or the duration of the war," as had John Allison, were not free of their service obligation in 1780. Continental troops, such as John Allison, were shocked to discover that the Continental Congress emphasized the enlistment terms as requiring the men to remain "for the duration of the war." Massive desertions occurred over this issue, but Allison was among those who did not wish to invite disgrace in deserting. Rather, Mr Mayer was surprised to discover a letter his ancestor had written, dated 16 April 1780, to the "To his Excellency Genl Washington Commander and Chief of the United States of North America." While there is no evidence that the letter was answered, we know that it did not change policy. Corporal Allison did go on to participate in the attack on the British Redoubt 10 during the 1781 siege of Yorktown. He completed his service at New Windsor, and was furloughed home in April 1783 as the troops of the Continental army disbanded.
Bob Mayers is an active member of ten historical societies in the areas of the country where this history took place. He is a frequent speaker and contributor to society publications. A previous work on his family's history spans 600 years and was accepted by local and global reference library collections in America and England. He is a graduate of Rutgers University. Mr. Mayers served as a combat officer in the Navy and Marine Corps. His military experience provided him with a special perspective to appreciate the many challenges faced by his ancestor in the American Continental Army.
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4 November 2009, "Music as a Reflection of the American Revolutionary Era." The program was presented by Dr. David Hildebrand, who discussed and performed selected patriotic songs, ballads, marches and dance tunes known by officers, soldiers, and civilians during the American War for Independence. Dr. Hildebrand addressed both the formal and less refined aspects of the era's music. His presentation focused on the prevalent practice of parody, while also touching upon related issues of social class, geography, and the symbolic power of tunes like "Yankee Doodle" and "The British Grenadiers." Rather than overview the presentation here, it is suggested that one visit Dr. Hildebrand's essay "What was Colonial or "Early American" Music?" posted at
http://www.colonialmusic.org/Resource/DHessay.htm
David, together with his wife Ginger, specializes in researching, recording, and performing early American music. Since 1980 the two have presented concerts and educational programs throughout the country for museums, historical societies, public schools, and universities. Mount Vernon, the Smithsonian Institution, the National Archives, Colonial Williamsburg, and the Styriarte Festival (in Graz, Austria) are among their past sponsors. David holds a Ph.D. from The Catholic University of America, and he earned his Master's at George Washington University and Bachelor's at Dickinson College. He consults and lectures widely in addition to finishing a book on music in Maryland for the Johns Hopkins University Press. Each spring David teaches a graduate course on the early history of American music at the Peabody Conservatory in Baltimore.
The Hildebrands provided soundtrack materials and served as period music consultants for several PBS broadcasts, including the six-part series Liberty! – the American Revolution, and the one-hour specials Jefferson: A View from the Mountain and Rediscovering George Washington. David and Ginger have issued six full-length recordings, most notably George Washington: Music for the First President (1998) and Music in the Life of Benjamin Franklin (2006), copies of which will be available the evening of November 4th. In 1999, together with dance historians Kate van Winkle and Robert Keller, the Hildebrands founded The Colonial Music Institute. The speaker invited prospective attendees to explore the "RESOURCES" section of the The Colonial Music Institut's website at www.colonialmusic.org.
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2 September 2009, "Present But Not Accounted For: Women at the Valley Forge Encampment." The program was presented by
Dr. Nancy Loane, historian and author of the recently published book Following the Drum: Women at the Valley Forge Encampment (April 2009). Her presentation highlighted several observations derived from her research.
Dr. Loane began by dismissing a few myths and misunderstandings about Valley Forge (1777-78). First it is not a valley, but rather a rise in the terrain that served well as a wartime position only a short day's march from the larger enemy army that occupied Philadelphia. It was ‘an encampment' and not a ‘battle', as frequently referenced in many general articles. The associated minor engagements military actions took place some distance from the perimeters of the encampment – skirmishes between foraging parties and reconnaissance forays, such as Lafayette's ‘Barren Hill' maneuvers.
Our speaker described what Valley Forge of 1777-78 was: approximately 2,000 huts, about 14,000 [and probably as low as12,000] soldiers, wagons, horses, cattle – and, yes, about 400 women! The audience was reminded that Valley Forge (1777-78) was not the severest cold and deep snow scene depicted in some popular histories. Such were more descriptive of the later Morristown 1780 winter encampment. Valley Forge of 1777-78 was wet and muddy. Worse, it literally stunk! Sanitation and camp discipline were yet to be adopted into the Continental Army. Food was a struggle in this era before the quartermaster skills of General Greene.
However our speaker wanted to emphasize the women – a topic she focused upon as she researched Martha Washington. Not surprisingly, narrative histories identify several of the officers' wives who traveled hundreds of miles from their comfortable homes to be with their husbands. Certainly we admire Martha Washington, who traveled 10 days from Mount Vernon to be with 'The General' at Valley Forge, as she did for most of the winter encampments during the 8 year war. There was Catharine ['Caty'] Greene, Lucy Knox, and Lady Stirling. There was also Margaret Thomas, wife of ‘Billy' Lee [General Washington's slave man servant.]. Narrative histories rarely address the many nameless women: nurses, washerwomen, seamstresses, cooks and ‘others' – who have often been disparaged as the ‘camp followers'. Some evidence suggests that a Mary Hays – who would later be identified as ‘Molly Pitcher' was at Valley Forge with her husband. Records often referenced the ‘nurses' of soldiers had the same name as did the soldiers – which suggested that they were family members. Besides the wives and mothers of the enlisted soldiers and the volunteers who served in the ranks, there were women who traveled with Washington's 'military family' -- a contingent that essentially supported The General's 'headquarters'. The reality was that many of the women followed the army because they had nowhere else to go.
In the past few years, Dr. Loane has presented over 100 lectures in four states about the women at the Valley Forge encampment. She was a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Speaker for the 2006-2007, has appeared on two documentaries about the Valley Forge encampment, and has published four articles about the women at camp. She focuses on primary research, and has studied more than five hundred diaries, journals, letters, returns, orderly books, records, books and periodicals of the Revolutionary War period. She is a Founding member of the American Revolution Round Table of Philadelphia, a former seasonal Park Ranger at Valley Forge National Historical Park, and a former Associate Professor, Miami-Dade College (Florida). Even if you have heard one of Dr. Loane's talks, one should visit her website at: http://www.womenatvalleyforge.com/
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6 May 2009, "Mapping the American Revolution." The program was presented by W. Scott Smith, commander of the Department of the Geographer to the Army, 1777-1783, a military living history unit of the Brigade of the American Revolution that was founded in 2004. His presentation outlined the formation of Washington's mapmaking staff, described how this small department conducted their operations, and what instruments they used.
Mr. Smith described how The American Revolution created many technical and logistical issues for Congress' Army, including the need for both strategic and tactical level intelligence through the form of maps and surveys, as such matters were handled by the British military prior to the commencement of hostilities. Recognizing the challenge, Washington wrote to Congress in early 1777 that, "A good geographer to Survey the Roads and take Sketches of the Country where the Army is to Act would be extremely useful… …" The Continental Congress responded in July 25, 1777, with a Resolution"
..."That General Washington be empowered to appoint Mr. Robert Erskine, or any other person that he may think proper, geographer and surveyor of the roads, to take sketches of the country, the seat of war, and to have the procuring, governing and paying the guides employed under him; the General to affix the pay of the said geographer, &c. and the allowance that shall be made to the guides."...
Mr Smith emphasized that the Continental Army Geographers should not be confused with military engineers. Engineers were trained in the construction and reduction of fortifications, while Geographers (cartographers, surveyors, or topographical engineers) specialized in reconnaissance, mapmaking, and surveying distances. In the Continental Army, military engineers were generally recruited from Europe, whereas the geographers were generally able to find skilled surveyors in the colonies. More detail can be found in an excellent and well illustrated webpage article authored by Scott Smith at http://http://www.armygeographer.org/history/index.htm.
Mr. Smith's unit of the Brigade of the American Revolution has three regional survey parties based in Virginia, Ohio, and New York. Mr. Smith works for the Region 2000 Local Government Council (regional planning commission) in Lynchburg, VA, where he works in community planning, development, and project management. Mr. Smith is also Managing Partner of 'The Antiquaries, LC', an historic resources consulting firm. He serves on the City of Lynchburg Historic Preservation Commission; is President of the Virginia Downtown Development Association; and is the Southern Section Director for the Virginia Chapter of the American Planning Association.. With his wife Emily and son, Carter, Scott lives in a circa 1813 house in Lynchburg that they restored.
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4 March 2009, "A Striped Ensign in Philadelpia in 1754?". The program was presented by Peter Ansoff, member of the ARRT and former president of the North American Vexillological Association (NAVA), an international organization dedicated to the study of flags.
Mr. Ansoff described his search to solve a long standing puzzle confronting historians to explain how a 1754 engraving of the Philadelphia waterfront could show a ship anchored in the Delaware River, flying a flag with the union crosses in the canton and stripes in the field. [see image vdg.jpg]. This flag is generally recognized by historians as "Continental Colours" flown by American ships and forts during the first year and a half of the Revolution. However, the "Continental Colours" was not created until 1775, and the flag's appearance in an engraving made 21 years earlier presents a mystery. Mr. Ansoff's investigation spanned examining 18th century art and maritime history involving three continents. 
The first clue was to recognize that the flag flown at the ship's stern in the 1754 engraving was similar to the flags flown on ships of the British East India Company (EIC). Mr. Ansoff located a 1732 painting of an EIC ship in Bombay harbor which had a strong similarity to the ship in the 1754 engraving. Another feature also associated the image with the EIC is that the ship's bow was distinctively that of a "Bombay Grab" – typical for the regions in which the EIC operated, but not the North Atlantic. Further, EIC ships were not allowed to deploy to North America. So the question was now limited to why was this particular type of EIC ship in Philadelphia waters in 1754? The key to the mystery was an engraving of the Bombay painting that was made in 1736, by the same engraver who made the Philadelphia engraving 18 years later. Apparently, the engraver re-used the 1736 Bombay image to illustrate the Philadelphia engraving, a sort of 18th-century equivalent of "photoshopping." Mr. Ansoff discussed several details of the images that supported this conclusion. One interesting aspect of the transfer process
was that the engraver had to redo the flags to make them consistent with the wind direction in the Philadelphia engraving. Comparison shows that the
flags in the latter are much more simply and crudely depicted than their counterparts in the Bombay engraving. This presentation was published as an article in volume 15 of the NAVA's Raven, a Journal of Vexillology in 2008.
Mr. Ansoff is the former president of the North American Vexillological Association (NAVA), an international organization dedicated to the study of flags. He is particularly interested in the early history of the flag of the United States and other flags that were used during the Revolution. His is a member of ARRT, and spoke to us in 2005 about his analysis of the flag raising on Prospect Hill in January 1776. His article on that subject has since been published in the NAVA's Raven, and is available among a selection offered on the NAVA web site at http://www.nava.org/Flag%20Information/articles/Index.php.
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5 November 2008, " First Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry in the Revolutionary War.". The program was presented by Historian Joe Seymour, on the staff of the US Army Center of Military History. Mr. Seymour reviewed how the ‘First Troop' originated as a response of the a few select equestrian citizens of Philadelphia decided to form a ‘private cavalry unit in defense of the city even before open war [armed rebellion] broke out. The unit was organized on 17 November 1774, by 28 gentlemen who gathered in Carpenters' Hall and formed the ‘Light Horse of the City of Philadelphia', a name that was later changed to ‘First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry' (FTPCC) – often referred to as the ‘Philadelphia Light Horse'. The initial members were volunteers – many were businessmen and merchants who had sufficient financial means to supplied themselves with uniforms, military equipment and horses. Initially, the First Troop's mission was envisioned a reconnaissance role directed at defending Philadelphia and its immediate environs. Related duties would be escorted for payroll deliveries and prisoner transfers. It was this troop that escorted George Washington from Philadelphia to New York, as the General traveled to take command of the Continental Army assembled at Cambridge outside of Boston in June 1775.
The troop's first commander was Abraham Markoe, a prominent figure in Philadelphia who had previous Danish military experience. Markoe's brief tenure influenced the uniform of the unit, their prescribed equipment, and the design of the unit's standard. Markoe had been born in the Danish West Indies, where he continued to have plantations. These land holdings were threatened with confiscation by the King of Denmark who issued an edict prohibiting his subjects to rebel against the King of England. This forced Markoe resign his command in 1776. The Troop's next elected commander was Samuel Morris, a Quaker and president the Gloucester fox-hunting club, which comprised a dominant presence in the initial First Troop. Captain Morris led The Troop through the rest of the war. The Troop was mustered into Continental service in July 1776 as part of the ‘Flying Camp' in the New Jersey Campaign.
The presentation focused on The Troop's participation in General George Washington's master-stroke counteroffensive which culminated in the victories at Trenton (26 December 1776) and Princeton (3 January 1777). During the American Christmas night advance on Trenton, The Troop escorted General Washington and his staff. The battle next morning lasted less than an hour, resulting in capture of nearly a thousand Hessians and the loss of two Americans. The Troop served as the Army's rearguard as it re-crossed the Delaware, returning to the southwest. The Troop was with Washington when the Americans again crossed the Delaware to re-occupied Trenton on 30 December. As Lord Cornwallis moved his British army in position to attack the American encampment at Trenton, Washington slipped his Army away during a night march toward Princeton. Washington's strategic maneuver was almost exposed when a unit of British Dragoons came across and routed some American militia at the rear of the Continental Army. Fortunately the Philadelphia Light Horse was nearby and drove off the British Dragoons, allowing Washington's advance to continue unimpeded. At the Battle of Princeton, many of the Troop were at General Washington's side in a "fine Fox-chase" charge that routed three British regiments. Washington withdrew his Army to winter quarters at Morristown. During the march, The Troop engaged British advance patrols in a rear guard action that saved the American artillery train. After its return to Philadelphia the Troop engaged in months of arduous service. The Troop served under Maxwell's command at the Battle of Brandywine (11 Sep 1777) and assisted in maintaining communications during the unsuccessful Battle of Germantown (4 October 1777). With the British occupation of Philadelphia, The Troop served as detachments during the winter at the American Valley Forge encampment. One group narrowly escaped capture with General Lafayette and his small force when they were nearly surrounded in the woods at Barren Hill (May 1778). When the British withdrew from Philadelphia (18 June 1778), the Light Horse were the first troops to reenter the city with Major General Benedict Arnold.
First City Troopers have served in all of the American wars and are also notable for their civilian accomplishments as community leaders. More can be learned from their websites at: http://www.ftpcc.com/FTPCC/History.htm and http://www.firsttroop.com/.
Joe Seymour is an historian in the Unit Histories Branch, Field Programs Division, at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is a long-time member of the Army National Guard and of the Philadelphia First Troop. He is the author of the popular book "First Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry: Images of America: Philadelphia."
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3 September 2008, " The Peace Treaties of 3 September 1783.". The program was presented by Albert D. McJoynt, a military historian and member of the ARRT. It was noted that this program concluded a series of ARRT programs commemorating the 225th Anniversary of the American War for Independence, and that our ARRT program was being conducted on the very date the anniversary of these definitive treaties was being celebrated in Paris. Great Britain signed two separate treaties that essentially ended the War for American Independence. One treaty, signed in Paris, was with the new American Republic; the treaty, signed at nearby Versailles, was with the Kingdom of France -- the American's only official (by the treaty of 1778) wartime ally. Mr McJoynt announced that his focus would be on the negotiations associated with the 1783 Treaty of Paris both in terms as the events unfolded and as some controversial aspects of the peace negotiations are presented in many popular narrative American histories.
The speaker's opening remarks explained that the general public appears to have a vague understanding of the treaties that ended this epic struggle, and this may be in part due to misunderstanding when and how the war ended and American Independence was acknowledged by Great Britain. The audience was reminded of a recent TV miniseries on John Adams, wherein two scenes expressed prevailing misunderstandings about the war's end. One scene has John Adam's wife learning of the British surrender at Yorktown on October 1781 and immediately announces to her family that the ‘war is over'. The miniseries follows with some brief scenes of Adams' only successful initiative as a diplomat in Europe in The Netherlands during 1780-1782. Then in a remarkable truncating of time, Adam's wife joins him and Thomas Jefferson in Paris in 1784, and the script allows a brief reference to a peace treaty having been negotiated. The speaker observed that is was unfortunate that highly publicized TV production – proclaiming association with some popular historians – should contribute to further promotion of this myth, and ignore a critical phase in the American winning of Independence.
Of course the war did not end with, nor was American Independence achieved at Yorktown 1781. George Washington and other leaders at the time certainly knew otherwise, given that New York City and Charleston remained occupied by a British army that still outnumbered the allied American and French armies in North America. It would not be until late in 1782 before serious peace talks began and a formal peace that acknowledged American Independence was signed in Paris on 3 September 1783. The speaker believed that it was important for the general American public to be reminded of critical military/naval campaigns and diplomatic actions during the last years of the American War for Independence. The ARRT has committed two presentations to cover these topics as part of commemorating the 225th Anniversary of the war. The description of the global military and naval aspects of the American War for Independence form 1781 to 1783 were addressed in Mr. McJoynt's 4 April 2007 presentation to the ARRT: "After Yorktown, 1781: The 'War Beyond the Horizon'". Understanding any serious consideration of peace had to await until Britain, France, and Spain had exhausted themselves in the Caribbean, the western Mediterranean, and India before they were ready to end the conflict.
During 1782, Britain gained temporary relief in successfully warding off major assaults on Jamaica and Gibraltar, but these were tenuous outcomes if the war were to linger. Often misunderstood is that the British Parliament's vote in February 1782 against "further ... offensive" warfare in North America was not a recognition of American Independence – the fundamental objective of the Franco American Alliance of 1778. May British leaders envisioned some political accommodation whereby the colonies remained part of the Empire – somewhat as was done with Ireland. While many British histories of the war emphasize a few military and naval victories in 1782, the fact is that their empire was on the global strategic defensive and risked losing some possessions considered more valuable than the 13 colonies if the war continued. Britain not only failed to gain alliances (an essential element in her previous war with France), but witnessed even Holland (generally an historic ally of England) recognizing the United States in October 1782.
Mr McJoynt's talk for this September program took up the efforts when serious peace negotiations began in 1782 and then completed in 1783. His approach was to review the sequence of key events as outlined in his handout packet [listed below review]. Important issues affecting the negotiations were introduced during the presentation. The negotiations were complicated. There were complex challenges to resolve old boundary disputes as to what geographic limits defined the new American Republic (where to draw the lines between British Canada to the north, and Spanish possessions to the south and west?). Further, the Americans wanted rights to the Mississippi and fishing off Newfoundland. The British wanted Loyalists and English merchants re-compensated. The French had to persuade Spain to accept Minorca in place of Gibraltar, and to be satisfied with re-gaining Florida in place of Jamaica. While fundamentally tied [by the 1778 alliance] to obtain American Independence from England, the French aims [as specified in their 1778 alliance treaty] were to maintain their prewar positions in the West Indies and fishing rights off Newfoundland.
Equally as important as these negotiating issues were controversial personality conflicts among the negotiators. The British Government experienced forced turnovers in ministerial leaders from March to July of 1782, and then in April 1783. The internal British political discord was certainly no less disturbing than the questionable personality characteristics of the American negotiators – factors often omitted in popular historical narratives. In contrast to summary remarks addressing the treaty in popular American narrative histories, less widely read scholarly publications introduce an array of controversial initiatives injected in the negotiations by a jealous John Adams and a suspicious John Jay.
Adams' resented Franklin's success in obtaining and smoothly maintaining the French alliance, and sought to have himself be acclaimed as ‘the George Washington of diplomacy'. Jay's entrenched anti-Catholic bias was re enforced by his failed mission to obtain either recognition or meaningful money directly from the Spanish Government after two years in Madrid. When Jay joined the ill Franklin in Paris, he was predisposed to suspect deceit on the part of the French. Jay falsely – as historical records show – suspected the French were undercutting the American's claims in the forthcoming negotiations. Jay easily succumbed to British negotiators suggestions to break the alliance with France. Jay even invited the British to use their army in North America to retake Florida before the final peace was signed. Fortunately neither gambit succeeded. To a large degree, a special relationship between the two more skilled diplomats – Vergennes for France and Franklin for the Americans – managed to overcome the negative encumbrances injected by the other American negotiators.
