List of Previous Programs
of the
American Revolution Round Table
of the District of Columbia

(September 2002 through May 2004)


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5 May 2004,"Battle of Hobkirk's Hill (25 April 1781)." The speaker was Dr. Dennis M. Conrad, who is a scholar on General Nathanael Greene, described and analyized this famous battle. Hobkirk's Hill was an engagement wherein General Greene, considered by many as one of the best generals of the American Revolution, believed he should have won. The reason, or reasons, he did not remain controversial and were masterfully assessed by the speaker. Dr. Conrad began the story after the Battle of Guilford Court House (15 March 1781), where Cornwallis won a ‘technical victory' by remaining ‘on the filed', but Nathanael Greene achieved a strategic advantage in inflicting such losses on the British force that the latter lost its previous advantage to remain on the offensive. In fact, there followed a strange sequel wherein the ‘defeated' American army now pursued the British ‘victor', which was withdrawing to the North Carolina port at Wilmington to be re-supplied. Though eager for a 'rematch', Greene, on 8 April, demonstrated his keen strategic sense, and decided to re focus on his primary objective of diminishing the British military position in South Carolina.

With Cornwallis' departure, the British commander in South Carolina was General Rawdon, who commanded 8,000 men that were at scattered posts in South Carolinia and Georgia, approximately 900 of whom where with him at his headquarters in Camden (SC). Greene led his approximately 1,500 man army directly south to attack Rawdon at Camden. On 19 April, Greene's army took up a position at Hobkirk's Hill, less than two miles north of Camden. Rawdon responded actively, launching a preempted, surprise attack against the American camp, striking the American picket's in mid morning of 25 April.
Noting the narrow British front initially presented in the British assault, Greene quickly countered by directing a double envelopment of the enemy's attacking elements, in addition to deploying William Washington's dragons on a deep end movement to take the enemy in the rear. Rowden countered quickly by extending his front line that not only denied the British flanks to the American maneuver, but even allowed for the British to press the American left flank. One of the American company commanders was killed early in the action, which introduced some confusion on the American flank. The commander of the American regiment in that sector attempted to have the units fall back and re form their line. Unfortunately, the American units failed to execute the order with discipline, resulting in further confusion and forcing a complete withdrawal of Greene's entire force from the field. Though the British were again technically ‘victorious', in that they remained ‘on the field', Rowden decided afterwards to abandon the Camden post and retreated to Charleston (SC). Other exposed British Southern posts began to fall, and the British in the Southern Theater were soon reduced to their main positions being Charleston (SC) and Savannah (GA).
The collapse of the American left at Hobkirk's Hill, made up largely of the Maryland Continentals who had a long record of accomplishments, has drawn considerable examination by historians. After addressing several theories, Dr. Conrad presented his conclusion that it was a severe shortage of officers that prevented the Maryland units from executing a disciplined and orderly change in position on the battlefield. The situation was made worse due to the large number of Loyalist in the British force, and reportedly Rowden made good use of these marksmen to pick off the few American leaders that there were with the troops. It did not help that Greene had sent his cavalry on a rather unproductive enterprise, rather than holding it in reserve. The famous ‘Carolina Gamecock', Thomas Sumter, declined to join his Partisan force in the campaign when requested by Greene. While this really did not influence the Hobkirk's Hill battle, it did cause animosity between the two men, that continued after Greene's death [at age 44, in 1786 of sunstroke] and fostered a post war US Senator Sumter to obstruct US payment of money owed Greene's estate.
Dr. Conrad is an historian at the Early History Branch of the Naval Historical Center. There he is an editor on the Naval Documents of the American Revolution series, volume 11 of which is soon to be published. Dr. Conrad recently published a short biography of John Paul Jones in Sea Raiders of the American Revolution: The Continental Navy in European Waters. Prior to coming to the NHC, he served as editor and project director of the Papers of General Nathanael Greene. He directed the completion of volumes 7 through 12 of that series covering Greene's campaigns in the South. He continues his association with the Greene Papers, serving as a contributing editor for volume 13, the final volume of the series. Greene was also the subject of Conrad's doctoral dissertation at Duke University. On 2 April 2003, Dr. Conrad presented the ARRT program titled: "Anticipating Newburgh: The Resignation of Nathanael Greene as Quartermaster General."