Controversy about the treaty negotiations continues as found expressed by modern biographers and historians who report on the peace negotiations of 1782-1783. While they may agree as to dates of specific events, historians seem to lean toward different ‘spins' as to what was really unfolding. Perceptions and delusions entered in the memoirs and biographies of some icons among the American Founders have been used by many modern editors and authors to suggest that the ‘militia diplomacy' conducted by Jay and Adams in 1782-1783 was "a kind of Yankee morality play." The speaker did not proceed into the debate further, but called attention to the list of ‘sources' in the handout package [see below]. For this last controversy one can examine: The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787. By Jonathan R. Dull. (Princeton University Press); and Lawrence S. Kaplan's review of Professor Dull's work in "Diplomacy of the American Revolution: the Perspective from France" printed in Reviews in American History (September 1976, The Johns Hopkins University Press).
Unfortunately, many modern authors leave unexamined the contemporary writings of the negotiators and diplomats which distort the actual motives and intentions of diplomats. Contrary to Adams' claims that the French wanted the war to continue, Vergennes was doing all he could to bring and end to the conflict. French communications that expressed reservations in supporting some of the American geographical border delineations were due to the French minister's doubts that the British would agree, and the dispute would only prolong the war. The French minister never faltered in supporting American Independence. When he learned of the separate preliminary articles of treaty signed between the British with the Americans in November 1782, Vergennes expressed his disappointment with the American negotiators furtiveness but complimented the Americans on acquiring far better arrangements with the British than he had thought possible. The French Diplomat's real sentiments were reflected in forwarding the Americans another large loan.
Mr. McJoynt has spoken previously to the ARRT about the French participation in the American Revolution, and in particular on events being commemorated during the 225th Anniversary of the Yorktown victory and less publicized subsequent developments. His most recent presentation was in April 2007 on "After Yorktown, 1781: the 'War Beyond the Horizon'" that explain the global aspects of the war between October 1781 and the start of serious peace negotiations in September 1782. Earlier presentations to the ARRT were: 5 April 2006, on "Allied Strategic Decisions and Actions Leading to the Yorktown Campaign in 1781; and 5 February 2003, on "The French-American Alliance Treaty of 1778". He authors the website for the Expédition Particulière Commemorative Cantonment Society.
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7 May 2008, "Tarleton's Charlottesville Raid, 1781". The program was presented by Dr. John R. Maass, Ph.D, on the staff of the US Army Center of Military History The speaker began with a brief background of Banastre Tarleton, who was born in 1754.
In 1775 Tarleton purchased a commission in the 1st Dragoon Guards, where he proved to be a fine horseman and an aggressive leader. He deployed with the British army to America in 1775. The speaker emphasized that Tarlton was a relatively young officer, which might explain both his energetic performance and daring, but at times hasty mis-carried actions. During the 1780 British campaign in South Carolina, Tarleton commanded the ‘British Legion' -- a mixed force of cavalry and light infantry. At times, Tarleton's immaturity prevailed over any benefit his dynamic prowess may have derived from his swift moving mounted troops. Atrocities were attributed to him that incited anti-British sentiments among many who had been relatively neutral in support of the Revolution. His actions inspired the famous Rebel rallying cry of "Tarleton's quarter"– meaning no quarter would be offered to British and Loyalist Soldiers.
Tarlton served Cornwallis well in the campaign of 1780. However, in January 1781, Tarleton's force took a ‘whipping' at the Battle of Cowpens in South Carolina, where Tarleton was out maneuvered in an open tactical engagement. The dashing cavalry leader fled, leaving his surrounded men to their fate. This ‘embarrassment' contributed to Cornwallis' fruitless pursuit to defeat the American Southern Army under the nimble leadership of General Nathanael Greene. The effort ended unsuccessfully with the Cornwallis' Pyrrhic victory at Guilford Court House (March1781), North Carolina. Tarlton remained with Cornwallis, who after refitting his British army at Wilmington, North Carolina, launched a campaign to subdue Virginia.
Upon entering Virginia in May 1781, Cornwallis was confronted by a small American force of a few Continentals and some militia under the command of the French volunteer, General Lafayette. The young Marquis surprised almost everyone – except perhaps General George Washington, who made the daring decision to give Lafayette the command. Though 3 years younger than Tarlton, Lafayette proved to be an astute military leader, managing to evade being outmaneuvered by the larger British army commanded by the experienced Cornwallis – considered by many as one of the better British senior officers deployed to America in the war.
The Speaker's topic centered on what happened after Cornwallis reached Cook's Ford [a point on the North Anna River, north west of Hanover Junction (today's Doswell)] on 30 May, abandoned the fruitless pursuit of Lafayette and altered his objective. Cornwallis directed Lt. Col. Tarlton to raid Charlottesville (about 60 miles to the west) and nearby Monticello, so as to capture then-Governor Thomas Jefferson and to disrupt the meeting of the Virginia legislature. Dr. Maass conducts guided tours of this historic event, which was reflected in his detailed account of the raid. Since many of the 1781 Virginia locations have changed names, or vanished from modern maps, the speaker's handout maps were most welcome in tracking the events.
On 3 June, Tarleton departed the British camp 180 cavalrymen and 70 mounted infantry. The British raiders moved along the main route, via Louisa CH, Boswell's Tavern, and Castle Hill. Tarleton's force rode into Louisa County the evening of 3 June. A Captain John Jouett of the Virginia militia, who was visiting his father's home [or as some versions relate, Jouett was asleep on the lawn of the Cuckoo Tavern – also known as ‘Pendeldon's Tavern'] heard the approaching cavalry. Jouett recognized the troops as British, and correctly suspected this was an intended raid on undefended Charlottesville to capture members of Virginia's government. Jouett mounted his horse at about 10 P.M. to ride the 40 miles from Louisa to Charlottesville. He took a backwoods route to the south of the main road that the British were expected to take. Fortunately, there was a full moon and Jouett was familiar with the trail. It was also fortunate that Tarlton did not push his march as fast as he could have. The British rested as Louisa CH from 11 PM to 2 AM of 4 June. Tarleton's raiders encountered and burnt some supply wagons bound for Nathanael Greene's American army in South Carolina.
Around dawn, Tarleton reached the plantations of Castle Hill and Belvoir, where the British captured some important figures -- including Daniel Boone, a legislator from what would become Kentucky. Legend has it that Doctor Thomas Walker connived to detain Tarlton at his home at Castle Hill with a slowly prepared breakfast. Tarleton's account says he paused at Castle Hill for only a half-hour. Whatever, this was about 4:30 AM in the morning when Jouett reached Monticello to warn Jefferson and his guests of several more Virginia legislators. Jouett then rode on two further miles to warn the town of Charlottesville. Jefferson was casual about departing his home -- reportedly sharing breakfast with his guests and not departing until the British detachment led by Captain Kenneth McLeod entered the front lawn of Monticello.
Departing Monticello, Jouett rode to the Swan Tavern (owned by Jouett's father) where most of legislators were staying. The legislators fled and reconvened 3 days later in Staunton, 35 miles west. Jouett's warning allowed most legislators to escape. The capture of seven legislators and the dispersing the Assembly could qualify Tarleton's raid a partial success. However, more successful was a concurrent raid Cornwallis directed in sending Simcoe's loyalist legion, the Queen's Rangers (300 men), to attack the Rebel supply depot at Point of Fork [now ‘Columbia', where the Fluvanna and Rivanna join to form the James River]. On 5 June Simcoe forced Steuben, who had only a small force of recruits, to abandon Point of Fork. While the Tarleton and Simcoe raids were being executed, Cornwallis led the rest of his army towards Goochland CH to destroy supplies stored there. On 9 June Tarleton joined Cornwallis at Elk Hill, a plantation owned by Jefferson, located 30 miles SE of Charlottesville. Here the British engaged in wanton destruction of livestock and buildings. This essentially ended the spaker's main theme.
The speaker's summation explained that Cornwallis led his army back to Williamsburg. The maneuvering between Cornwallis and Lafayette continued and merged into the decisive Yorktown Campaign of 1781. Tarleton returned to England, enjoyed a successful political career, eventually became a full general in the British army, and was awarded knighthood in 1820. He fought to maintain the slave trade in England and died in 1833.
Dr. John R. Maass holds a B.A. from Washington and Lee University and an M.A. in history from UNC-Greensboro. His Doctorate is in Early American History, from Ohio State University (2007), and his dissertation was on Revolutionary N.C. He is also an Editorial Assistant for The Journal of Backcountry Studies, and served on several committees associated with the preservation of the Camden, SC battleground. Dr. Maass has authored: "All this Poor Province Could Do: North Carolina and
the Seven Years War, 1757-1762," which was in the North Carolina Historical Review (January 2002); "To Disturb the Assembly: Tarleton's Charlottesville Raid and the British Invasion of Virginia, 1781," in Virginia Cavalcade (Autumn 2000); and "That Unhappy Affair:" Horatio Gates and the Battle of Camden (published in 2001).
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The 7 June "Tarleton's Charlottesville Raid of 1781" day bus tour sponsored by the ARRT of Richmond was sold out well in advance. However, a September 1781 trip is being planned and anyone interested can contact Dr. Maass directly at his Ft. McNair office: 202-685-2337.
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Of interest are the following:
Dr. Maass' article on Tarleton published in the Autumn 2000 issue of Virginia Cavalcade magazine at http://fusilier.wordpress.com/banastre-tarleton-article-2000/
and a report [with photos] of Dr. Maass' June 2008 tour Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton's June 1781 raid at http://fusilier.wordpress.com/2008/06/09/tarleton-tour-08/
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2 April 2008, "Suffren's 1781-1783 Naval Campaign in Indian Ocean". The program was presented by David Bongard, long time ARRT member. The presentation focused on the French admiral Pierre Andre de Suffren Saint-Tropez's remarkable naval campaign in Indian Ocean between 1781 and 1783. The speaker used handouts of a timeline of the major events in the admiral's life and a map of the campaign area for 1782-83 in the Bay of Bengal, western Indian Ocean along the Coromandel Coast.
Mr Bongard provided a brief review of Suffren's career and noted that he was among the younger French naval leaders at the time. Being from a noble family in Provence, he rotated naval service between the Order of Malta, cruising against the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean, becoming a Knight and Commander within that Order; and alternatively service in the Royal French navy when France was at war. He saw action against the English in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and Seven Years' War (1756-1763) before the War for American Independence, which France formally engaged against England in 1778. He was made a prisoner in the first war, and took part in capturing English held Minorca in the second war before again being mad a prisoner.
Suffren took part in a series naval training exercises designed to improve naval tactics and part of the post Seven Years' War reforms inaugurated by the new French Navy Minister, Castries. Suffren commanded a ship in d'Estaing's 1778-1779 deployment to North America and Caribbean. Though Suffren was outspoken in criticizing d'Estaing's naval competence, it was d'Estaing who recommended Suffren receive command of a squadron that deployed in 1781 to aid the French war effort in India, with an additional task to aid the Dutch outpost at the Cape of Good Hope. It was this expedition, wherein, Suffren gained his reputation as an aggressive naval commander. Enroute to The Cape of Good Hope, he took advantage of the poorly anchored British squadron he discovered Porto Praya, in the Portuguese Cape Verde islands. The French attack so seriously damaged the large British force, that Johnstone failed to succeed in the British planned assault against the Dutch port at the Cape. Arriving at Isle de France (Mauritius), Suffren assumed command of the French squadron that he led to the Bay of Bengal, where he engaged a British fleet under admiral Sir Edward Hughes in a series of naval battles until June of 1783, when news arrived of the Peace Treaty having been signed earlier in the year.
Mr Bongard described in detail four naval actions that took place in 1782 and 1783. Three indecisive naval actions took place in 1782: on 17 February off Madras (or Sadras); 6 April off Providien (Trincomalee); 6 August, off Cuddalore (Negapatam). Suffren managed to maintained his squadron without the help of a port to refit until landing a force that captured Trincomalee in late August 1782. In early September, Suffren drove off Hughes' attempt to retake Trincomalee. In June 1783, Suffren again repelled Hughes' squadron off Cuddalore allowing the French and their Indian ally land force to captured that port town. Soon after news of the Peace arrived and Suffren returned to France a hero. He was awarded the rank of vice-admiral of France that was created for him. He had been promoted bailli in the Order of Malta during his absence. His death occurred suddenly on 8 December 1788, though there later surfaced a rumor that he might have been killed in a duel. The speaker was asked where was Suffren buried. The answer is that Suffren was buried in Paris, in a chapel of the Chevaliers de Malte had there. It was probably in the Eglise du Temple, which was destroyed and ransacked during the French Revolution. The post presentation discussion also addressed how Suffren's operations illustrated the global reach of the American War for Independence – to regions were no Americans were involved.
Mr. Bongard is a past president of the ARRT and a current member of the Executive Committee. He has spoken to the Roundtable before on "The Care and Feeding of Armies and Fleets" for the March 1999 program, and "The Logistics of the Continental Army" for the October 1994 program. Mr. Bongard is a published military historian. His article on Suffren is among others he contributed to the International Military and Defense Encyclopedia (Brasseys, 1993). Dave has particular interest in a range of historical and military topics, including the history of food (and drink), coastal, amphibious, and riverine naval and military operations, oar-powered naval warfare, and the evolution of military and tactical organization.
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5 March 2008, "Rebellion in the Ranks, Mutinies of the American Revolution.". The program was presented by John A. Nagy member of the ARRT of Philadelphia and author of the recently published book Rebellion in the Ranks Mutinies of the American Revolution, The speaker began with a general overview, explaining that a ‘mutiny' are to be distinguished from mere ‘disorderly conduct'. His research found that mutinies in the American Revolutionary armies were usually traced to command and control problems; expirations of service commitment [enlistments were for specified periods]; accumulated grievances over inadequate provisions of food, clothing, and pay. Instigation due to infiltration of spies were rare. His book Rebellion in the Ranks, which was available for purchase at the meeting, covered over 110 mutinies in the American ranks. For this Mr. Nagy briefly addressed about 12 events that were listed on his PowerPoint slides.
Mr. Nagy began with an interesting introduction to mutinies experienced aboard the Continental Navy's warship Alliance, commanded by the erratic French naval captain Pierre Landais. Most in the audience were familiar with notorious incident during the famous September 1779 encounter between John Paul Jones' Bonhomme Richard and the British Serapis, during which Landais directed broadside fire from the Alliance against its allied ship the Bonhomme Richard. However, it seems that under Landais' command the Alliance experienced a mutiny in early 1779 during the voyage that took Lafayette back to France. Though Franklin removed Landais from command of the Alliance after the Bonhomme Richard incident. A spiteful Arthur Lee overrode Franklin and placed Landais back in command of the Alliance that was taking Lee back to America in 1780. Landais' behavior forced another near mutiny, which finally ended the Frenchman's career in the US service. The speaker noted that there were many naval mutinies, but only quickly noted one other in the Virginia State navy in 1776.
The rest of the program topics dealt with army mutinies. George Washington had experienced mutinies during his service in the French and Indian War and was prepared to deal swiftly with them. At the Siege of Boston, in September 1775, Washington confronted a mutiny of ‘over the mountain' riflemen at Prospect Hill (Cambridge). Washington's approach to the mutinies was to punish the authors of the mischief – inflict instant punishment – and reclaim the rest by clemency. This guidance was generally followed by the American commanders as they had some empathy with the grievances of the rank and file, and the officers desired to retain the initial loyalty of their troops. The speaker quickly touched on the famous 1781 mutinies of the Pennsylvania Line (1-10 January) and the New Jersey Line (20-25 January). In summation, the speaker noted that the mutinies were led and incited by sergeants and reflected resentment within the ranks as to failures in the senior military and political authorities in providing the necessary basic support. Many commissioned officers sympathized with the grievances, but were obligated to take necessary actions to quell the disruptions. In the case of commissioned officers, the very few problems were treason – Benedict Arnold being the notorious case. The question arose as how to classify the March 1783 incident at New Windsor camp, where Washington was able to quell a near revolt of the senior officers due to failed back pay and Congress cutting promised pensions. The speaker admitted this was a close call, but it failed the ‘mutiny' classification test in that it never evolved into overt action.
Mr. Nagy is an expert in antiques and antique manuscripts and is also a consultant for the Clements Library at the University of Michigan and has appeared on the History Channel. Mr. Nagy was the founder of the American Revolutionary Roundtable in Philadelphia and is its current president. His book, titled the same as the presentation, is available in bookstores. See link to the Philadelphia ARRT website from the ARRT DC gateway page.
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11 February 2008, "George Washington's Revolutionary War Letters.". The program was presented by Edward G. Lengel, associate professor at University of Virginia and an editor of the Papers of George Washington, who explained the significance of his recent book This Glorious Struggle: George Washington's Revolutionary War Letters. This work contains some of Washington's most important and interesting wartime correspondence – from among about 140,000 personal and official documents written during the Revolutionary War. The selection includes several letters never published before. Those who are familiar with Lengel's earlier, excellent book, General George Washington: A Military Life (2005) can be assured that the professor is well qualified to make a judicious selection of representative letters to illustrate insightful moments in General Washington's epic career. As Lengel explained his selection was meant to reveal a broad scope of Washington's character and several of the letters exhibit some surprisingly candid observations about the General's wife and family, friends, Congress, fellow soldiers, and war opponents. In essence, Lengel's theme was to explain that Washington is portrayed as such a towering figure in so many historical narratives that the true measure of the man is obscured as a superficial symbol, and that the best way to know the real George Washington is to read what he wrote. Fortunately Washington's fine prose makes reading his letters a rewarding, as well as educational, experience. The lecture was followed by a reception and book signing. Most of the tightly packed audience was eager to purchase a copy of Professor's Lengel's book and it became necessary for the program sponsors to rush out and procure more copies from a nearby book store to satisfy the demand.
Dr. Lengel's previous programs to the ARRT were on 7 September 2005, the topic was "General George Washington: A Military Life;" and 1 September 1999, the topic was "The George Washington Papers and the Battle of Brandywine." His work has received praising reviews in journals and newspapers as well as by members of the ARRT. He took some time of his 11 February 2008 program to address the challenges faced by the Papers of George Washington Project and to explain efforts making Washington's documents more accessable on line. More information can be found at The Papers of George Washington website is at http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/.
It should be noted that the this February 2008 program was a change [date and location] from the regular ARRT of DC venue, in that interested ARRT members were invited to attend an event hosted by Gadsby's Tavern Museum, 134 North Royal Street, in Alexandria, Virginia. The ARRT appreciates the museum's society sharing their event. Gadsby's Tavern Museum's website is at http://www.gadsbystavern.org .
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5 December 2007, "The Green Water Revolution: Naval Warfare on the Waters of the Southern Chesapeake Bay during the American Revolution." The program was presented by Dr. Thomas C. Long, PhD, professorial lecturer in history and international affairs at The George Washington University; and member of the ARRT of DC., Dr. Long began his presentation by describing the 20-21 April 1775 night raid of British sailors that seized the gunpowder supplies at Williamsburg, Virginia, as directed by the Royal Governor of colony, John Murray, Fourth Earl of Dunmore. The speaker explained that Dunmore, was following London issued directives, received in early February, instructing the royal governors to interdict the flow of arms into the colonies; as well as reacting to the events of the Second Virginia Convention (held in Richmond on 20 March 1775), wherein Patrick Henry made his impassioned speech ("Give me liberty, or give me death") and called for military preparations against the British in support of concurrent incidents of rebellion taking place in the northern colonies. In Massachusetts, the British authorities had already seized militia gunpowder weapons' stores at Salem (February 1775) and attempted the same at Concord (19 April). Employing British army units from their sizable garrison at Boston, the British were only partly successful in Massachusetts as they met armed resistence and were forced back to their garrison. Most narrative accounts of the American Revolution focus on the dramatic developments following the Lexington-Concord opening shots in the war that were ‘heard around the world', leading to the siege of Boston in June 1775. The ARRT's speaker addressed the war's lesser known early engagements of the Rebellion in Virginia, and described operational trends in this theater up until the final climatic campaign of 1781. While Lord Dunmore succeeded in seizing the Williamsburg gunpowder, he was immediately confronted by outraged local citizens. Fearing mob violence, Dunmore sent his family aboard a British warship on 30 April. Virginia Rebel militia, led by Patrick Henry, marched on Willliamsburg on 4 May. The royal Governor 'outlawed' Henry on 6 May, but was forced to ‘reimburse' the colony's citizens for the seized powder, explaining that his action was taken it to prevent a rumored slave uprising.
Geography played a particular role in influencing early events of the Revolution in Virginia lower Chesapeake Bay area. Williamsburg, the seat of the British colonial government in Virginia, was located in a region marked by the confluence of rivers emptying into the lower Chesapeake Bay – a large part of the region known as the ‘Virginia Tidewater'. The many rivers and associated swamp lands restricted overland the movements of regular troops and militias. The navigation of naval warships were restricted by narrow and shallow river ways, where smaller water craft [‘boats', barges, and oar-powered galleys] provided the most effective means of conveying combatants. Such geography dictated adapting to amphibious operations – conditions intuitively understood by the civilian-merchants and watermen that made up the ‘state navy' in service of the Virginia Rebel ‘militias'. The Virginia British Royal Governor had only a small number of army troops and a few – eight at most – British warships at his disposal. Employing British naval marines, launched from war ships and transported ashore in boats, was Lord Dunmore's principle tactical option in subduing the Rebellion.
Dunmore's pleas for a more robust British naval presence in the southern Chesapeake were ignored by the senior British military and naval commanders in North America who were focused on the disturbances in their immediate northeastern theater. On 8 June 1775, the Virginia Royal Governor re-locate his entire seat of governemnt to join his family aboard the HMS Fowley. By Fall of 1775, Lord Dunmore attempted to moved his headquarters and assembled Loyalists south of the James River to Norfolk, where he expect to find larger Tory support and make use of the nearby shipyards at Portsmouth and Gosport. On October, 24-25 Oct, Dunmore sent forces to the northern shore of the James in an attempt to destroy Rebel stores at Hampton. The venture was repelled by strong Rebel rifle fire from the shore, and a humiliating loss of some British ships. The Governor declared Martial Law (7 Nov) and offered to free Rebel-owned slaves and indentured servants to serve in his volunteer army of Loyalist supported by a few British regulars. The Governor's forces won a skirmish on 14 November, at Kemp's Landing (now Kempsville, southeast of Norfolk). Dunmore launched raids, seizing the colonial press in Norfolk and emancipating the slaves in the surrounding countryside. About 20 miles south of Norfolk, Lord Dunmore constructed a stockade fort near the tiny village of Great Bridge, a small island in the southern Branch of the Elizabeth River, twelve miles southeast of Norfolk – a location chosen to block the main road between Virginia and North Carolina in the midst of an otherwise vast swampland. A Patriot Virginia Regiment constructed a breastwork on the southern bank of the river. A narrow causeway connected the two opposing camps. With grenadiers in front, supported by two cannon, the British launched two frontal assaults across the narrow causeway on 9 December, and suffered serious casualties – losing a number of commanding officers – from unexpected massed Rebel rifle fire. The disaster forced Dunsmore to withdraw from Norfolk. In departing, on 1 January 1776, the British naval artillery barraged the town to destroy stores being seized by the Virginia Patriot forces.
Increasing numbers of Patriot forces dominated the shores of the Elizabeth and James Rivers, thus denying food and water to Dunmor's ever growing ‘Floating Town' of evacuating Loyalists. On 25 May 1776, Dunmore's ‘fleet', numbering some 100 ships, roughly 700 soldiers and nearly 2,000 Royalists, sailed from the Hampton Roads and out into the Bay. Bearing north, they landed at Gwynn's Island, a small strip of sand and scraggly trees near the confluence of the Piankatank River into the Chesapeake. Virginia Patriot forces continued to harass the expanding number of Tories fleeing the mainland and gathering on the island,. In August 1776, scarcity of food and water, outbreak of smallpox in the crowded Tory camp, along with the advancing summer heat, forced Dunmore to lead his Tories and British troops out from the Chesapeake.
The speaker emphasized that the 1775-1776 Virginia campaign revealed some inescapable aspects of military and naval operations in the lower Chesapeake Bay. The conditions continued as the British launched raids into the colony in an effort to destroy the tobacco holdings and maritime smuggling trade that helped to sustain the Rebellion. The speaker summarized these two British raids. In May 1779, Admiral Collier's British fleet brought 1,800 troops led by General Matthews into the bay. The British raid managed to burn Portsmouth's shipyard. Suffolk and the surrounding towns also suffered. The raid exposed Virginia's military weakness and the caused the state capital to be relocated inland to Richmond. The state navy managed to save many assets by moving further up river streams and out of reach of larger war ships. The raid alerted Virginia militia to be better prepared for the next raid that came in October 1780, led by British Major General Leslie with 2,500 troops and orders to destroy Rebel stores at Richmond and Petersburg. Apparently Leslie perceived the venture not worth the effort and he departed Virginia in mid November to join Cornwallis in the Carolinas. At about the same time, General Von Steuben arrived in Richmond to take command of all Patriot military forces in Virginia. The speaker summarized these two British raids as Collier's being devastating in aggressively attacking the Virginia militia and infrastructure; whereas, Leslie simply waited for orders, failed to establish a permanent post in the Hampton Roads area, conducted no serious raids and did little damage.
Evidence of this assessment is found in observing the effectiveness of British Brigadier General Benedict Arnold's late December 1781arrival in the Chesapeake Bay with 27 ships and an expeditionary force of about 1,600. The typically energetic Arnold launched a dynamic campaign, moving aggressively up the James River pushing aside the Virginia militia and burning parts of Richmond. The same fate was in store for Petersburg. The speaker emphasized that Arnold's effectiveness was his skill in conducting amphibious warfare and dynamic leadership. Arnold's aggressive offensive pushed seamlessly over land and water, effectively reduced the Virginia naval assets and out maneuvered the colony's militia.
Dr. Long did not address details of 1781, but noted that Arnold's incursion into Virginia reflected Collier's aggressiveness and had the advantage of orders that permitted him to stay. Arnold's 'invasion' of Virginia compelled Washington to deploy a force of Continentals to the theater, Almost concurrently, Clinton reinforced Arnold with more British troops. An escalation continued as Cornwallis entered Virginia in April 1781 with more British forces. French naval assets began to deploy to the lower Chesapeake Bay, eventually leading to major naval operations between British and French fleets. The increased concentration of larger and naval fleets, dramatically changing the theater and evolved into the well known Yorktown Campaign of 1781.
The speaker summarized by noting that the British leadership in London was late in appreciating importance of the Chesapeake Bay in the War. Equally, the southern Chesapeake theater and related operations of the Royal Navy and the Colonial state navies have been overlooked in most historical narratives of the war. The speaker reminded the audience that modest resources of the Royal Navy were engaged in the region from the earliest days of the war. He quickly reviewed the ventures of HMS Fowey (24 guns), an ageing frigate, that supported Lord Dunmore in his escape from Williamsburg and in his subsequent campaign. The Fowey participated in operations from Boston to Savannah. In 1780, she accompanied Benedict Arnold up the James River on his second offensive against central Virginia, and participated in the final defense of Yorktown, where she was scuttled on 13 October 1781. Eight British warships took part in Chesapeake wartime operations . They ranged from the schooner Magdalen (14 guns) to the two-decker Roebuck (50-guns). Only two of the British ships survived the war. The Royal Navy was opposed by the fifty-two craft and roughly 1,800 men of the Virginia Navy. The state navy included oar-powered galleys and ocean-going three-masted ships --- some of which sailed to France and the Caribbean in service to the colony.
Dr. Long is a native of Denver, with a fascination for the sea. He graduated from Dartmouth College in 1965 in mathematics and then served in the United States Navy. After Harvard Law School (1970), while he practiced corporate and banking law until his retirement at the end of 1998, he pursued his interest in military history as an amateur historian. He received his Ph.D. in naval and colonial history from The George Washington University in 2005. He has conducted extensive research on both the Virginia and Royal Navies of the period. He is an assistant professorial lecturer in history and international affairs at The George Washington University, where he teaches Colonial America, the Era of the Revolution, Military History, Naval History, Strategy and Policy, and America and the Wars in Indochina (1945-1975). He also taught at St. Mary's College of Maryland in 2005 and 2006. He resides in Great Falls, Virginia with wife Susan.
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7 November 2007, "'Give Them as Much Trouble as You Possibly Can': The Battle of Cooch's Bridge, 3 September 1777." The program was presented by Mr. Wade P. Catts, an Associate Director of Cultural Resources with John Milner Associates in their West Chester office. Cooch's Bridge was the opening action of the fall 1777 Philadelphia campaign, and the only American Revolutionary War battle fought on Delaware soil. The engagement was short and spirited as the newly formed American Light Infantry Corps attempted to delay the a more powerful vanguard of the British army and allow the American army more time to establish a stonger defensive position to protect Philadelphia. Mr. Catts' illustrated lecture presented information, based upon on going research, regarding the composition of the American forces and the advanced guard of the British Army that was marching from Head of Elk (now Elk Landing), Maryland, to take the American Rebel's Capitol city. The presentation used contemporary accounts to reconstruct how the landscape influenced the course of the battle, to placed the battle's outcome in the broader context of the campaign, and to explain how generations of Delawarean's view the battle in the context of their state's history. One unusual aspect of the episode wase General Washington's ad hoc creation, late in August, of a light infantry corps under the Brigadier General William Maxwell – a necessity since Morgan's Rifles had been sent to the Northern Department to confront the advance of Burgoyne's British army descending upon Albany, New York. The battle also inspired a legend that the recently adopted 'Stars and Stripes' reportedly made one of its earliest appearances in this event – a thesis that the speaker find unlikely
For an excellent review of the full presentation, please visit the webpage of the Delaware Society of the Sons of the American Revolution posted at http://www.rsar.org/military/cooch.pdf.
This is Adobe Acrobat Reader file is an excellent article by Ralph Nelson that was pubished in The SAR Magazine (Fall 2003): "Give Them as Much Trouble as You Possibly Can", a presentation by Wade Catts on Aug 23, 2002 for the 225th anniversary of the Battle of Cooch's Bridge.
Mr. Catts is a Registered Professional Archeologist, and has worked in the field of cultural resource management for over twenty-five years. His Revolutionary War historical and archeological experience spans several states. In Pennsylvania he has worked at Valley Forge and the site of Camp Security, a British POW camp near York. In New Jersey his work has included researched at Morris County's Beverwyck Plantation – where Washington, his officers, and the French ambassadors were entertained – and at Raritan Landing, where British forces cantoned during the winter-spring of 1777. A long-time resident of Newark, he earned a Master's degree in American History from the University of Delaware in 1988. He is a member of Society for Historical Archeology, the Council for Northeast Historical Archeology, the Company of Military Historians (US), and the Society for Army Historical Research (UK). With the assistance of a McKinstry Award from the Delaware Heritage Commission, he is completing a book of The History and Archeology of The Battle of Cooch's Bridge, Delaware's only Revolutionary War Engagement.
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3 October 2007, "John Jay: Peripatetic Revolutionary." The program was presented by Mr. Walter B. Stahr, an international lawyer and author of John Jay: Founding Father (Hambledon & London, 2005). Mr. Stahr
chose the title 'Peripatetic' Revolutionary to emphasize the many different places Jay worked and visited during the Revolution which included: upstate New York, Philadelphia, Madrid, Paris, and London. The time period Mr. Stahr covered roughly spanned the fall of 1774, when Jay participated in the First Continental Congress, through the summer of 1784, when Jay returned to the United States from his long service abroad.
Jay participated in the First Continental Congress, which he attended with little intention of taking the Rebellion as far as Independence. He hopped that the British would ‘re-think' their unpopular policies. Reluctant to call for Independence, Jay drafted the ‘Olive Branch Petition' and sought re-establishment. He often saw the revolution as a ‘civil war'. Jay did not sign the Declaration of Independence. Nevertheless, when the rupture occurred, Jay threw himself in to serving the Colonists' cause. As a trained lawyer, he was called upon to undertake a variety of assignments. Initially he was sent to Connecticut to get cannon from foundries. He was an active member of the Continental Congress' secret ‘Conspiracies Committee', to gather counter-intelligence on British and Loyalist activities.
Jay served as the first chief justice of the New York Supreme Court from April 1777 to December 1778, when he went to Philadelphia and was elected President of the Continental Congress.
In 1779 he, accompanied by his wife Sara, Jay was sent to represent the US Congress at Madrid. He failed to obtain Spanish recognition for the US and received less that desired financial aid. In June 1781 he was sent to Paris to join in the peace negotiations. With Adams, Jay prevailed over Franklin to negotiate separately with British. The resulting Preliminary treaty managed to obtain very favorable Western boundaries for the US.
In 1784 Jay returned to the US and served as the second Secretary of Foreign Affairs, an office which after 1789 became Secretary of State. He argued for a more effective government structure than The Articles of Confederation and co-wrote the Federalist Papers with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. Though he did not attend the Constitutional Convention, Jay supported its adoption. He served on the U.S. Supreme Court as the first Chief Justice of the United States from 1789 to 1795. In 1794 he negotiated the controversial Jay Treaty (1795) with the British. A leader of the new Federalist party, Jay was elected Governor of New York state, 1795-1801. He was the leading opponent of slavery and the slave trade in New York, and finally succeeded in 1799 in obtaining a law that eventually emancipated the slaves of New York. Jay was offered a spot on the Supreme Court by President Adams, but Jay declined and retired from public life. He died in 1829.
Walter Stahr is an international lawyer who grew up in Arcadia and Newport Beach. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Stanford University in 1978 and cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1982. Since graduation, he has lived and worked in Washington, DC, and Hong Kong.
He now works for Emerging Markets Partnership in Washington, DC, and lives, with his wife and two children, in Northern Virginia.
He has a longstanding interest in the history of the American Revolution, and his biography on Jay has been most favorably reviewed:
"Stahr has succeeded splendidly in his aim of recovering the reputation of John Jay as a major founder. His biography is a reliable and clearly written account [and] makes a persuasive case for including Jay among the first rank of Revolutionary leaders." -- Gordon S. Wood in the New York Review of Books.
"Walter Stahr's even-handed account, the first big biography of Jay in decades, is riveting on the matter of negotiating tactics, as practiced by Adams, Jay and Franklin." -- The Economist.
"Stahr's Jay is a welcome and worthy biography." -- The Sunday Times (London).
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5 September 2007, "Why Did American Revolutionaries Join Freemasonry?." The program was presented by Mr. Mark Allen Tabbert, Director of Collections, George Washington Masonic National Memorial The speaker briefly reviewed the origins of Freemasonry. After the formation of the First [Premier] Grand Lodge of England, in 1717, the history of Freemasonry is sufficiently documented so as to trace the creation of hundreds of Grand Lodges that spread rapidly in Europe and in the North American Colonies. Before this date, and aside from scattered documentation of lodges in Scotland and England in the late seventeenth early eighteenth centuries, the origins of Freemasonry are based upon theories and legends.
Freemasonry is often misunderstood by the general public. Such misunderstanding is partly due to its members being sworn to secrecy about certain rituals. However, membership is not secret and the Freemasons are very active in promoting many public charitable deeds. Freemasonry is not a religion, nor is it a secret or a political organization. It is a ‘brotherhood' [or fraternity] organization structured around ‘lodges' that are affiliated globally by an allegiance to a code of conduct emphasizing positive morale values. The values which the Freemasons espoused emphasized religious tolerance (though believe in a ‘Supreme Being'– otherwise general ‘deism' – was considered essential). Freemasons are to seek self improvement – many of the rituals serving as guides in such a pursuit -- and to aid and assist ‘brethren' members.
Probably one of the causes of misunderstanding the organization has to do with the circumstances under which Freemasonry formed in early modern Wester Europe. The movement was part of the larger ‘Enlightenment', wherein traditional authority of ruling nobility and high clergy was being questioned. The secrecy surrounding the degrees which impart Masonry's lessons date from a time when ideas such as freedom of thought and religion, and the equality of political rights were viewed as subversive and dangerous by institutions in power. These 'subversive' ideas coincided with many of the founding principles of the United States of America. The speaker did not support that Freemasonry ‘made the Revolution', but there is justification to presume that the fraternal order facilitated cooperation among the separate colonial states. There is undeniable evidence of the noticeable number of Freemasons among the leadership. For a fuller coverage of Freemasonry in the American Revolution, the speaker recommended Steven C. Bullock's Revolutionary Brotherhood: Freemasonry and the Transformation of the American Social Order, 1730-1840 (1996).
The speaker emphasized the personal basis that motivated many Colonial-era Americans to join the Freemasons. The Freemasonry ritual provided a ‘mystic tie' that enhanced an individual's self esteem and provided confidence in adopting the rules of conduct. Joining the organization was an act of seeking self improvement through adopting the tenets of Freemasonry. What appears to have made the organizational popular among politicians, merchants, and tradesmen in the British Colonies was that membership in the Freemasons certified a man of ‘quality', and facilitated social as well as business interaction.
Membership in the Freemasons by ambitious individuals provided opportunities to exchange ideas concerning perceived economic and political abuses of the British authorities. There is evidence that even within the organization of Freemasonry, there was a pattern that paralleled confrontations concerning self-government and economic opportunities – namely that the individuals in the Colonies were never going to be accepted on an equal basis with those in Great Britain. Such intellectual positions openly debated in Freemason lodges undoubtedly encouraged many members of the brotherhood to support a political challenge, and to eventually break with Great Britain. On the other hand, this position certainly was not universally held by all Freemasons, as many in the brotherhood remained Loyalists. Further, despite some exaggerated claims, not all of the American Rebel leaders were Freemasons.
The speaker introduced a distinction that existed between the Freemason lodges at the time of the American Revolution. In 1751, some lodges made up largely of Scotts and Irish viewed the Premier Grand Lodge of London that had formed in 1717 as being too aristocratic and deviating from the earlier [‘ancient'] practices of ‘the Craft' [Freemasonry practices], and decided to join with an alternative group of lodges that were unaffiliated with the ‘Premier Grand Lodge'. These unaffiliated Masons and their Lodges were referred to as ‘Old Masons', and referred to groups affiliated to the Premier Grand Lodge, as ‘The Moderns'. This schism existed in the Colonies, where Benjamin Franklin was a ‘Modern' and Paul Revere an ‘Ancient'. The difference did not seem to prevent cooperation among those supporting the Rebellion,
Another note of interest was mentioned: in 1775 British occupied Boston, Prince Hall and several other Boston free African-Americans were initiated into a military lodge of Irish soldiers. After British troops evacuated Boston in March 1776, Hall and his brothers remained without an official Lodge charter, but supported the Rebel cause and encouraged African-Americans to enlist in the Continental Army. In 1791, Hall became Grand Master of the first African-American Grand Lodge, which was named after him when he died in 1807.
Following his presentation, the speaker identified a website with information about Masons among the ‘Founding Fathers' who were signers of the Declaration of Independence, signers of the Constitution, and Generals in the Continental Army under Washington; see http://bessel.org/foundmas.htm.
Mr. Mark Allen Tabbert was born and raised in Iowa, Mark graduated from Allegheny College with a B.A. in European History in 1986. He received his M.A. in American History and Museum Studies at Duquesne University in 1996 while working at the Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania in Pittsburgh, PA. Between 1997 and 1998 he worked for the Missouri Historical Society in St. Louis, Missouri. During this time he became a Mason in Malta Lodge No. 318 AF&AM in Burlington, Iowa. In 1999 he began work at the Scottish Rite Masonic National Heritage Museum in Lexington, MA as Curator of Masonic and Fraternal Collections. Since then he has published numerous articles, given many presentations and curated several Masonic exhibitions. In 2005 the National Heritage Museum and New York University Press jointly published his book American Freemasons: Three Centuries of Building Communities. In 2006 Mark accepted the position of Director of Collections at the George Washington Masonic National Memorial in Alexandria, Virginia. As a Freemason, he is a Past Master of Mystic Valley Lodge, Arlington, MA, member of the three York Rite Masonic Bodies, the Masonic Society of Blue Friars and a 33rd Degree in Scottish Rite of Freemasonry. For more information, visit the website for the George Washington Masonic Memorial in Alexandria, VA at: http://www.gwmemorial.org/
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ARRT June 2007 ‘FIELD TRIP' to MOUNT VERNON With the special cooperation of the Director and Staff at our local Mount Vernon Estate and Gardens, twenty ARRT members participated in an unusual June ‘field trip' in visiting the recently constructed Museum and Education Center at Mount Vernon. This was not a guided tour, as the elaborate exhibits are best visited at a pace suitable to individuals' desires. A number of ARRT members who are also members of ‘Friends of Mount Vernon' had already visited the facility. Of particular interest was the special exhibit "A Son and his Adoptive Father: The Marquis de Lafayette and George Washington" This ‘traveling' exhibit has now moved on to Lafayette College in Easton PA, and will later head to New York City before going to France in 2008.