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7 April 2004,"Two Roads to Batsto." The speaker was Mr. Dale Denda, who has been working at unraveling the confusing and often contradictory accounts of this action for several years, in an effort to assure the preservation of the historic site. Mr Denda's exceptional Powerpoint presentation tackled a complex story. Part of the problem has been that few historians are prepared to agree where the main military action actually took place. Captain Patrick Ferguson, the British commander at Little Egg Harbor (and the inventor of the famous "Ferguson Rifle") left three different accounts of the action of 15 October 1778, which differ in several particulars. The British raid on the privateer base at Chestnut Neck on 6-7 October 1778 is pretty well established, but the British withdrew hurriedly in the face arriving Continental troops: Pulaski's Legion, and a company of artillery, both sent from Trenton on 4 October. The British remained offshore for almost a week before landing again at the Loyalist refuge of Osborne Island, at the mouth of the Mullica River, probably about 2 or 3 am on 15 October. Their commander, Captain Patrick Ferguson, has said he intended to surprise Pulaski's Legion, and then move some 20 miles upriver to destroy the warehouses and iron works at Batsto. Pulaski, though he had to guard against two routes of approach to his position at Little Egg Harbor, led the defense well enough that only the "outpost" of about 50 men was overrun by Ferguson's attack. Although Ferguson withdrew to Osbounre Island by 5 am and burned the bridge to the mainland behind him, the British squadron stayed in the area for several days longer. Apparently Ferguson's operation, despite the success he claimed for it, did not serve as the first step for an attack on Batsto as planned.

Mr. Dale Denda, is a student of military history, manages a market and operations research firm in McLean, Virginia. In June 2000, he became involved with Affair at Egg Harbor Historical Society to assist in developing a long-term preservation plan for a site and monument marking the Pulaski Legion's defense of Little Egg Harbor. Denda is a Detroit native, received a Bachelors degree in the Arts from University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and has done graduate studies work abroad. He is a Northern Virginia resident and a member of the Company of Military Historians

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3 March 2004,"The Advance on Saratoga, 1777." The speaker was Edwin C. Bearss, Chief Historian Emeritus of the National Park Service, who rewarded ARRT members and guests with the very fine and dynamic presentation on the famous and critical Saratoga Campaign of 1777. This presentation was a follow-on to the speaker's talk in March of 2003 that addressed the 1775 failed American invasion into Canada. One of the main figures in the earlier venture, Arnold, remained prominantly on the scene when the British, under ‘Gentleman Johnny' Burgoyne led his forces down Lake Champlain in 1777, with the intent to converge with other British thrusts at Albany, New York. With the British already occupying New York City at the south end of the Hudson River, Burgoyne's seizure of Albany would effectively cut New England from the rest of the rebellious colonies. General Montgomery, the American commander who was killed at Quebec in 1777, would had been the American commander in in the Northern Theater to have met the British advance. His place was first taken by General Schuyler, who was unable to rally the New England militias needed to meet the threat. The British advance appeared unstoppable after their capture of Fort Ticonderoga on 5 July.