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2 May April 2007, "Battle of Valcour Island' (11 October 1776)." The program was presented by Edwin C. Bearss, Chief Historian Emeritus of the National Park Service. Ed Bearss provided a dramatic and detailed description of this unusual naval engagement. The Valcour Island naval action might have been an 'obscure' battle on an inland lake, involving vessels and small gunboats. It accuired special historical interest due to the creative tactics adopted by the famous – and later ‘infamous' – Benedict Arnold. The speaker reviewed the background -- which he had covered in a previous ARRT program (March 2003), wherein Arnold played a dominant role in the failed 1775-76 American attempt to seize Quebec.
Technically, Valcour (1776) was a tactical defeat for the Americans, the campaign acquired strategic significance by delaying a large British naval force and effectively foiled the time table of a serious British invasion of the American colonies in the fall of 1776. The British invasion of the following year led to Burgoyne's Saratoga campaign of 1777. Again, it was Benedict Arnold, who played a critical role in defeating the British in the last battle of that campaign -- a topic Ed covered in the March 2004 ARRT program.
Ed Bearss is one of the nation's most famous battlefield guides, and is the author of many important works on the wars in North America. His previous programs to the ARRT were: "Battle of Cowpens, 1781" (presented April 2002), "Quest for the ‘Fourteenth Colony' – Canada, and Aftermath, 1775-1776" (presented March 2003), "The Advance on Saratoga, 1777" (presented March 2004), and "Washington's Crossing the Delaware (December 1776)" (presented October 2005). Ed is arguably the ARRT's most popular program speaker and a recipient of the ‘ARRT Certificate of Appreciation Award'.
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4 April 2007, "After Yorktown, 1781: the 'War Beyond the Horizon'." The program was presented by Albert D. McJoynt, a military historian and ARRT member. The speaker expressed the need to correct the distorted depiction in most popular American histories that the War for American Independence essentially ended with Yorktown 1781, and that the interval between late 1781 and the signing of a peace treaty in 1783 was merely a period of bickering over peace arrangements. This presentation was to explain the course of the war between Yorktown (October 1781) and the start of serious peace negotiations in September 1782. In so doing, the speaker hoped to provide an appreciation of the impact of the entangling alliances that enabled the Yorktown victory of 1781, but created a Global War that instigated continuing the war in places away from Colonial American shores. The presentation addressed significant events that are not expected to receive attention in the on-going 225th commemoration of the American War for Independence.
Interestingly, Washington and Rochambeau, did not see Cornwallis' surrender as the last major action even in North America. Washington tried to persuade de Grasse to remain in North American waters and to assist with a siege of either Charleston or New York. But de Grasse had been deployed in early 1781 to participate primarily in another major theater of the Global War – the Caribbean. Washington appreciated that his great success at Yorktown had depended upon strategic resource allocations decided in European capitals. Washington had to accept that since 1778 Alliance the war had taken on global dimensions, and evolved into ‘entangling alliances' that prevented a simple resolution in just one theater of operation.
After the Yorktown victory, Washington took his American army back north to keep in check the British at New York. Rochambeau's expeditionary force remained in Virginia in readiness for a possible new British offensive in the Southern Department. To plan any further offensive in North America, Washington had to hope for the return of the French fleet in late summer of 1782, when the naval forces moved out of the West Indies during the July-October hurricane season.
While the decisive military outcome of Yorktown 1781 certainly influenced the course of the broader global war, it could only play a secondary role in the broader, Global context of the war following France allying with the Americans in 1778, Spain allying with France in 1779, and The Netherlands becoming a third enemy of Great Britain in late 1780. All nations involved had overseas possessions and interests that became as important wartime objectives as did the initial cause of American Independence.
The British Parliament's February 1782 declaration "to end offensive war' in the Colonies, did not mean granting the Rebels Independence – a prerequisite for peace prescribed in the American-French 1778 Alliance. Rather, the Parliament's action reflected British recognition that they had to give priority to other strategic operational theaters in the expanding Global arena. In turn, this led to major encounters occurring well away from American shores, and conditions which eventually led to serious negotiations for peace.
The speaker admitted that even ‘a quick overview' of the ‘Global War' covering little over a year was challenging for a 45 minute talk. He could only highlight the complex ‘world war' that existed in late 1781 to late1782. Assisted by handouts, the speaker addressed interrelationships of geographically dispersed events of the last years of the war. This was a period when the British Empire had to engage adversaries from the Hudson Bay, in Canada; to the Bay of Bengal, India; and from the North Sea to the northern coast of South America. With the addition of Spain's naval assets, France had sought to force dispersed deployment of the powerful British navy, thus allowing France to take the initiative in geographic regions of its choosing. This strategy allowed for a major offensive in the Caribbean that incidently contributed to the October 1781Yorktown victory, as well as the capture of several British islands in the West Indies from late 1781 to early 1782. Concurrent with the 1781 deployment of the West Indies naval force, the French deployed second naval squadron to the Indian Ocean.
Spain's participation in the war led to an extended siege of Gabraltar (from June 1779 to February 1783). Though Britain sustained Gabraltar with a series of brilliantly led naval relief expeditions, the British lost their Mediterranean position to the east at Minorca (captured by the allies in February 1782). Britain quickly eliminated a Dutch naval threat in the north Sea at the Battle of Dogger Bank (August 1781), and then turned to deal with the French and Spanish naval offensive in the Caribbean. A British squadron won a significant victory at the famous Battle of the Saintes (12 April 1781), wherein de Grasse was captured along with 7 of his 30 battle ships. The speaker emphasized that the effect of this battle is often exaggerated. While the British naval victory did prevent an invasion of Jamaica, France retained its net gain of West Indian islands taken – a distinct advantage during the later peace negotiations. The French naval squadron that went to the Bay of Bengal was led by Admiral Suffren, who contrived with a local Indian Mysore leader to seize two British ports. Suffren prevailed in the last major naval battle of the war on 3 September 1783.
After the fall of the British Prime Minister North, in March 1782, exploratory talks were opened with the American representatives in Paris, in April 1782. In the same month, The Netherlands recognized the US – the second nation to do so after France in 1778. Faced with mounting challenges, Britain allowed conditions of American Independence to be discussed for the first time in September 1782. This led to ‘Provisional Articles' being signed between British and American representatives in November 1782. These, eventually led to the 'Definitive'Peace being signed by all parties in September 1783.
The speaker said that he was not going into the negotiations – the history of which is controversial, convoluted, and required a separate program. Hopefully this presentation's truncated review made the case that in 1782, Great Britain was confronted with dire circumstances from an unwanted ‘global war'. Its renowned navy was stretched thin. England was without allies on the Continent – an essential part of its earlier war strategies when confronting France – and was acquiring more adversaries. Continue efforts to crush the American rebellion was placing parts of the British Empire as risk. Peace had to be obtained at the price of granting Independence to the Rebels.
Mr. McJoynt authors the website for the Expédition Particulière Commemorative Cantonment Society at http://xenophongroup.com/mcjoynt/ep . Webpages at that site provide expanded background on themes mentioned in the 4 April program presentation:
‘West Indies Score Card During the American War for Independence' at http://xenophongroup.com/mcjoynt/WI2.htm ; ‘Strategic Assessment of the Battle of the Saintes (12 April 1782)' at http://xenophongroup.com/mcjoynt/assess01.htm, and ‘Suffren's East India Campaign (1782-1783)' at http://xenophongroup.com/mcjoynt/suffren.htm .
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7 March 2007, "George Walton and Quaker Manumission of Slaves in Revolutionary-Era North Carolina." The program was presented by Dr. Michael J. Crawford , Ph.D, Head of the Early History Branch, Naval Historical Center. Dr. Crawford described the dramatic experience of a South Carolinian Quaker, George Walton, whose life was transformed by a 1772 dream soon after he became a member of The Society of Friends. As Walton described his dream, he was traveling on a dark, narrow path. The path seemed to be up hill and very slippery, and Walton envisioned himself struggling as the ground moved out from under him – as if to capture him. Nearby was a black boy, who appeared to want to help Walton. Such dramatic dreams were taken seriously by The Friends (Quakers), and Walton was compelled to make some sense – seek some meaning of ‘truth' – from his experience. His interpretation was that the ‘slippery ground' was the ‘Devil' who sought to entrap his soul; and the ‘black boy' was ‘Jesus Christ' who sought to save him. In essence, the dream convinced Walton to see equality of all mankind, and to advocate the elimination of slavery in the society about him. The Quakers were very disposed to recognize and to respect such ‘life alternating' inspirational experiences and many in the community of Friends supported this cause. Further, there were already some anti-slavery sympathies among The Friends living in the colonial Carolinas, which were influenced to some extent by stronger positions on the subject held by Quakers from Pennsylvania. However, such beliefs clashed with established social and economic conditions in the South. Initially, Carolina Quaker merchants and large farm owners hesitated. But by 1775, the South Carolina Friends passed a resolution that slave holding was inconsistent with ‘Righteousness'.
By 1776, many South Carolina Quakers began freeing their slaves. Unfortunately, the movement met with considerable resistence by the broader community. There were some of the Rebels [Patriots] who sensed that the manumission movement was another British scheme. Newly freed slaves were often seized by militia ‘Night Patrols' seeking ‘escaped slaves', who were then re-sold back into slavery. Particular resistance came from the government of North Carolina, whose laws restricted manumissions. In 1778, the local higher courts supported such retrenchment, and Walton's crusade came to an end. Walton, himself, was eventually expelled from The Friends due to excessive drinking.
Dr. Crawford's topic is addressed in his article, " ‘The Small Black Boy at my right hand is Christ': George Walton and Friends Manumission of Slaves in Revolutionary-Era North Carolina," in The Southern Friend, Journal of the North Carolina Friends Historical Society, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2006, pp. 3-17. He is also working on a book that will be a documentary history of the North Carolina Quaker manumission movement of the era of the American Revolution.
Dr. Crawford, is the editor of two major historical documentary series, Naval Documents of the American Revolution and The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History. He is co-editor (with William S. Dudley) of The Early Republic and the Sea: Essays on the Naval and Maritime History of the Early United States (Brassey's, Inc., 2001). He graduated from Washington University, in St. Louis, and earned a doctorate at Boston University. Dr. Crawford has spoken to the American Revolution Round Table (of District of Columbia) on: ‘A Yankee Mariner: Christopher Prince and the American Revolution' (October 2002); ‘The Barbary Wars' (March 2002); ‘Battle of Valcour Island – 11 October 1776' (May 2001); ‘How the Queen of France Came to America in 1778' (November 1997); ‘Christopher Prince, New England Mariner of the American Revolution' [covering Christopher Prince's early career] (May 1996); ‘Revolution and the Bay: Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution' (February 1993); ‘The French Naval Campaign of 1778 in North America' (October 1989); ‘The Second Battle of the Virginia Capes' (September 2006).
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7 February 2007, "Northern Virginia in the American Revolution" The program was presented by Michael Cecere, a local educator, reenactor and author of the recently published book: In This Time of Extreme Danger: Northern Virginia in the American Revolution (Heritage Books, 2006). Mr. Cecere did not follow a written script, but occasionally read briefly from a selection of primary accounts as he reviewed, in chronological order, some key moments that highlighted Northern Virginia's contribution to American independence.
The troubles began when the British Parliament attempted to recover debt from the French and Indian Wars though levying direct taxes upon commerce in the British North American colonies. The Sugar Act of 1764 and Stamp Act of 1765 were essentially modest in size, but were accompanied by stricter enforcement in tax collection by the British authorities. The net effect was significant loss to the colonial economy which had previously benefitted from various tax avoidance schemes and smuggling of non-British good through the West Indies trade. Some of the most vocal opposition to the taxes began in Massachusetts, but soon spread to the Virginia House of Burgesses, where the British government was viewed as a threat to the tradition of local political autonomy that had been practiced – and taken for granted in the colonies. Mr. Cecere emphasized that the amount of tax was inconsequential; but what alarmed the American colonists was their perception of a dangerous precedent being set, wherein they were being taxed by a political body in which they were not represented. "No taxation without representation" became a rallying phrase among the colonial assemblies.
A prominent citizen of Fairfax County, militia Colonel George Washington stated in a 1765 letter that the Stamp Act was an "unconstitutional method of Taxation" and joined other leading Virginians to call for a boycott of British goods. Patrick Henry proposed forceful resolutions in the Virginia House of Burgesses, insisting that only that General Assembly had the right to levy such taxes on its citizens. This opposition was echoed by the other colonial assemblies and the British repealed the Stamp Act in 1766. However, the British Parliament soon attempted to assert its authority over the colonies with the Declaratory Acts of 1766 and the Townsend Duties of 1767. By 1769, Northern Virginian leaders such as Washington and Mason were advocating more strongly a boycott of British goods. Voluntary ‘Non-Importation Associations' were formed in the colonies which led to a noticeable decline of British imports. The British Parliament was forced to repeal the Townsend Duties in 1770, except for the tax on tea.
In a devious scheme, Parliament attempted to break the boycott on English tea imports by letting the British East India Company sell its taxed tea directly to customers and by pass the American merchants, thereby undercutting the merchant's prices. This challenged the colonists to abide by their principals – either buy cheaper tea that is taxed or pay more for ‘non-taxed' tea. The response was the Boston Tea Party in December 1773, an incident which was not looked upon favorably by many Virginians – destruction of merchants' property was analogous to lawlessness to many who espoused to ‘the rule of law'. On the other hand, the incident incited the British Parliament to respond with a harsh crackdown on Boston with the ‘Intolerable Acts' of 1774 – Massachusetts Assembly was abolished, the colony placed under martial law, Boston harbor was closed. Virginian's House of Burgesses sensed the British actions as a potential threat to all the colonies and attempted to draft resolutions expressing Virginia's support for Boston. Prince William County residents were the first to adopt county resolves in support of Boston. The British governor in Virginia, Lord Dunmore, feared insurrection and dissolved the House of Burgesses in May 1774. Virginian leaders like Washington openly expressed the need for the colonies to unite in resisting "Shackles of Slavery" being put upon them by the British Parliament. Virginians sent like-minded representatives to participate in the First Continental Congress, held in Philadelphia, September 1774. In the same month, a meeting of Fairfax County freeholders launched Virginia's first Independent Militia Company of Volunteers. Mr. Cecere's took the title of his book (In This Time of Extreme Danger...) from the opening lines in the proclamation drafted by George Mason at the 21 September 1774 meeting of Fairfax County freeholders. Colonel George Washington was chosen to command – though he was attending the First Congress in Philadelphia at the time.
1775 was a busy year as the war erupted at various locations throughout the colonies. The speaker touched briefly on the Gunpowder Incident in Williamsburg in April, and the eventual flight of the Royal Governor Dunmore's safety on a British warship. The Second Continental Congress established the Continental Army and elected the Virginian George Washington as Commander in Chief. Virginia experienced its first ‘stand up battle' at Great Bridge near Norfolk. However, the weight of the war was to be waged in the northern theater until the British launch a major ‘Southern Strategy' in 1780. The 12 May 1780 surrender of Charleston to the British resulted in the capture of a significant portion of Virginia Continental Line, thus leaving only Commonwealth militia to confront British military incursions into Virginia starting in early 1781, and to play a part in the dramatic and decisive Allied victory at Yorktown in late 1781.
Mr. Cecere made his point that while many Revolutionary battles were fought outside of the colony, Virginia was in the forefront of taking early action and providing leadership for the rebellion; and would play a similar role in defining the new political system to emerge. Needless to say that there was a lively and extended question and answer period.
Michael Cecere teaches American History at Robert E. Lee High School in Fairfax County and was named the 2005 Outstanding Teacher of the Year by the Virginia Society of the Sons of the American Revolution. Mr. Cecere also teaches American history at Northern Virginia Community College. He holds a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Akron in History and another in Political Science. An avid Revolutionary and Civil War re-enactor, he participates in numerous living history events throughout the year. Besides his already mentioned latest book, Mr. Cecere has authored the following:
They Behaved Like Soldiers: Captain John Chilton and the Third Virginia Regiment, 1775-1778,
An Officer of Very Extraordinary Merit: Charles Porterfield and the American War for Independence, 1775-1780,
Captain Thomas Posey and the 7th Virginia Regiment, and
They Are Indeed a Very Useful Corps: American Riflemen in the Revolutionary War.
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6 December 2006, "A Hero and A Spy: The Revolutionary War Correspondence of Benedict Arnold" The program was presented by Russell M. Lea, author of a new book published (2006) by Heritage Books of the same title as his program talk.
The speaker made use of PowerPoint visual aids that depicted the memorial scenes that traced the actions that made Arnold a 'hero' in the perceptions of some. But as the speaker reviewed the events he included the aspects that also frustrated the very ambitious Arnold. Before the war, Arnold did not have a very promising experience as a merchant, and management of money was obviously not his strong point. Military action tempted him with teasing promise of fame and better fortune. Though Arnold played a part in the recaptured Fort Ticonderoga from the British (May 1775), the immediate recognition went to Ethan Allen. History is more favorable in recognizing Arnold's resolute leading an American force through the wilderness of Maine to seize British held Quebec (December 1775). However, Arnold was wounded early in the crucial final assault which failed due to many other misfortunes. Probably Arnold's most successful military/naval adventure was conceiving of a scheme to counter a British invasion entering through Lake Champlain, and personally directing the tactical maneuvers in the Valcour channel (October 1776). Though a tactical defeat, Arnold's American flotilla of gunboats effectively stalled the advance of a larger British fleet. The strategic result was the defeat of the British invasion plan. In April 1777, Arnold co-commanded about 500 American militia that repelled about 2000 British regulars raiding Danbury, Connecticut. Probably Arnold's most famous 'heroic' act was at the battle of 'Second Saratoga' (October 1777), where he ignored Gates' orders and personally led an assault that captured a key redoubt in the British defensive entrenchments. The initiative exposed Arnold to his second battle wound in the war, but contributed to the collapse of Burgoyne's offensive and the surrender of his British army. On the other hand, Arnold's conduct in the campaign was viewed by some as insubordinate and made him an 'enemy' of the more politically astute Gates.
Arnold had become victim to factionalism in the American officer corps, and was already at odds with Gates when the latter assumed command of the American army that opposed Burgoyne. In fact, resentment in having been passed over in promotions and in not being reimburse for personal expenses had caused Arnold to resign his commission in July 1777, only to quickly ask that his resignation be ignored so as to participate in the campaign to oppose Burgoyne's army. The American Congress could not ignore Arnold's performance at the Battles of Saratoga, and being lauded by General Washington to be his "greatest fighting general," Arnold finally acquired the rank of Maj. Gen, back dated to Feb 1777. Slow to recover from his battle wound, Arnold was posted to command Philadelphia when the city was evacuated by the British in 1778. His position led to several charges of misconduct and drew resentment of his penchant for ostentatious living -- perceived above his known income. Arnold seemed not to worry about his reputation in marrying a young woman of half his age and of a known Troy family. In hind sight, it is known that it was during this period he began secretive contacts with British agents.
It is at this point our speaker described Arnold's attempt to deliver West Point to the British as revealed in the correspondence between Arnold and the British Major John André. Knowing the audience's familiarity with the discovery of Arnold's treason and André's subsequent execution, Mr. Lea related only a few specifics to underscore the high drama of events on the Hudson River in late 1780 that would challenge any fiction writer. However, the speaker and wise historian, had at his disposal the soundest basis for History: written documents contemporary with, and by participants in the events being described. It cannot be properly summarized here. One can only suggest read the book!
Given the often expressed ARRT members' interest in Arnold and his treason, the extensive question and answer period that followed Mr. Lea's talk was not surprising. Of course there was the prominent question: "Why did Arnold do it?" The answer is conjectural and complex, but certainly evidences flaws in Arnold's character. If he had to sum up the answer in simply a word, the speaker offered the reason being Arnold's: "impatience." Arnold was not the only American officer who did not receive immediate awards or accolades for his service and brave deeds. The real ‘heroes' were the ones who sustained themselves by perceiving the larger cause and purpose.
The program closed with a book signing, where Mr. Lea further awarded purchasers of his book on Arnold with copies of his two trivia books on the history of West Point in celebration of the Academy's bicentennial in 2002: W. P. Bicentrivia and The Long Green Line. It was while researching for these these works that Mr. Lea discovered and was attracted to tell the full story about Arnold. Mr. Lea has adapted A Hero and a Spy into a screenplay and is currently producing a biography and a screenplay about John Paul Jones. Learn more at http://www.russlea.com/
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1 November 2006, "The 1780-1781 Spanish Campaigns of the American Revolution, in North America." The program was presented by Mr. Héctor L. Díaz, scholar and author on topics relating to Spain's participation in the American Revolution. Some of the recent ARRT program speakers covering events of the 225th Anniversary of the American Revolution briefly referenced some specific incidents of Spanish contribution in the military campaigns being conducted by the French and Americans in North America. Mr. Díaz's talk put these incidents into perspective.
The speaker briefly explained the reasons for Spain's declaration of war against England in 1779. In part, Spain was motivated to regain some global territories that were lost during the Seven Years War (1756–1763). Spain's open involvement was pushed at the behest of France, as part of a joint Bourbon Family alliance against the common, historic enemy. The speaker noted that Spain did not followed France in formally allying with the rebel American colonies, as the Spanish authorities were concerned with the influence such an insurrection could have on many of Spain's colonies in North America. Nevertheless, Spain's effective assaults on British possessions in North America – for the most part in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Mississippi River, could not help but divert English military and naval resources from quelling the American rebellion.
Most significant in the effectiveness of Spain's offensives against the British, as well as ‘unofficial' but very active logistical support of Washington's American Army, was the initiative of Spain's Governor in Louisiana, General Don Bernardo de Gálvez. He openly enabled military supplies arriving from Europe at the port of New Orleans, to be shipped up the Mississippi and delivered to American forces fighting in the Ohio Valley and in many campaigns in the Northeast US. Arguably, Gálvez's operations against Pensacola, Capital of British West Florida, in March-May 1781 were important influences on the concurrent American-French allied 1781 campaigns addressed in recent ARRT programs.
Mr. Díaz covered in some detail the Spanish Siege of Pensacola. When confronted with some hesitation [lacking adequate nautical maps, some Spanish ships had run aground] from his own Spanish admirals, Gálvez personally led his small ‘militia navy' in to the bay against an array of British coastal defenses. Once ashore the Spanish established siege artillery positions against the British redoubts defending the area. Fearing the imminent arrival of British reinforcements Gálvez pressed a aggressive siege of Fort George, the principal defensive position for Pensacola. However, when reinforcements arrived in early May, it was a Spanish and French fleet with more troops. On 8 May, a fortunate Spanish artillery shot caused the explosion of the powder magazine at the key British redoubt. The extensive damage weakened the British defense, allowed the Spanish to seize critical high ground in the fort's defenses, compelling the British commander to surrender.
During the Q and A period, the ARRT the topic of the rather poor presence of the British navy at Pensacola was further evidence of the French broad naval strategy – as described by Dr Crawford in the September program – to force the large British navy to disperse it resources in a global conflict. During the Spanish offensive against Pensacola, the British were having to prepare for the arrival of a large French fleet in the West Indies and its possible link up with a French military expedition that had already arrived in North America. Of course, such a American-French Allied offensive did develop with the Yorktown Campaign in late summer of 1781.
Mr Díaz also described more direct Spanish involvement in the Yorktown Campaign. Gálvez granted the French admiral de Grasse permission to take all the French combat vessels and French colonial regiments that were assigned to support French-Spanish operations in the West Indies in a temporary deployment to the Chesapeake in August-October 1781. These naval and military assets proved to be essential in the operations that developed. Equally important was the 1,200,000 livres collected in only a few hours from citizens in Havana and given to de Grasse as he was en route to Virginia. This money sustained the French and American forces which found themselves nearly pennyless as they commenced the Yorktown siege. Mr. Díaz provided a valuable handout whith is also posted on the ARRT website:
See: Concise Bibliography and Recommended Web Links on the Spanish Participation in the American Revolution.
Mr. Héctor L. Díaz holds a B.A in Psychology from the University of Puerto Rico, has continued his education with post graduate studies in U.S. and Puerto Rican History and languages. He works as a language analyst in Department of Defense. His interest in the role of Hispanics to American independence began while on a visit to Yorktown Battlefield Park in Virginia in 1985, where he came across a Spanish 18th century flag in one of the displays in the museum. Wondering what it was doing there, he was completely surprised to learn that it "…belonged to the Spanish "Regimiento del Principe" which had taken part, along with other Hispanic forces, in the successful Spanish sieges of Baton Rouge, Mobile and Pensacola during the American Revolution – ne of many other Hispanic contributions to the conflict.
Subsquently, Mr. Díaz has researched and written several articles on the subject. In 1993 Mr. Díaz created a living history group to reenact the soldiers of Spain and her colonies who participated in the war. He also authored a resolution on their accomplishments which was approved by the Maryland Legislature on March 8, 1997. He was the ARRT's featured speaker in February 2004, ‘Spain's Participation in the American Revolution'. At present, he is assisting the recreated "Regimiento Fijo de Puerto Rico" to participate in the 2007 re-enactment of the successful defense of San Juan, Puerto Rico, against the British Attack of 1797.
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4 October 2006, "The Siege of Yorktown: the Decisive Engagement of the American War for
Independence." The program was presented by Glenn F. Williams, a Senior Historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC.. The speaker gave an unique presentation that emphasized the distinctive military aspect of the Yorktown Victory – it was a superbly executed, classical Eighteenth-Century siege, like none other in North America during the war. The theme is often ignored in the many social science oriented narratives of the event. Mr. Williams' experience as a military historian enabled him to explain the intricate inter relationships of military engineering and artillery that defined ‘military science' in that era. Referencing the previous ARRT programs, the speaker quickly reviewed the convergence of British and Allied American and French armies at Yorktown in September 1781. There was no surprise that the professional British force under General Cornwallis would have established substantial field fortifications to hold off the attacking allied force and await succor from the large British naval and army forces positioned at New York. Cornwallis had some justification in expecting his field defenses to force the attackers to spend weeks in costly frontal assaults. The presence of a large French naval fleet in the Chesapeake Bay was certainly inconvenient and a serious constraint on the British at York. The significantly larger Allied land forces assembled around York was equally threatening. At some point in early October, Cornwallis was shocked to realize that the Allied land force had both the heavy artillery and professional skills to conduct an aggressive siege according to well-established and formal tactical doctrine practiced in Europe.
With the aid of excellent PowerPoint visuals, Mr Williams described the basics of 18th-century fortification design and outlined the methods for reducing them. He explored the intricacies and the technical expertise required to plan and to construct parallel siege lines, digging zig-zag trenches reenforced with ‘gabions' and ‘fascines' in a systematic approach toward the British defenses. Such counter earthworks permitted the placement of formidable Allied artillery – a significant number of 24 and 18 pounder siege pieces – to be within effective range of British positions.
The siege progressed quickly in stages: Allied forces completed their Investment and Reconnaissance of the British positions by the end of September. In the first few days of October the British were constrained within tight and shrunken lines, as well as denied forage. Allied Pioneers opened the first parallel on 6 October and the first Allied siege guns began firing 9 October. Systematic construction of ‘Saps' advanced toward the British defense lines, and key British Redoubts were seized, enabling the opening of a second parallel on 15 October. Recognizing that the Allied guns were now close enough to breach their defenses, the British attempted and failed to break out on the night of 16 October. Cornwallis agreed to surrender on 18 October.
Thus French-American forces destroyed a British field army, defending a well-fortified position, without resorting to a bloody frontal assault. Although it did not mark the end of hostilities, the Siege of Yorktown proved to be the decisive battle of the War for American Independence.
Glenn F. Williams, an ARRT member, is the author of Year of the Hangman: George Washington's Campaign against the Iroquois (Westholme Publishing) and the recipient of the Thomas J. Fleming Award for the Outstanding Revolutionary War Book of 2005. He is also the author of USS Constellation: A Short History of the Last All-Sail Warship Built by the U.S. Navy (Donning, 2000), and a number of journal and magazine articles on military and naval history topics. He is a retired Army officer who entered public history as a second career, in which his previous positions include serving as the Historian for the American Battlefield Protection Program of the National Park Service, and Curator of the USS CONSTELLATION Museum. He holds a BA from Loyola College of Maryland, a MA in History from University of Maryland Baltimore County, and is presently a doctoral candidate in History at University of Maryland, College Park.
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6 September 2006, "The Second Battle of the Virginia Capes." The program was presented by Dr. Michael J. Crawford , Ph.D., Head of the Early History Branch, Naval Historical Center. The speaker described the remarkable naval engagement, begun 5 September 1781, between French and British fleets off the Virginia Capes. Tactically, the engagement's outcome was indecisive, as both fleets were left with some capabilities to continue the struggle. However, strategically this event was arguably the most important naval encounter in the American Revolution. Dr. Crawford explain this engagement as the product of choices between strategic and tactical alternatives that confronted British and French ministers and naval commanders as the two nations engaged in the War for American Independence.
When France inserted itself in the struggle in 1778, allying itself with the American rebels, the war became global in that France and Great Britain had the naval resources to engage in many geographical locations other than North America. To offset their lesser number of fighting ships, the French allied with Spain. As Britain's main focus was ending the rebellion in the north American colonies, France had the strategic option to either concentrate its naval forces at some strategic point, or to engage the British at various global locations. Some believed that the first option might best offset the generally accepted qualitative superiority of British seamanship. The alternative option would be to confront the British at geographically dispersed points, forcing a dispersal of British naval assets, and attempting to catch some British naval forces at a disadvantage. The first option was pursued for a year with an attempt to win control of La Manche [the channel]. French and Spanish naval forces failed to conduct effective allied deployments, and the French then resorted to the second option. In 1781, France deployed fleets to the Indian Ocean and West Indies. The latter, under the Admiral comte de Grasse, was principally assigned to participate in French-Spanish combined operations. However, de Grasse was instructed to venture temporally to North America if there were an opportunity to assist the French and American land forces there. In late summer of 1781 such an opportunity did arise with the presence of a sizable British army presence close to eastern coast of Virginia. With significant help of his Spanish allied leaders in the West Indies, de Grasse was able to take his entire battle fleet, a large contingent of French troops stationed in the West Indies to the Chesapeake Bay at the end of August. On 5 September, a British naval fleet commanded by Admiral Graves arrived and the struggle for control of the Chesapeake Bay began.
When addressing the tactical battle, Dr Crawford returned to the theme of examining options the naval commanders had to decide. Caught in the process of unloading, with many of his ships' crews ashore, De Grasse had to decide to set out to engage the approaching enemy fleet with several under manned ships. But he deemed it more important to be ‘at sea' and in a position to maneuver. The British admiral, having less ships of the line had to determine how to close and engage the French. Dr. Crawford made good use of his PowerPoint graphics to explain the three main options for closing the ‘windward' line of British ships toward the‘leeward' stream of French struggling to egress from the Bay. It appears that the British commander elected the best option, but then miss communicate his intentions to the rest of his fleet by careless flag signals. The failure of part of the British line to close effectively, degraded their original tactical advantage. After an exchange of furious broadside fire for a few hours, the fleets drifted apart and out of cannon range. Mutual battle damage left both sides leery to re-engage without some advantage in position and winds. Essentially it was a tactical stalemate.
The situation was dramatically changed when de Grasse elected first to consider the broader strategic aspects of the campaign. Control of the entrance to Chesapeake was more important than attempting a decisive naval victory. Returning to the Bay on 11 September, de Grasse found anchored the small French naval squadron from Newport. Barras had navigated his small squadron far out to the Atlantic so as to avoid interception by the British, and managed to sneak into the Bay with the vital French siege artillery. Graves may not have fully realized how vulnerable Cornwallis was left, but increased number of French ships left the British admiral little choice other to return to New York for repairs. In the meantime, de Grasse had moved ships in an around the waters of the York River to further confine Cornwallis' army.
Washington and Rochambeau arrived at Williamsburg on 14 September to join Lafayette [commanding a small contingent of Continentals and American militia] and St Simon [commander of French forces that came with de Grasse]. The senior Allied commanders held a war conference on 17 September, aboard de Grasse's flagship, the Ville de Paris. De Grasse deployed ships up the Chesapeake to speed the transport of the Allied armies that had come from New York. By the end of the month, the Allied armies moved from Williamsburg to invest York and conduct the siege.
Dr. Crawford, is the editor of two major historical documentary series, Naval Documents of the American Revolution and The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History. He is co-editor (with William S. Dudley) of The Early Republic and the Sea: Essays on the Naval and Maritime History of the Early United States (Brassey's, Inc., 2001). He graduated from Washington University, in St. Louis, and earned my doctorate at Boston University. Dr. Crawford has spoken to the American Revolution Round Table (of District of Columbia) on: ‘A Yankee Mariner: Christopher Prince and the American Revolution' (October 2002); ‘The Barbary Wars' (March 2002); ‘Battle of Valcour Island – 11 October 1776' (May 2001); ‘How the Queen of France Came to America in 1778' (November 1997); ‘Christopher Prince, New England Mariner of the American Revolution' [covering Christopher Prince's early career] (May 1996); ‘Revolution and the Bay: Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution' (February 1993); ‘The French Naval Campaign of 1778 in North America' (October 1989).
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3 May 2006, " Flushing the Bird: Nathanael Greene's Early Campaign in the South ." The program was presented by Dr. Dennis M. Conrad, a historian at the Early History Branch, Naval Historical Center. Dr. Conrad described how an essential component of the historic Yorktown campaign – the presence of Cornwallis' British army – came to be in Virginia in late summer of 1781. The speaker described how General Nathanael Greene, the American commander for the Southern Department, essentially ‘flushed' the initially larger and better equipped British army from its strategic focus to subdue the Carolinas, and encouraged a frustrated Cornwallis to seek an alternative objective of removing the Virginia-based supply link for the American Southern army.
The British ‘Southern Strategy' – to take advantage of presumed, latent Loyalist sympathies in the southern colonies and destroy the rebellion in that area – appeared off to a good start in 1780 with the British capture of Charleston (12 May) and the destruction of Gates' American army at Camden (16 August). However, these American military reverses did not stir a rising of loyalists. In fact, Clinton's June 1780 proclamation to the citizens of South Carolina calling for a declaration of allegiance was not well received in the ‘backwoods' areas of the Carolinas. The British ‘Southern Strategy' was dealt a significant reverse with the defeat of Loyalist at the Battle of King's Mountain (SC) on 7 October 1780. The defeat also ended a British ‘invasion' into North Carolina, and forced Cornwallis to draw British troops from Virginia to the support his campaign in the Carolinas.
When Greene assumed command of the American army in the South, in December 1780, his forces lacked the size and material resources to confront directly the British occupation of major communities in the region. Nevertheless, Greene elected to go on the ‘strategic offensive'. With the benefit of able, local militia commanders like Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter, Greene
initiated scattered guerrilla actions that mitigated effective British military response. In a daring break with conventional military principals, Greene divided his army. Events proved Greene's genius in recognizing that such an initiative forced a fragmentation of the British forces and left Cornwallis in doubt as to what were Greene's intentions.
Eventually an event that should have been a mere ‘small action' at Cowpens , SC, (17 Jan 1781) became an embarrassing defeat for a British legion under the famous cavalry leader Tarlton. The incident incited Cornwallis to conduct an aggressive pursuit of the American forces, wherein the British army plunged inland, away from its support base. Cornwallis destroyed much of his supply train to enhance his rate of march in an effort to catch Greene's army in what is known as ‘the Race to the Dan'. The speaker touched upon a few of the noteworthy – but near run – successes of the American rear guard that allowed Greene's army to cross the Dan River into Virginia on 14 Feb 1781. Lacking boats, Cornwallis had to give up his chase, and led his exhausted army back to the southeastern NC, along the Cape Fear River, seeking logistical replenishment brought in land from the sea coast. After a brief rest in VA, Greene led his American force back into NC and continued to keep pressure on Cornwallis by harassing British foraging and to disrupt Loyalist units forming.
In the meantime, Greene's army was benefitting by the addition of more militia, while Cornwallis' force remained hampered from the reduction of its supply wagons sacrificed during the ‘Race to the Dan'. Finally, Greene (now with the larger force) was ready to challenge Cornwallis and the two sides engaged in the vigorously fought battle at Guilford CH, NC, (15 March 1781). It was the speaker's view that Greene, who up to this point had demonstrated remarkable skill in adopting unconventional strategies, resorted to a conservative tactical deployment. The speaker suggested this may have contributed to American's failure to hold the field in spite of the greater casualties inflicted upon the British. However, again, Greene achieve the better strategic outcome. The engagement forced Cornwallis to remove his exhausted and logistically weakened army from any further contests until replenished at Wilmington, NC.
Greene decided to return to SC and conduct largely successful operations against the scattered British posts, many of which were lightly manned. Cornwallis, on the other hand, made the fateful decision, to leave British operations in the Carolinas and Georgia to his second, General Rawdon, and to lead a major effort to conquer Virginia. Cornwallis reasoning appears to have been a mixture of not wanting to admit failure by returning to SC, and by a genuine belief that removing the Rebel's Virginia logistical base was the best way to complete the British conquest of the South. As it turned out, unforseen strategic developments intervened. About five months later, Greene learned that Washington's allied army was descending upon Conrwallis, bottled up at York, VA, between a French fleet and Lafayette's forces. Reportedly, Greene accepted the news with the statement: "We have been beating the bush, and the General has come to catch the bird."
Dr. Conrad served as editor and project director of the Papers of General Nathanael Greene, a thirteen volume documentary series publishing the papers of that great Revolutionary War strategist. Greene's campaigns in the South was the subject of Conrad's doctoral dissertation at Duke University. His previous programs to the ARRT were: ‘Battle of Hobkirk's Hill (25 April 1781)' [presented in May 2004] and ‘Anticipating Newburgh: The Resignation of Nathanael Greene as Quartermaster General' [presented in April 2003].
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5 April 2006, " Allied Strategic Decisions and Actions Leading to the Yorktown Campaign in 1781." The program was presented by Albert D. McJoynt. The speaker identified that he would address two broad areas: the ‘Strategic Political Decisions' that sent the essential resources [a professional French military expedition and a large French naval fleet] to the North American Theater; and then the critical ‘Operational Military and Naval Decisions' made by army and naval commanders which deployed the allied armies in North America and the French fleet in the Carribean to Virginia in 1781.
The speaker was particularly motivated to address the topic having observed in several recently published works on Yorktown the promotion of distortions and legends as to how the Yorktown Campaign evolved. There seems to be a prevalence of books by journalists who eagerly report so-called ‘secret' incidents that launched the campaign. One old legend continues to surface that has Washington and Rochambeau devise the Yorktown strategy in May 1781 at a Wethersfield, CT meeting. This Ignores the implausibility of such – as Cornwallis was not known by them to have just entered Virginia, and no one at the time would have envisioned that the British would have a meaningful force at the small tobacco town of York, in Virginia, three months later. However, the temptation to see some presumed deception behind British interception of Washington's post Wethersfield meeting dispatches is too tempting. Another assertion still floating about is that de Grasse was persuaded to go to the Chesapeake by a field grade American officer who made a brief visit aboard the admiral's flag ship – as if such an encounter had any impact over the several dispatches from Rochambeau and the French Minister to the US Congress that all urged that the French fleet head to Virginia.
The speaker traced the strategic foundation for the Yorktown Campaign to the French-American Alliance signed in February 1778. However, the significant shift in the strategic situation in the American theater did not occur until the arrival of a French military expedition in July 1780. This critical event depended upon first the French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, changing the focus of French global strategy from European waters to the Caribbean and North America. By many accounts the American rebellion was not going well and French observers, such as Lafayette and other French volunteers in the American Continental Army, were reporting back to Versailles that the French needed to send troops. The problem was that many of the American leaders were known to have said early in the war that they did not want the presence of French troops – money, arms, military engineers, and naval forces, yes!, but no troops. Vergennes took the initiative and had the newly appointed French Minister to the US, Chevalier de la Luzerne, confront Washington directly in September of 1779. Washington gave his approval then, and in the same month stated so in a letter to Lafayette, who had returned temporally to Paris. Vergennes made his decision in January 1780. On 2 February, the king's council formally approved the deployment of a French auxiliary force to serve under Washington's supreme command. The French units were taken from select and well equipped forces already assembled for the recently cancelled attack on England. Appointing Rochambeau to command the expedition was probably the most important part of Vergennes' decisions. From this point, a fundamental component for what would later take form as ‘the Yorktown Campaign' had been cast.
The next critical strategic decision was also made at Versailles, overseen by Vergennes, and developed in detail by the French ministers of army and navy (Ségur and Castries). In March 1781, a large French fleet under admiral comte de Grasse was to be deployed to the Caribbean, with an auxiliary role to assist the North American allied military operations. Washington and Rochambeau had been alerted to the deployment. When de Grasse arrived at Martinique in late April 1781, he sent word to the allied generals asking how best he might assist. Conducting a series of offensives in the Indies without much interference, de Grasse arrived at Cap François in mid July, where awaited responses from Rochambeau, Washington, and the French Minister Luzerne. While Washington emphasized combined/joint operations against the British at New York, the others suggested the best opportunity may be to assist Lafayette in Virginia. Most of the French knew that their naval commanders were not comfortable in attempting to pass the sand bar at the entrance to the New York Bay. De Grasse announced his decisive decision in a 28 July dispatch that would not be received by Rochambeau and Washington until 14 August. De Grasse's decision was backed with exceptional aggressive action – taking three French regiments from the West Indies and, with the cooperation of the local Spanish authorities – all of his main warships. He arrived at the Chesapeake 30 August.
Outside New York, Washington had begun to doubt his capability to pursue the intended siege against the formidable British defenses; and noted such in his diary on 1 August. He was ready on the 14th of the month to put the last component of the campaign into motion. The allied armies began their move on 25 August overland and by waterways toward a little tobacco port town of York in Virginia, arriving late September 1781. The very important French siege train was taken by the small French naval squadron from Newport, RI, to Virginia. Concurrent with these strategic decisions in France, and operational decisions in the Caribbean and at allied headquarters in New York, were some important operational and tactical decisions made by the British and American forces in the South. These will be addressed in the ARRT's May program.
Mr. McJoynt has spoken previously to the ARRT about the French participation in the American Revolution, and in particular on the French expedition of 1780-83 in America, and authors the website for the Expédition Particulière Commemorative Cantonment Society.
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1 March 2006, " King George's Webbed Feet: British Combined Operations Under Benedict Arnold." The program was presented by Mark L. Hayes, a historian at the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C.
The speaker reminded the audience that Arnold had established himself a master a joint operations early in the American Revolution when he directed the small Rebel fleet at Valcour Island (October 1776) that effectively disrupted the British invasion from Canada via Lake Champlain. This action demonstrated in his character restless, instinctive aggressiveness, and sense for tactical leadership in operations that seamlessly transcended land and water. He continued to evidence such talent after he changed sides and served as a British Brigadier General in his Virginia Campaign of early 1781.
The speaker described the background for the Virginia campaign. Virginia had escaped the depredations of intensive military operations for 4 years, with only occasional raids by British forces in an attempt to destroy the tobacco stores that the American rebels used to purchase or trade for military supplies from Europe. The almost non existent Virginia state navy and small militia units were severely ill prepared to resist even small British raiding forces, most of which set up operations based temporally at or around Portsmouth near the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay.
The British commander in North America, General Clinton, decided to become more aggressive in 1780 and deployed a force to the Chesapeake in October 1780. However, the British commander in Virginia was not aggressive enough for Clinton, who in late 1780 was trying to find a role for the American traitor Arnold in his new role as a British officer. As no northern position seemed suitable, Clinton acquiesced to Arnold's request to go to Virginia. The speaker pointed to the rather strange command instructions Clinton gave to the two veteran British officers who would serve immediately under Arnold. These lieutenant colonels were expected to monitor Arnold's command decisions, reflecting that the British high command was either leery of his treason or just simply did not trust a colonial to lead British troops. However, Arnold demonstrated exceptional aggressiveness in what would be labeled the ‘James River Campaign.' Richmond's extensive Tobacco warehouse stores were destroyed as well as the poorly manned Virginia ‘navy' ships.
When the French naval squadron, that had deployed as an escort to Rochambeau expedition in 1780, sent a few ships to go against Arnold in the Chesapeake waters, Arnold cleverly withdrew his smaller squadron up the Virginia rivers to where the French ships could not follow. The French later attempted in 1781 to deploy some land forces to conduct a joint offensive – in conjunction with an American land force led by the Marquis de La Fayette in early 1781. The French squadron was repelled at the mouth of the Chesapeake in the 16 March ‘First Battle of the Virginia Capes'. Lafayette was left to contend alone against Arnold, now re enforced in late March by more British forces under the command of the British General Phillips. In May 1781, Cornwallis entered Virginia with a large British force from the Carolinas. At this point, Arnold was withdrawn from the Virginia theater and proceeded to practice his skills in amphibious operations in the northeast, where he earned an even more disreputable reputation in American history.
However, Arnold failed to draw sufficient followers in his unit of American deserters or to gain the respect of fellow British officers. He retired to England in December 1781.
The question and answer period brought out the usual questions attempting to understand the complex nature of Arnold, and to tell of his dismal experience as a failed businessman in London.
Mark L. Hayes is a historian at the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C., where he has worked since 1991. He is assistant editor of Naval Documents of the American Revolution and co-author of Sea Raiders of the Continental Navy and The Spanish-American War: Historical Overview and Select Bibliography. He has had chapters published on the American Civil War battles of Port Royal and New Orleans and a chapter on the "Naval Blockade of Cuba During the Spanish-American War." Mr. Hayes has presented several papers on naval topics, including one on "Gustavus Conyngham in Spain" to the ARRT in 1994. In May 2005, he spoke to the ARRT on "Littoral Warfare in the Chesapeake Bay, 1777-1778."
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1 February 2006, "The Portraits of George Washington." Program was presented by Dr. Ellen G. Miles, Curator and Chair of the Department of Painting and Sculpture at the National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution.
This was a rare opportunity for several of the ARRT members who have attempted to study the many images of George Washington – either for art's sake or to determine what this great man looked like. So many painters execute Washington's portraits over a long time, and the differences are evident. Even allowing for Washington aging, there are variances in many facial features in these images that frustrate one seeking to comfortably conceive of his likeness. Oddly, there is a dearth of printed sources to assist the study of this question. Dr. Miles admitted as much when she cited only one real examination of Washington portraits by artists for whom he sat, or was in close contact so to be observed with confidence. The thick and rather rare work, The Life Portraits of Washington and Their Replicas, by John Hill Morgan and Mantle Fielding (Philadelphia, 1931) remains the best study on this topic. Of course the topic of what Washington looked like and the varied depictions would be too lengthy for an hour-long presentation. Though the topic was occasionally touched upon, Dr. Miles chose to review some of the key portraits of Washington, and to address why they were made by particular artists. She covered several sittings to elaborate upon what Washington thought about sitting for his portrait, and his interaction with the artists, in an effort to learn something about Washington, himself. Her talk was effectively supported by 35 mm slides. Her wide knowledge of portraiture of the era contributed considerably to the presentation.
Dr. Miles noted that all the portraits of Washington were commissioned by admirers of the man – no caricatures. There were 25 attributed to be ‘life-portraits' – ones for which the subject actually appeared before the artist and was painted from the living form. From these, the artist who executed the original ‘life-portrait' usually made ‘replicas', and other artists painted ‘copies'. After the Revolution, and particularly after his presidency, reproduction paintings of Washington were popular – especially those by Gilbert Stuart and Charles Wilson Peale.
C. W. Peale did the first known portrait of Washington (in a Virginia colonial militia uniform), from life, at Mount Vernon in Spring of 1772. Reportedly he painted Washington five times from life-sittings, the last sitting in Philadelphia in 1795.
Various members of the Peale family, sons James and Rembrant Peale, made copies from C.W. Peale's originals. Charles Peale Polke, a nephew, made many copies of the portraits by C.W. and James. C.W. Peale had the opportunity to know and paint Washington before, during the war as Commander-in-Chief of the American Armies, and later as the first President of the United States. For this reason, C.W. Peale's works are valued in assessing Washington's facial features over time. However, as the speaker emphasized when comparing the later C.W. Washington portraits to those executed by artist that first observed Washington late in life, Peale's portrayal persisted to convey ‘younger' features of the subject.
Washington became to find sitting to be painted a chore, which may explain that some of the later life portraits are rather formal and ‘stiff'. Gilbert Stuart was evidently frustrated in not getting Washington to conduct a conversation during the sittings. However, Stuart agreed with many that possibly the most accurate portrayal of Washington was by the French sculptor, Jean Antoine Houdon. Houdon traveled from France to Mount Vernon in 1785, where he made a life-mask of Washington's face and took measurements of his body. The principal commission was for the life-size, marble statue now in the rotunda of the State Capitol at Richmond, Virginia. Bust copies were many busts were made in marble and terra cotta; a clay bust remains at Mt Vernon where is was modeled during Houdon's stay.
It is not possible to do justice to the full scope of interesting details in Dr. Miles' talk. One ARRT questioner encouraged her to publish an overview of George Washington's life portraits and related reproductions so to be more accessible and manageable for the modern audience than the 1931work by Morgan and Fielding.
Dr. Miles was co-curator with Carrie Rebora Barratt of Gilbert Stuart, an exhibition organized jointly by the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the National Portrait Gallery in 2004-05, seen at the Metropolitan Museum and at the National Gallery of Art. She is co-author of the catalogue, published by the Metropolitan Museum of Art and distributed by Yale University Press. Recent publications also include the catalogue for the exhibition George and Martha Washington: Portraits from the Presidential Years, held at the National Portrait Gallery in 1999; A Brush with History; Paintings from the National Portrait Gallery, with Carolyn Kinder Carr (exhibition catalogue, National Portrait Gallery, 2001); and "Gilbert Stuart's Portraits of George Washington," in George Washington: A National Treasure, published in 2002 by the National Portrait Gallery to accompany the exhibition of Stuart's 'Lansdowne' portrait of Washington. In 2002 Dr. Miles was a recipient of a Getty Curatorial Research Fellowship for research for the Stuart catalogue, and in 2004 she was selected at the Smithsonian as the Secretary's Distinguished Research Lecturer. Earlier publications include American Paintings of the Eighteenth Century (Washington, D.C., 1995), a volume in the National Gallery of Art's series of systematic catalogues of its permanent collection; Saint-Mémin and the Neoclassical Profile Portrait in America (National Portrait Gallery/Smithsonian Press, 1994), a study and catalogue of the work of late eighteenth century profilist C.B.J. Févret de Saint-Mémin; and American Colonial Portraits: 1700-1776 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1987), with Richard H. Saunders. She was co-curator of the exhibition of that title at the National Portrait Gallery in 1987 and is editor of a collection of related conference papers, The Portrait in Eighteenth-Century America (University of Delaware Press, 1993). She received her BA from Bryn Mawr College in 1964, and her PhD from Yale University in 1976, both in the history of art. She lectures frequently on topics in American portraiture.
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7 December 2005, "The Year of the Hangman: George Washington's Campaign against the Iroquois." Program was presented by Glenn F. Williams, Historical Operations Officer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC. The speaker covered a complex topic covered in his recently published book of the same title. The topic focused on the western frontiers of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia during 1777 – 1779.
In 1777, the British Indian Department succeeded in winning the powerful Six Nations of the Iroquois to entered the war on the side of the Crown. In 1778, British Provincial rangers and warriors of their allied Indian nations, principally from the Iroquois Confederacy, conducted a campaign of terror along the frontiers of the new United States. These forces, under the command of leaders like Major John Butler and Chief Joseph Brant, conducted raids to destroy agricultural fields producing crops intended for military supply the American Rebel's magazines. These raids further inhibited recruitment of volunteers for Continental Army and tied down militia The initial dependence on militia reaction and the posting of some Continental units in the territory proved ineffective against the active irregular warfare. In 1779, Washington adopted a new strategy that launched a concentrated campaign spearheaded by some of the best Continental Army units and under the command of some of its ablest military officers to invade the land of the Iroquois with the objective to destroy the Indian villages and waste their cornfields.
Keeping up with the names of the various Indian leaders and grasping the interplay of pre-war political factors is challenging to cover in a single talk. The speaker could only hit briefly opon some of the more famous ‘massacres' – Wyoming Valley (July 1778), Cherry Valley (November 1778), etc. – and leaders of the ‘allied forces serving the British Crown' such as Joseph Brant, John Butler, etc. against James Clinton and John Sullivan, etc. for the Patriots. There is no escaping it, one will ‘have to read the book' to get the full story.
However, the speaker was able to highlight some significant points. Importantly he clarified that where some view the American expeditions of 1779 as failing ‘to conquer' the Indian allies of the British, the limited objective clearly described by Washington was achieved. The goal was to "relieve...[the American] frontiers from the depredations" of the Indian raids. In this the American offensive not only dissuaded many tribes from continuing their aggression against the American frontier settlements but also further burdened the British logistical support of their Indian allies. While not fully removing the threat of pro-British Indian attacks, the American campaign significantly broke the larger unity and power of the Six Nations' coalition, relegating the frontier theater to more manageable proportions by the American militias.
Mr. Williams, a member of the ARRT, spent some of his younger years as a part-time docent aboard USS Constellation. While a History major in college, Mr. Williams held seasonal employment with the National Park Service at Fort McHenry National Monument and Historic Shrine. As an officer in the US Army (1975-1996), he held numerous history-related duties, including teaching military history to college Army ROTC cadets. His immediate post Army experience included assignments as Assistant Curator of the Baltimore Civil War Museum - President Street Station, research Historian with the Army Historical Foundation (both 1998-1999), and a docent at the Babe Ruth Museum (1991-1998). He holds a BA in History from Loyola College of Maryland, a MA in History from University of Maryland Baltimore County, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate in History at University of Maryland, College Park.
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2 November 2005, "Dumfries, Virginia and the Weems-Botts Museum." Program was presented by Ms Kimberly Ward, Weems-Botts Museum Administrative Director and Curator. Her slide-assisted presentation gave an overview of the fascinating early history of Dumfries, Virginia. Dumfries happens to be the oldest chartered town in the Commonwealth. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Dumfries was defined by its location where the Quantico Creek entered the Potomac River, and formed an ideal harbor for exporting locally grown tobacco. The town was named after Dumfriesshire, Scotland, the birthplace of John Graham, who built the town's first grist mill in 1690. Over time, the harbor filled in with silt and the community's port lost its commercial edge. For many, Dumfries' history is most known for two colorful personalities who had lived in the same building that is now the ‘Weems-Botts Museum'. These personalities were the Rev. Mason Locke Weems, and attorney Benjamin Botts.
Ms Ward explained that ‘Parson' Mason Locke Weems bought the vestry house of the Quantico Church in 1798, and used the building for his bookstore. Though an educated cleric, Weems made his living as an author and bookseller – undertaking both pursuits with aggressive imagination. Reportedly, he played a fiddle outside his bookstore to attract customers. His most famous authored work was a biography of George Washington. This was the first such work on the Nation's hero. Though, today, many are critical of Weems' injection of legendary accounts in to Washington's early life, the work became very popular and arguably contributed to elevating Washington's status in the early nineteenth century United States.
In 1802, Weems, sold his building to a well known young lawyer, Benjamin Botts. Botts was a rising star in Virginia's legal community. He used the building as his law office, and is best remembered as one of the lead lawyers who successfully defended Aaron Burr during Burr's treason and conspiracy trial.
Between 1869 and 1968, the building was owned as a residence of the Merchant family. In 1975, it was opened as a museum to educate the public on Dumfries and its colorful history. More on the ‘Weems-Botts Museum' can be found at its website http://www.geocities.com/hdvinc
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5 October 2005, "Washington's Crossing the Delaware (December 1776)." Program was presented by Edwin C. Bearss, Chief Historian Emeritus of the National Park Service. Ed Bearss described Washington's 'master stroke' at a time when the American cause reached a critical point. Following a series of military defeats, driven from New York, forced to retreat through New Jersey, Washington's Continental Army was close to disintegrating. Many enlistments were up as the year of 1776 drew to a close. Taking advantage of the vastly larger and well equipped British army going into winter quarters early, Washington launched a daring maneuver, executed under severe weather conditions. His small force crossed the Delaware River on the night of 25 December, marched through show and sleet to launch a surprise, early morning attack on a Hessian detachment at Trenton, NJ. While some elements of Washington's rather complex scheme failed to go as planned, the attack was a great success. Equally daring was Washington's response to an attempt by a British second force to close in on the smaller American army. Using deception and executing a turning maneuver to strike the enemy in its rear areas, Washington was able to defeat much of the larger British army in detail. The effect was to force the British to retire from most of New Jersey during the first month of 1777. It further lifted American morale from serious depths and allowed the Revolution to continue. Washington's operational maneuver on this occasion is regarded by many as the most creative tactical operation of the war. While many in the audience were familiar with the general campaign, all were rewarded by Ed's masterful oral narrative and insertion of rich detail that makes attending his talks so memorable and rewarding.
Ed Bearss is one of the nation's most famous battlefield guides, and is the author of many important works on the wars in North America. His previous programs to the ARRT were: "Battle of Cowpens, 1781" (presented April 2002), "Quest for the ‘Fourteenth Colony' – Canada, and Aftermath, 1775-1776" (presented March 2003), and "The Advance on Saratoga, 1777" (presented March 2004). Ed is arguably the ARRT's most popular program speaker, and deserving of the ARRT Certificate of Appreciation Award.
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On 5 October 2005, Mr. Edwin C. Bearss received the ARRT's Certificate of Appreciation, awarded to individuals who have provided sustained support to the organization.
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7 September 2005, "General George Washington: A Military Life." Program was presented by
Dr. Edward Lengel, a military historian and associate professor at the University of Virginia. His presentation drew upon some themes addressed in his new book on General Washington's military career. The speaker's opening remarks struck a familiar cord with those in the audience who have experienced publishers' preferences for military history. In this case, the publishers wanted ‘drama' and to have the narrative end with a ‘good cavalry charge'. Fortunately Dr. Lengel convinced the publisher that there was enough ‘drama' in Washington's military career for a good book without inventing a climatic cavalry charge in eighteenth-century North America. For his presentation to the ARRT, Dr. Lengel chose to review two significant moments in Washington's military experience.
The first was during Washington pre-revolution years, when the young Washington played a major role in making the Colonial Virginia Regiment a militia unit comparable to the best European regulars. The speaker emphasized that, contrary to the impression promoted in so many popular narratives, Washington was not a proponent of irregular tactics employed by frontiersmen in fighting the Native Americans. Washington saw the British defeat in Braddock's ill fated expedition due to the poor discipline of the European units that were hurriedly assembled and deplored to America. The defeat at The Monongahela (1755) did not prove the superiority of irregular warfare, but only reinforced Washington's appreciation for logistical management and troop discipline. These principles guided Washington in establishing the Virginia Regiment as the best trained and equipped provincial unit in the thirteen colonies. This achievement was the result of Washington learning that the commander had to work long and hard in attending to administrative details, to cultivate support of various political factions, and to appreciate the variety in regional jurisdictions among the American colonies. In effect, Washington had been prepared when the American Revolution came in 1776. As soon as he assumed command at Boston,Washington saw his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental army to forge a professional army, and was able to apply much of what he had learned in developing the Virginia Regiment.
The second significant moment occurred during the 1777-78 Valley Forge winter encampment, where Washington won the respect of his troops. Washington achieved this not by pandering to the troops – as was often the course taken by politically appointed commanders of provincial units -- but by demonstrating his commitment to manage the army efficiently, attending to endless administrative details, and sharing the hardships of the winter encampment. General Washington's personal conduct and sacrifice effectively bonded him with his army. The evidence was exhibited at the Battle of Monmonth (1778), when Washington's mere appearance on the field elicited a degree of positive emotional response not heretofore expressed by the Patriot rank and file.
Dr. Lengel is an associate editor at the Papers of George Washington documentary editing project in Charlottesville, VA. He last gave a program to the ARRT on 1 September 1999, when his topic was "The George Washington Papers and the Battle of Brandywine." His most recent book, General George Washington: A Military Life, (Random House, June 2005), takes the measure of Washington's military career from the French and Indian War to the Revolutionary War and the Quasi-War of the late 1790s. The work has received praising reviews in journals and newspapers as well as by members of the ARRT.
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4 May 2005, "Littoral Warfare in the Chesapeake Bay, 1777-1778" Program was presented by Mr. Mark L. Hayes, a historian at the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C. The scheduled talk was to be on British joint [land and naval] operations conducted by Benedict Arnold in both Virginia and Connecticut during 1781. However, late developing computer complications ‘sunk' the speaker's prepared Power Point presentation, and Mr Hayes substituted an excellent talk on the general background of such operations as they played an important role in the operations in the Chesapeake Bay during the early and mid phases of the American Revolution.
The speaker explained how the British navy was stretched thin during the American Rebellion – especially after France openly joined the conflict. The global scope of naval challenges left limited British naval resources to blockade the American coastline. Even before the French open involvement, cannon, muskets, and other military supplies made it through the blockade to equip the Continental Army. The speaker noted that historians have generally shied away from telling the story of the American inland naval operations as, for the most part, they usually resulted in tactical defeats in contrast to the few spectacular ventures of American seamen engaged in attacking British trade on the open seas. Nevertheless, there is a case to be made for the value of American challenges to the British Navy in the waterways of the Colonies.
Certainly, though a tactical defeat, Arnold's Lake Champlain stand in 1776 managed to frustrate the British strategic scheme, and contributed to the defeat of John Burgoyne's expedition in 1777. Less well known is the Pennsylvania Navy's galleys keeping the British from re-supplying their army in Philadelphia for six weeks in the fall of 1777. However, the struggle in the Chesapeake was of longer duration.
It was well known that exports from the southern colonies were of vital economic importance to the American war effort. The British Navy had the task to keep shipments of rice, indigo, and most of all tobacco from reaching Europe or the West Indies. Destruction of this export trade would go a long way in denying the rebels their needed war materials. Key in this struggle was the entrance to the Chesapeake, the vast twelve-mile opening between Cape Charles and Cape Henry in Virginia. Although under favorable circumstances foreign vessels could slip through, the British were able to maintain a reasonably effective blockade with two or three warships. Other ships of the British squadron – frigates, sloops, and auxiliary vessels – ranged up and down the Bay in search of rebel ships and foreign merchants.
Opposing the British blockade of Chesapeake Bay were the navies and militia of Maryland and Virginia. Of these, it was galleys of the small-sized state navies that were best suited to deal with the British ships. Galleys were deployed in the major rivers to protect merchant vessels from attacks by armed British auxiliaries and boats operating in the Bay. While not intended to directly engage frigates, or even sloops of the Royal Navy, the lower draft galleys constituted a serious threat to British vessels that entered shoal waters.
A close examination of operations during 1777-1778 reveals that the state navies and militias were able to exacerbate the already difficult circumstances facing the British naval forces in the Bay. The British naval commanders in the Chesapeake had the challenges of obtaining provisions for their crews, and maintaining ships that were long overdue shipyard maintenance.
British ships found it necessary to leave their stations at the entrance of the Bay in order to search of fresh water. The American state galleys were relatively effective in discouraging British ships obtaining fresh water and provisions from the sympathetic residents living on Tangier and Watts Island and near the shore in Sommerset County.
The speaker's conclusion was that by limiting the reach of British warships in American waters and interfering with their efforts to obtain fresh provisions and water, the galleys of the Virginia and Maryland navies helped protect the tobacco shipments vital to obtaining loans in France. An examination of the 1777-1778 operations suggests that the states' galleys played a significant role in the new nation's War for Independence.
Mr Hayes' presentation was most informative, and certainly provided excellent background for he returns to give the ARRT his Power Point supported talk on ‘King George's Webbed Feet: British Operations Under Benedict Arnold'. Mr. Hayes has been with the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C. since 1991. He is assistant editor of Naval Documents of the American Revolution and co-author of Sea Raiders of the Continental Navy and The Spanish-American War: Historical Overview and Select Bibliography. He has had chapters published on the "American Civil War battles of Port Royal and New Orleans" and an upcoming chapter on the naval blockade of Cuba during the Spanish-American War. Mr. Hayes has presented several papers on naval topics, including one on ‘Gustavus Conyngham in Spain' to the ARRT in 1994.
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 6 April 2005, "The Flag on Prospect Hill: A New Interpretation"
Program was presented by Mr. Peter Ansoff, President of the North American Vexillological Association (NAVA) and member of the ARRT. The speaker reviewed the traditional view that when the newly formed Continental Army confronted the British troops in Boston in January 1776, the Americans hoisted the ‘Grand Union', or ‘Great Union' flag atop Prospect Hill. This is reflected in the recent photograph of the monument at the right -- the ‘field' of alternating red and white stripes, the ‘canton' being the ‘Union Flag' [or ‘Union Jack'] used by Britain's military. The 'Union Flag' consisted of the Red cross of St. George with white border superimposed over a white cross of St. Andrew, all on a blue background. The speaker proceeded to explain how his research led to his questioning whether this ‘Grand Union' was the flag at Prospect Hill in 1776.
The speaker stated that such a flag had been raised aboard the Continental navy flagship Alfred on 3 December 1775, in Philadelphia harbor; but is questionable if this new naval ensign had been known to the new Continental Army at Boston only a month later. Relying upon new research, the speaker identified three eyewitness accounts of the flag flown on Prospect Hill in early 1776. One account is George Washington's reference to the flag as ‘the Union Flag'. Washington's letter went on to point out the ironic coincidence that the Continental Army had raised the King's flag just before the arrival of the King's speech to Parliament denouncing the revolt in America. Another report by a British transport captain also calls it ‘the Union Flag'. In neither of these two cases are stripes mentioned and the term ‘Union Flag' was the accepted name for the British national flag at that time. A third witness, a British Lieutenant Carter, described what appears to be two flags: the Union Flag and another beneath it with stripes. The speaker suggested that later, nineteenth-century authors
latched on to Carter's description and jumped to the conclusion that he and the other eyewitnesses were describing the same flag that was raised by the Navy in December.
 The speaker illustrated the rather surprising fact that the regular 'Union Flag' was used by the American colonists in the pre-Revolutionary period as a symbol of their resistance to British policies. In some cases, it was modified with the addition of words -- for example, the one raised in Taunton, Massachusetts in October 1774 contained the words ‘LIBERTY' and ‘UNION'. The use of the Union Flag, by the Americans reflected an ambiguity, at the time, in the minds of many rebels that they were fighting as true English subjects for their rights against a despotic parliament, and not to separate from England. This ambiguity continued even after the early clashes at Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill. The flag-raising on Prospect Hill, concurrent with the receipt of the King's speech and the formation of the Continental Army, can be seen symbolically as a final end to the hope that American grievances could be settled within the framework of the British Empire.
The speaker also presented a case that the terms 'Great Union' and 'Grand Union' as names for the union-and-stripes flag were created by later historians and were not used in the 18th century.
Hundreds of books written about the origins of the American flag, and most have simply repeated and embellished the stories introduced by a small group of historians in the mid-nineteenth century. Though well-intentioned, these authors' research was often cursory, and their conclusions were distorted by their own assumptions and attitudes regarding the American flag -- which, in many cases, were very different from those of the founding fathers who created it. Mr. Ansoff's presentation is part of a larger project that is re-examining the primary sources relating to early American flags and the events surrounding their creation and use. His paper on the so-called ‘First Navy Jack' flag received the NAVA's ‘Driver Award' for original contributions to vexillological scholarship, and was published in the NAVA journal, the Raven. Other forthcoming papers in the series will cover the ‘Pine Tree Flag', various ‘Rattlesnake Flags' and the creation of the ‘Stars and Stripes'.
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2 March 2005, "The Charters of Freedom: 'A New World Is at Hand'"
Program was presented by Stacey Bredhoff, Senior Curator at the National Archives, and author of a new book which showcases the Nation's Founding Documents. The particular documents being collectively identified as the 'Charters of Freedom' are the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. As the speaker explained, these 'charters' -- as they have evolved and have interacted with governmental agencies and forums over 200 years -- have defined the rights and freedoms of Americans. Ms Bredhoff briefly surveyed the dramatic events associated with the creation of these key documents. Interestingly, the Declaration of Independence' had only reached the final editing on 4 July 1776, but signing did not begin until much later in the year after copies had been made on parchment. The speaker mentioned some of the philosophies that led to the creation of these historic documents in the 18th century. She then gave a few examples of how some of these 'Charters of Freedom' impacted the course of history in the United States and around the world.
The 'A New World Is at Hand' exhibit opened on Constitution Day in September 2003 after the Rotunda, the museum area in the National Archives building, had been closed since 4 July 2001. The Rotunda underwent renovation and the 'Charters of Freedom' underwent conservation. Before the Rotunda closed, only the first and last pages of the Constitution were on permanent display. Now, all four pages are on permanent display. The 'Charters of Freedom', themselves, are the centerpiece of the exhibit. They are preceded by a display of documents relating to their creataion, and followed by a display of documents telling of their impact. The displayed documents are presented along with images of major figures and events in U.S. history. Combined with quotes from the nation's founders and leaders, these elements reveal the drama, passion, and poignancy of the struggle for freedom that has defined much of U.S. history. The exhibit can be viewed online at: http://www.archives.gov. Go under 'Exhibit Hall', and then under 'The Charters of Freedom'.
Exhibitions Ms Bredhoff has curated include: "The Charters of Freedom—‘A New World Is at Hand'" (2003), "American Originals" (1995-2004), and a series of exhibitions which were awarded the John Wesley Powell Prize by the Society of History in the Federal Government in 1997, and toured the United States from 2001-4. Previous publications include: American Originals: Treasures from the National Archives (2001), Powers of Persuasion: Poster Art from World War II (1994), and Draw! Political Cartoons from Left to Right (1991).
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2 February 2005, "The Tripolitan War."
Program was presented by Richard B. Parker, former U.S. ambassador to Algeria, Lebanon, and Morocco, and author of Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History (2004). The speaker began by reminding the audience that not long after the winning independence, the ‘Big News' in the United States was the nation's first hostage crisis. It was part of an international problem endured by all merchant ships in the Mediterranean and in the waters immediately east of the ‘Pillars of Heracles' as the infamous ‘Barbary pirates' practiced their age-old custom to seize merchant ships of nations not protected by treaties with the various ‘Barbary' states [Algiers, Tunis, Morocco and Tripoli] in North Africa. The practice included not only seizing the cargo as booty, but enslaving the crews to extort ransoms. For years the major European countries protected their ships with treaties and tribute payments to the various Berber coastal states. These North African city ‘states' were remnants of a stronger Turkish empire that since 1659 existed as anarchical republics and lived by plunder.
Over time, the European powers attempted to counter the Barbary corsairs' activities with naval operations, but eventually found it more economical to pay tribute to the North African states rather than finance standing naval presence or to launch suppressive naval and military campaigns in the area. The speaker explained that the Barbary corsairs were not ‘terrorists' in the context of the times. Eighteenth-century corsairs usually had authorization by an established political state. The practice was followed by European and Americans, where the term ‘corsairs' or ‘privateers' were substituted for ‘pirates'.
In the eighteenth century, American merchants ships conducted considerable business in the area. This maritime commerce had been protected by British Treaties before the American Revolution, and for a short time by the French under the 1778-1783 US-French Alliance treaty. However, Independence introduced the new Nation with one of its first serious international challenges, starting with the capture of two US ships off the coast of Portugal in 1785. The speaker introduced the audience to some aspects of the our Nation's response that are often omitted in the brief – almost cliché – descriptions so frequently given in popular media. For example, the initial Nation's response was to pay the tribute.
In the last months of 1793, eleven American ships were seized. The American negotiators were unable to raise the demanded gold to pay the ransom for the crews until the nearly million-dollar ransom was obtained by borrowing from a Jewish moneylender living in Algiers. This money ransomed in 1795, the those captured seamen whom could still be obtained, and had not been sold off to other owners. The speaker noted another exception: an individual who had accepted a high administrative position in the Turkish government.
In the last years of John Adams' administration the US Congress funded the fitting of frigates to engage in a so-called ‘Quasi-War' with France (1797-1801). However, that conflict was quickly resolved by negotiations after a few naval actions. The emerging US naval assets were quickly employed by the next President, Thomas Jefferson in implementing his long held position to engage the Barbary Pirates with force.
In 1801, President Jefferson sent a small ‘punitive expedition' to the Tripolitan theater that managed to partially constrained the corsairs. Tripoli declared war on the United States, but their disorganized fleet retreated as it attempted to passed into the Atlantic when confronted by the newly dispatched American squadron. The Americans cruised the Mediterranean, evacuating American merchantmen and winning several engagements with the corsairs. Later that year, Sweden and some Danish forces joined in the campaign with the Americans. However, destruction of the corsairs remained elusive.
In early, 1802 President Jefferson ordered that the war be pursued with greater vigor, and for a time the Western ‘coalition forces' bombarded Tripoli. US Marines went ashore at Tripoli and contributed small-arms fire to the siege, but the defenders held firm and a significant number of small, fast corsair boats continued to slip through the naval blockade. The Americans sought, but failed to draw the pirates into, decisive naval battle. When Sweden made peace that year, the blockade collapsed
In September 1803, the American commander was replaced by the more aggressive and skillful Captain Edward Preble, accompanied by a subordinate, Stephen Decatur. Both began earning their place in the lore of US Navy history as they performed superbly in a series of actions that continued into early September 1804.
Concurrently, a US Naval agent, William Eaton, led an expedition of a eight US Marines and a band of North Africans overland from Alexandria in an attempt to overthrow the Pasha at Tripoli. What appeared to be an successful joint operation for both Preble and Eaton, was disrupted by the arrival of a replacement US naval commander, Samuel Barron, and Tobias Lear, the US consul general at Algiers. In 1805, Lear concluded a treaty with the Pasha of Tripoli, in which ransom for 300 American prisoners and a reduced tribute was promised to the Pasha. Eaton was forced to abruptly withdraw, leaving his Tripolitan allies stranded. Though criticized in the US, the treaty was approved.
American operations against the Barbary states were temporarily discontinued during the War of 1812 with Britain. The Barbary corsairs took advantage of this intra-Western powers' conflict to increase their activities. With the end of British-American hostilities in 1815, Commodore Stephen Decatur led a squadron of 10 vessels to the Mediterranean. After capturing 2 Algerian warships, he sailed into the harbor of Algiers, where he demanded and received cancellation of all tribute and release of US prisoners without ransom. Similar guarantees were forced from Tunis and Tripoli. This ended the American Barbary Wars.
For Europe, the problem continued until Algiers was conquered by France in 1830.
Ambassador Parker's presentation was made all the more enjoyable by his many references to particular asides: New England cod was in the eighteenth century, and is today, a popular menu item in North Africa; and many of the American participants played distinctive roles in domestic American history.
Amb. Parker has taught at the University of Virginia, Lawrence University, and the John Hopkins University. He was the editor of the Middle East Journal from 1981 to 1987.
ARRT members may recall Dr. Michael J. Crawford's 6 March 2002 talk on how ‘The Barbary Wars' (1801-1715) forced the United States to re-constitute a navy. See separate webpage reviewing ARRT Programs for September 1997 through May 2002.
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No ARRT program was given in January 2005.
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1 December 2004, "Stopping at the Tavern."
Program was presented by Ms Gretchen Bulova, Director of Gadsby's Tavern Museum, in Old Town Alexandria, who gave a very informative and enjoyable PowerPoint presentation on what the eighteenth-century traveler could expect to encounter as at the typical tavern in Alexandria, a rather prospers port town on the Potomac River at the time. Many in the ARRT audience were familiar with ‘Gadsby's' today and had a casual awareness of it playing a role during George Washington's time. A John Wise owned the two-building establishment (a tavern, constructed ca. 1785, and a hotel added in) before it was purchased by the entrepreneurial Englishman John Gadsby in 1796. However, it was Mr. Gadsby that became its most famous tavernkeeper, well known by many of the tavern's famous patrons such as George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson. The most memorable events, still commemorated today, were the ‘Birthnight Balls', held in Washngton's honor and attended by George and Martha in 1798 and 1799.
As to everyday happenings at the tavern: there was food (breakfast, dinner, and supper), drink, and often rudimentary over-night lodging. On occasions there was entertainment, and space for group meetings or general socializing. The speaker covered a variety of alcoholic beverages [cider, beer, wine, and rum], coffee, tea, and chocolate. Pork/bacon was a prominent staple along with corn bread. The Potomac allowed the Alexandria tavern to offer oysters. But the tavern scene was a ‘man's world'. Women came only when escorted, and certainly did not use the crowded bedrooms with multiple-occupancy beds. As the speaker explained, women's accommodations were always arrange at a private home. The speaker introduced a wealth of detail on how we are still learning today about the tavern's operations as archaeology and scholarly research continue.
Again, some in the audience were in the the know, but most were surprised to learn that there were actually two ‘Gadsby's' in the area. John Gadsby abruptly departed Alexandria (leaving some owed bills evidently) and went to Baltimore. In 1808, he came back south to set up the successfully ‘Nation's Hotel' in the new capitol – but many merely referred to it as ‘Gadsby's'.
The City of Alexandria has taken over the original building and ‘Gadsby's Tavern' continues to offer an eighteenth-century Virginian ambiance and menu, and includes a museum. Gadsby's still offers entertainment and hosts Washington's annual Birthnight Ball. Its very full agenda can be see at its website at http://www.gadsbystavern.org
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3 November 2004, "Contributions of African-Americans to the winning of American Independence."
Program was presented by Noel B. Poirier who addressed several themes pertaining to the roll of African Americans in the Revolution. His main theme was that the Continental Army was racially integrated, a fact that has been obscured in general popular historiography. Mr. Poirier gave a convincing argument as to why this has been so. Historians have examined the war – in particular the role of African Americans – through nineteenth and twentieth-century ‘prisms' that ‘filtered' out the actual late mid eighteenth-century social conditions as they existed in the North American colonies. The popular trend of history emphasizing the social aspects of slavery and segregation encouraged even military historians to ignore the African Americans' real contributions – as soldiers and as labors during the American Revolution . Only recently have military historians seriously noted the many contemporary journals and eye-witness drawings by European observers that confirm the presence of a significant number of African Americans in the ranks of the Continental Army -- – "America's first integrated force, an integration that would not again prevail until the Cold War Army of the twentieth century."
Some of the first studies to address the role of African Americans in the war focused on British initiatives, which were basically to use the issue of enslaved African Americans as a political weapon. Lord Dunmore's famous emancipation proclamation was directed toward slaves that deserted their Rebel masters, not Loyalists owners. It was an attempt to undermine the Rebels' social institutions.
Initially, in early 1775, the American Rebel leadership was reluctant to accept the enlistment of freed slaves. However, manpower shortages developed in the ranks as a result of decreasing enlistments of European Americans. The northern states were the most active in accepting the negros who signed up – and there was lax attention to questioning their slave status. By 1778, the Continental Army was substantially an integrated force. This is substantiated by a special report conducted by Col. Alexander Scammell, the Continental Army's adjutant general, dated 24 August 1778. By 1779, many of the senior American officers – Alexander Hamilton, Henry Laurens, Lafayette, Benjamin Lincoln, Nathanael Greene – championed the enlistment of African Americans. South Carolina and Georgia were the only states that refused to enlist African Americans.
The speaker addressed the impact after the war. He emphasized that there needs to be more study, but suggested that the temporary increase in the number of post war slave manumissions seemed to show a relationship to what would be the expected life span of African Americans who had served in the war. His suggestion that this could very well have been due to many of the European American veterans developing a sense of ‘brotherhood' with their former comrades-in-arms. He cautioned that such a phenomena did not raise to the level of a broad acceptance of racial equality, and that it could not correct the social and economic conditions of the later eras that encouraged continued slavery in the South and racial segregation in the Nation.
Another main point made by the speaker was that the African Americans' roles in logistical support of the war are often ignored, but as any military historian knows, the logistics are as critical to campaigns and war outcomes as are the maneuvers of units and direct combat actions. The evidence is that African Americans were very active in arms manufacture and transportation functions, as well as serving on naval and privateer ships. Many African Americans, free and enslaved, worked in the publicly operated arms manufactories in states like Virginia. Again, these men and women worked alongside their Euro-American counterparts, in spite of their status as unfree individuals.
Mr. Poirier's presentation was only an overview of his excellent, scholarly article, "The African American Citizen-Soldier and the Continental Army" published in the Army Historian, Fall 2002 issue. Mr. Poirier received his M.A. in Military Studies from American Military University in Charleston, WV and his BA in American History from Indiana University of Pennsylvania in Indiana, PA. He has worked for the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation since 1992, serving a six-year apprenticeship in the Department of Historic Trades. Mr. Poirier is also a freelance historian, genealogist and author, having written numerous articles in nationally syndicated publications. He is a regular contributor and member of the editorial board of Colonial Williamsburg's Research publication, The Colonial Williamsburg Interpreter. Mr. Poirier's works are cited at his website: http://www.widomaker.com/~npoirier.
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6 October 2004, "Hussars of Lauzun's Legion in the American Revolution."
Program was presented by Dr. Robert A. Selig author of Rochambeau's Cavalry: Lauzun's Legion in Connecticut and several recently researched studies for various State Historical Preservation Offices supporting the 225th Commemoration of the Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route program of the National Park Service. Lauzun's Legion -- Volontaires étrangers de Lauzun -- consisted of infantry, a light cavaly of 'hussars', and a small artillery company. The Legion was formed quickly in early 1780 so as to be deployed with the French expedition.
The speaker explained that France adopted the ‘legion' configuration, composed of irregulars [soldiers committed to limited service] so as to integrate them into the main army structure that was made up of regular [permanent] French regiments. In the eighteenth century, the French created such ‘legions' to expand their armies to meet short term needs of more manpower. With France's increased involvement in ‘overseas' wars, in distant regions from mainland France, legions drew volunteers that included areas outside of metropolitan France. Some ‘legion' troops were raised in overseas areas, but most were volunteers from communities on France's eastern borders, where French cultural traditions were not yet strongly embedded. A large number of the rank and file were German speaking, in addition there were numbers of various various Slavic, Italian and Anglo-Irish volunteers. The term ‘étranger' [literally ‘foreigner'] related more to the basic cultural association – usually non French speaking – of the majority of the rank and file, who were largely French subjects but from regions recently acquired by France. In all cases their officers were French and the units were fully integrated into the French armed forces.
As France formally entered the War of American Independence in 1778, the Volontaires étrangers de la Marine was created. As the name indicated, the organization was under the French navy [marine], and the initial objective was for its employment to be primarily in French colonial territories – West Indies, India, African littoral, etc. The organization originally consisted of eight legions that were soon deployed overseas, except for one that was held as part of a planned force to invade England. In 1780, this latter legion was re designated the Legion de Lauzun, commanded by the battle-experienced Armand Louis de Gontaut- Biron, duc de Lauzun. Its was organized specifically to be part of the French military expedition under the comte de Rochambeau that served in the United States from 1780 to 1783. As there was not enough space aboard the ships when the legion departed France in April 1780, the legion departed without its two fusilier companies, 400 hussars and horses. What arrived at Newport on 11 July 1780 were 250 men of the hussars, the grenadier and chasseur infantry companies, and cannoniers – some 600 men total. Hussars and French officers acquired their horses from American sources. Lauzun's hussars were most noticeable for their Hungarian style uniforms, braggadocio, and unfortunately for their relatively disorderly behavior – the speaker reminded the audience that the term 'hussar' came for a Slavic word for thieves and looters. The hussars performed the usual light cavalry duties: messengers, flank screening, reconnaissance and rapid raids to disrupt the enemy or to obtain loot. The hussars were a unique discipline problem for Rochambeau, whose army is otherwise highly accredited by historians for its exceptional discipline in America. The hussars were generally encamped in remote areas and left unattended by sufficient officers. Their leader, Lauzun, was not the most obedient subordinate. However, he was the 'star player' in the 3 October 1781 'Battle of the Hook' that took place at Gloucester, VA, as part of the Yorktown Siege. Lauzun led a hussar charge that forced the British cavalry under Banastre Tarleton to retreat.
Lauzun's colorful life ended – as with so many to the noblemen officers – at the guillotine 31 December 1793. But the hussars had a longer history. When ‘Lauzun's Legion' was disbanded in June 1783, the mounted units formed the newly created ‘Lauzun's Hussars' and became part of the regular Royal army. With the French Revolution the unit was recast in 1791 as the 6th Hussars, and Lauzun lost his proprietorship. The 6th Hussars disintegrated [desertions to the Austrians being a serious part of the problem] in 1792, and was re-constituted the 5th Hussars. It was dissolved as an active unit in January 1976, and as a reserve unit in December 1992.
Dr. Selig received his Ph.D in history from the Universität Würzburg. He now works and lives in the US. He was Visiting Adjunct Professor of German and History, Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He has held Visiting History Professor positions a various other US and German academic institutions. He is author of many articles in German and American journals, and often published in The Journal of Colonial Williamsburg. His work has established him as a leading scholar on the French Army in North America between 1780 and 1781, and in particular on German-speaking troops who served in the French ranks at the time. His broad field of research and published works are cited in his personal website at http://xenophongroup.com/vita/selig.
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1 September 2004, "Profiling America's Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Battlefields."
Program was presented by Ms Tanya M. Gossett, the Preservation Planner for the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP), National Park Service (NPS). Her talk explained the on going 'Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Historic Preservation Study' which identified and surveyed 246 battlefields, of which 168 were related to the American Revolution. The study's goals are to identify the battlefield sites and evaluate the status of their preservation. The purpose is to establish a base for further examination for more or expanded preservation initiatives. The study, so far, identified almost 40% of the Revolution battlefields as in good or fair condition, but nearly 60% are in a poor or hopelessly lost state. In a few cases, documentation and research is lacking, making fieldwork impossible at this time. It did not surprise many of the ARRT audience to learn that the American Revolution and 1812 wars were only recently given by Congress the attention that for 10 years had addressed only the Civil War battlefields. In November 2003, the House of Representatives (H.R. 3498) proposed to amend the American Battlefield Protection Act of 1996 by establishing a battlefield acquisition grant program for Revolutionary War and War of 1812 battlefields. If approved, this bill will permit using the Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) monies for these earlier wars as is already done for Civil War battlefield acquisitions. More on the ABPP can be learned from its main website, a link to which is given below.
The speaker, Ms Gossett, holds degrees in History and Historic Preservation Planning from James Madison University and Cornell University respectively. Formerly with the National Register of Historic Places, she has worked for the ABPP since 1995. Ms. Gossett is the principal author of the draft report for the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Historic Preservation Study.
This Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Historic Preservation Study covered in a ABPP website at: http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/rev1812.htm
The broader mission and work of the ABPP are covered on their main website at: http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/index.htm
The main ARRT page has links to special data lists of battlefields that are maintained by the ABPP.
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At the 1 September 2004 program meeting, a member of the Executive Committee of the American Revolution Round Table (ARRT) of the District of Columbia, Colonel Henry G. Morgan (USA, Ret), presented a special plaque in the name of the ARRT -- a "Citation of Exceptional Contribution" awarded to Colonel George R. Allin, Jr. (USA, Ret) for his faithful service over many years as the ARRT Program Meeting Attendance Chairman.
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5 May 2004,"Battle of Hobkirk's Hill (25 April 1781)."
The speaker was Dr. Dennis M. Conrad, who is a scholar on General Nathanael Greene, described and analyized this famous battle. Hobkirk's Hill was an engagement wherein General Greene, considered by many as one of the best generals of the American Revolution, believed he should have won. The reason, or reasons, he did not remain controversial and were masterfully assessed by the speaker. Dr. Conrad began the story after the Battle of Guilford Court House (15 March 1781), where Cornwallis won a ‘technical victory' by remaining ‘on the filed', but Nathanael Greene achieved a strategic advantage in inflicting such losses on the British force that the latter lost its previous advantage to remain on the offensive. In fact, there followed a strange sequel wherein the ‘defeated' American army now pursued the British ‘victor', which was withdrawing to the North Carolina port at Wilmington to be re-supplied. Though eager for a 'rematch', Greene, on 8 April, demonstrated his keen strategic sense, and decided to re focus on his primary objective of diminishing the British military position in South Carolina.
With Cornwallis' departure, the British commander in South Carolina was General Rawdon, who commanded 8,000 men that were at scattered posts in South Carolinia and Georgia, approximately 900 of whom where with him at his headquarters in Camden (SC). Greene led his approximately 1,500 man army directly south to attack Rawdon at Camden. On 19 April, Greene's army took up a position at Hobkirk's Hill, less than two miles north of Camden. Rawdon responded actively, launching a preempted, surprise attack against the American camp, striking the American picket's in mid morning of 25 April.
Noting the narrow British front initially presented in the British assault, Greene quickly countered by directing a double envelopment of the enemy's attacking elements, in addition to deploying William Washington's dragons on a deep end movement to take the enemy in the rear. Rowden countered quickly by extending his front line that not only denied the British flanks to the American maneuver, but even allowed for the British to press the American left flank. One of the American company commanders was killed early in the action, which introduced some confusion on the American flank. The commander of the American regiment in that sector attempted to have the units fall back and re form their line. Unfortunately, the American units failed to execute the order with discipline, resulting in further confusion and forcing a complete withdrawal of Greene's entire force from the field. Though the British were again technically ‘victorious', in that they remained ‘on the field', Rowden decided afterwards to abandon the Camden post and retreated to Charleston (SC). Other exposed British Southern posts began to fall, and the British in the Southern Theater were soon reduced to their main positions being Charleston (SC) and Savannah (GA).
The collapse of the American left at Hobkirk's Hill, made up largely of the Maryland Continentals who had a long record of accomplishments, has drawn considerable examination by historians. After addressing several theories, Dr. Conrad presented his conclusion that it was a severe shortage of officers that prevented the Maryland units from executing a disciplined and orderly change in position on the battlefield. The situation was made worse due to the large number of Loyalist in the British force, and reportedly Rowden made good use of these marksmen to pick off the few American leaders that there were with the troops. It did not help that Greene had sent his cavalry on a rather unproductive enterprise, rather than holding it in reserve. The famous ‘Carolina Gamecock', Thomas Sumter, declined to join his Partisan force in the campaign when requested by Greene. While this really did not influence the Hobkirk's Hill battle, it did cause animosity between the two men, that continued after Greene's death [at age 44, in 1786 of sunstroke] and fostered a post war US Senator Sumter to obstruct US payment of money owed Greene's estate.
Dr. Conrad is an historian at the Early History Branch of the Naval Historical Center. There he is an editor on the Naval Documents of the American Revolution series, volume 11 of which is soon to be published. Dr. Conrad recently published a short biography of John Paul Jones in Sea Raiders of the American Revolution: The Continental Navy in European Waters.
Prior to coming to the NHC, he served as editor and project director of the Papers of General Nathanael Greene. He directed the completion of volumes 7 through 12 of that series covering Greene's campaigns in the South. He continues his association with the Greene Papers, serving as a contributing editor for volume 13, the final volume of the series. Greene was also the subject of Conrad's doctoral dissertation at Duke University. On 2 April 2003, Dr. Conrad presented the ARRT program titled: "Anticipating Newburgh: The Resignation of Nathanael Greene as Quartermaster General."
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7 April 2004,"Two Roads to Batsto."
The speaker was Mr. Dale Denda, who has been working at unraveling the confusing and often contradictory accounts of this action for several years, in an effort to assure the preservation of the historic site. Mr Denda's exceptional Powerpoint presentation tackled a complex story. Part of the problem has been that few historians are prepared to agree where the main military action actually took place. Captain Patrick Ferguson, the British commander at Little Egg Harbor (and the inventor of the famous "Ferguson Rifle") left three different accounts of the action of 15 October 1778, which differ in several particulars. The British raid on the privateer base at Chestnut Neck on 6-7 October 1778 is pretty well established, but the British withdrew hurriedly in the face arriving Continental troops: Pulaski's Legion, and a company of artillery, both sent from Trenton on 4 October. The British remained offshore for almost a week before landing again at the Loyalist refuge of Osborne Island, at the mouth of the Mullica River, probably about 2 or 3 am on 15 October. Their commander, Captain Patrick Ferguson, has said he intended to surprise Pulaski's Legion, and then move some 20 miles upriver to destroy the warehouses and iron works at Batsto. Pulaski, though he had to guard against two routes of approach to his position at Little Egg Harbor, led the defense well enough that only the "outpost" of about 50 men was overrun by Ferguson's attack. Although Ferguson withdrew to Osbounre Island by 5 am and burned the bridge to the mainland behind him, the British squadron stayed in the area for several days longer. Apparently Ferguson's operation, despite the success he claimed for it, did not serve as the first step for an attack on Batsto as planned.
Mr. Dale Denda, is a student of military history, manages a market and operations research firm in McLean, Virginia. In June 2000, he became involved with Affair at Egg Harbor Historical Society to assist in developing a long-term preservation plan for a site and monument marking the Pulaski Legion's defense of Little Egg Harbor. Denda is a Detroit native, received a Bachelors degree in the Arts from University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and has done graduate studies work abroad. He is a Northern Virginia resident and a member of the Company of Military Historians
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3 March 2004,"The Advance on Saratoga, 1777."
The speaker was Edwin C. Bearss, Chief Historian Emeritus of the National Park Service, who rewarded ARRT members and guests with the very fine and dynamic presentation on the famous and critical Saratoga Campaign of 1777. This presentation was a follow-on to the speaker's talk in March of 2003 that addressed the 1775 failed American invasion into Canada. One of the main figures in the earlier venture, Arnold, remained prominantly on the scene when the British, under ‘Gentleman Johnny' Burgoyne led his forces down Lake Champlain in 1777, with the intent to converge with other British thrusts at Albany, New York. With the British already occupying New York City at the south end of the Hudson River, Burgoyne's seizure of Albany would effectively cut New England from the rest of the rebellious colonies. General Montgomery, the American commander who was killed at Quebec in 1777, would had been the American commander in in the Northern Theater to have met the British advance. His place was first taken by General Schuyler, who was unable to rally the New England militias needed to meet the threat. The British advance appeared unstoppable after their capture of Fort Ticonderoga on 5 July.
Ed explained how a tapestry of events soon unraveled Burgoyne's grand scheme. Ed addressed how the Americans reorganized and checked the British pursuit at Hubbardton (7 July), how Burgoyne blundered in deciding to cut a road – rather than take a water route – from Skenesboro to Fort Ann as he advanced upon Fort Edward, and how the publicized murder of Jane McCrae mustered the militia for the battle at Bennington. Even though the American cause was looking better, Congress replaced the unpopular Schuyler with general Horatio Gates. About the same time a separate British army approaching from the northwest, meant to support Burgoyne's advance, was thwarted at Fort Stanwix and Orisknay. These various events came together to impact upon the decisive outcome at Saratoga, New York, in late September and early October 1777.
With excellent map handouts, Ed described the tactical detail of the two battles of Saratoga – ‘Freeman's Farm' [the ‘first battle' on 19 September] and ‘Bemis' Heights' [‘the ‘second battle' on 7 October]. The ‘first battle' did gain for Burgoyne the position of Freeman's Farm. but at a considerable price in lives. The American field defenses had been directed by the French trained, Polish military engineer Kosciuszko, and influenced the direction of the battle, forcing the emphasis at Freeman's Farm. Neither Gates nor Burgoyne were up to taking advantage of the fluid situation. Only Arnold appeared to be the dynamic leader, but he was snubbed by Gates in the latter's report of the action. The rift between the two American commanders caused Gates to remove Arnold from any official command in the subsequent, ‘second battle'.
In the meantime, the British commander at New York, Sir Henry Clinton, had advanced north from New York City and seized the American forts Clinton and Montgomery, and pushed up beyond West Point on the Hudson River. However, Clinton was to learn that on the day he took Fort Clinton, Burgoyne had fought and lost his ‘second battle' [‘Bemis'] at Saratoga. The American victory was unquestionably attributed to Arnold imposing himself into the battle at two critical moments – being wounded in the effort. Unaware of the progress of Clinton from the south, and suffering extensive losses and low reserves, Burgoyne surrendered. The British troops and German mercenaries were designated to being the ‘Convention Army'. Knowing of Clinton's advance, Gates agreed to ‘a convention' in which the prisoners would be allowed to return to Europe in exchange for promising not to fight again in the war, The US Congress later disavowed the terms, and except for the most senior British officers, the surrendered British and German troops remained prisoners until the end of the war. In terms that a British army was defeated, it was a specular victory. It brought Gates undeserved acclaim, and encouraged France to openly associate itself with the American cause with an alliance.
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4 February 2004,"Spain's Participation in the American Revolution."
The speaker was Hector L. Diaz, Governor of the Washington D.C. Chapter of the ‘Granaderos and Damas de Gálvez' and President of ‘The Hispanics in History Cultural Organization'. Mr. Diaz explained that his presentation could only be an overview so as to identify the broad scope of Spain's contribution to the American colonies winning independence. Like France, Spain was providing some material support and financial backing that sustained the American army. Spain contributed half of the initial seed money that launched in 1775 the ‘Roderique Hortalez' company which shipped the bulk of military materiel that sustained the American Rebels in the field during the initial phases of the war. American privateers were allowed to operate out of Spanish ports in Europe and in the Caribbean. Spain's reluctance to openly go to war against Great Britain was influenced both by not wanting the British to take advantage of a dispute Spain was having with Portugal (an ally of the British), and also Spain felt vulnerable in parts of North America, such as Louisiana, where Spanish colonies shared land borders with the English colonies. This latter concern was a factor in Spain not signing an alliance treaty, as had France in 1778, with the American colonies.
Persuaded with promises of French help to regain Gibraltar and Minorca, Spain eventually declared war against Britain in 1779. Immediately Spain engaged in a series of naval and military campaigns which diluted British power between Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Since so much of Spain's participation was either secret and often conducted apart from US military operations, the story is not reflected in the general American history narratives.
Probably the most recognized episode of Spain's role is that of the charismatic governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Gálvez, the conqueror of British West Florida, climaxed with his victory at Pensacola in 1781. But little is know of Fernado de Leyba, who rose from his death-bed to successfully lead the defense of strategic ‘San Luís de Ilinoa' (St. Louis, Missouri), against a British force several times the size of his own.
Though no Spanish troops took part in the fighting at Yorktown in 1781, Spanish officials played an important background role in that most decisive campaign of the war. It was with Bernardo de Gálvez's permission, as the overall commander of French and Spanish forces in the West Indies, that the French admiral de Grasse was allowed to take his full fleet and a large contingent of French troops to the Chesapeake. These naval and military assets proved to be essential in the operations that developed. Equally important was the 1,200,000 livres collected in only a few hours from citizens in Havana and given to de Grasse as he was en route to Virginia. This money sustained the French and American forces which found themselves nearly pennyless as they commenced the siege fo Yorktown.
Mr Diaz was able to address many more aspects in the long question and answer period that followed his talk. He certainly succeeded in his mission to provide the assembled ARRT members a better understanding of the contributions of Spain and Spanish America to the American Revolution. His handout of a bibliography on his topic is available on a separate webpage, along with recommended links to webpages, see:
bibliography03.htm
Born in Puerto Rico in 1955, Mr. Díaz is a Psychologist, historian and professional actor by training. He has been researching the Hispanic assistance to the American Revolution since the mid-1980's, and recreating the Hispanic troops of General Bernardo de Gálvez since 1993. Mr. Diaz is the author of Maryland's "Senate Joint Resolution 2" adopted in 1997, which recognizes the "Hispanic Participation in the American War of Independence" and of several articles written for COBBLESTONE Magazine. Hector Diaz' e-mail is: hldiaz60@hotmail.com
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No ARRT program was given in January 2004.
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3 December 2003, "The Southern Indian Frontier and its Role in the American Revolution. " The speaker was Mr. Jerry Clark, who presented an overview of the Cherokees during the period of the American Revolution. Mr. Clark reminded the audience that for the Native Americans, this was only a small part of a longer era of Cherokee and Anglo-American conflicts. The speaker's several handouts proved essential to support his array of unusual ‘Indian' names and to orient one to the many geographic locations not found on most maps. Mr. Clark explained some of the unusual characteristics of the Cherokees. They settled along the rivers, spanning out from where modern Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee join, in a mostly northeastward direction along the Tennessee River. The Cherokees covered 4 sub regions and consisted of 7 clans. Sons belong to their mothers' clan; daughters to their fathers'. Chiefs were elected, and there were different ones for various functions: war, managing slaves, and various ‘administrative' affairs . Much of Mr. Clark's talk built upon the influences of European traders [a considerable number of whom were Highland Scotsmen] who lived and married among the polygamous Cherokees. These European traders, called ‘Indian Country Men' often married the daughters of Indian chiefs and their offspring produced an unofficial aristocracy that held considerable influence in Cherokee leadership for years.
As far as impacting the American Revolution, Mr. Clark made the observation that Cherokees failed to conduct coordinated military operations against the European settlers known as ‘the over the mountain men', These European [or immediate descendants of Europeans] on the Colonial frontier were not prone to favor the American rebellion from the English King. However, British policy just before the Revolution was perceived as too pro ‘Indian', and fear of the Indians overcame otherwise tendency to support Loyalists. As the ‘over the mountain men' managed to successfully subdue the ‘Indian' communities on their frontier, they turned their attention in defeating the British Loyalists at the very critical battle of King's Mountain.
Mr. Clark is an Archivist at the US National Archives, and a specialists in Cherokee records and the holdings of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. He has a B.S. in history from West Chester State University in Pennsylvania, and did graduate study at the American University in D.C. He served in the U.S. Navy, and is a registered citizen of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.
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