Ed explained how a tapestry of events soon unraveled Burgoyne's grand scheme. Ed addressed how the Americans reorganized and checked the British pursuit at Hubbardton (7 July), how Burgoyne blundered in deciding to cut a road – rather than take a water route – from Skenesboro to Fort Ann as he advanced upon Fort Edward, and how the publicized murder of Jane McCrae mustered the militia for the battle at Bennington. Even though the American cause was looking better, Congress replaced the unpopular Schuyler with general Horatio Gates. About the same time a separate British army approaching from the northwest, meant to support Burgoyne's advance, was thwarted at Fort Stanwix and Orisknay. These various events came together to impact upon the decisive outcome at Saratoga, New York, in late September and early October 1777.
With excellent map handouts, Ed described the tactical detail of the two battles of Saratoga – ‘Freeman's Farm' [the ‘first battle' on 19 September] and ‘Bemis' Heights' [‘the ‘second battle' on 7 October]. The ‘first battle' did gain for Burgoyne the position of Freeman's Farm. but at a considerable price in lives. The American field defenses had been directed by the French trained, Polish military engineer Kosciuszko, and influenced the direction of the battle, forcing the emphasis at Freeman's Farm. Neither Gates nor Burgoyne were up to taking advantage of the fluid situation. Only Arnold appeared to be the dynamic leader, but he was snubbed by Gates in the latter's report of the action. The rift between the two American commanders caused Gates to remove Arnold from any official command in the subsequent, ‘second battle'.
In the meantime, the British commander at New York, Sir Henry Clinton, had advanced north from New York City and seized the American forts Clinton and Montgomery, and pushed up beyond West Point on the Hudson River. However, Clinton was to learn that on the day he took Fort Clinton, Burgoyne had fought and lost his ‘second battle' [‘Bemis'] at Saratoga. The American victory was unquestionably attributed to Arnold imposing himself into the battle at two critical moments – being wounded in the effort. Unaware of the progress of Clinton from the south, and suffering extensive losses and low reserves, Burgoyne surrendered. The British troops and German mercenaries were designated to being the ‘Convention Army'. Knowing of Clinton's advance, Gates agreed to ‘a convention' in which the prisoners would be allowed to return to Europe in exchange for promising not to fight again in the war, The US Congress later disavowed the terms, and except for the most senior British officers, the surrendered British and German troops remained prisoners until the end of the war. In terms that a British army was defeated, it was a specular victory. It brought Gates undeserved acclaim, and encouraged France to openly associate itself with the American cause with an alliance.

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4 February 2004,"Spain's Participation in the American Revolution." The speaker was Hector L. Diaz, Governor of the Washington D.C. Chapter of the ‘Granaderos and Damas de Gálvez' and President of ‘The Hispanics in History Cultural Organization'. Mr. Diaz explained that his presentation could only be an overview so as to identify the broad scope of Spain's contribution to the American colonies winning independence. Like France, Spain was providing some material support and financial backing that sustained the American army. Spain contributed half of the initial seed money that launched in 1775 the ‘Roderique Hortalez' company which shipped the bulk of military materiel that sustained the American Rebels in the field during the initial phases of the war. American privateers were allowed to operate out of Spanish ports in Europe and in the Caribbean. Spain's reluctance to openly go to war against Great Britain was influenced both by not wanting the British to take advantage of a dispute Spain was having with Portugal (an ally of the British), and also Spain felt vulnerable in parts of North America, such as Louisiana, where Spanish colonies shared land borders with the English colonies. This latter concern was a factor in Spain not signing an alliance treaty, as had France in 1778, with the American colonies.

Persuaded with promises of French help to regain Gibraltar and Minorca, Spain eventually declared war against Britain in 1779. Immediately Spain engaged in a series of naval and military campaigns which diluted British power between Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Since so much of Spain's participation was either secret and often conducted apart from US military operations, the story is not reflected in the general American history narratives.
Probably the most recognized episode of Spain's role is that of the charismatic governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Gálvez, the conqueror of British West Florida, climaxed with his victory at Pensacola in 1781. But little is know of Fernado de Leyba, who rose from his death-bed to successfully lead the defense of strategic ‘San Luís de Ilinoa' (St. Louis, Missouri), against a British force several times the size of his own.
Though no Spanish troops took part in the fighting at Yorktown in 1781, Spanish officials played an important background role in that most decisive campaign of the war. It was with Bernardo de Gálvez's permission, as the overall commander of French and Spanish forces in the West Indies, that the French admiral de Grasse was allowed to take his full fleet and a large contingent of French troops to the Chesapeake. These naval and military assets proved to be essential in the operations that developed. Equally important was the 1,200,000 livres collected in only a few hours from citizens in Havana and given to de Grasse as he was en route to Virginia. This money sustained the French and American forces which found themselves nearly pennyless as they commenced the siege fo Yorktown.
Mr Diaz was able to address many more aspects in the long question and answer period that followed his talk. He certainly succeeded in his mission to provide the assembled ARRT members a better understanding of the contributions of Spain and Spanish America to the American Revolution. His handout of a bibliography on his topic is available on a separate webpage, along with recommended links to webpages, see: bibliography03.htm
Born in Puerto Rico in 1955, Mr. Díaz is a Psychologist, historian and professional actor by training. He has been researching the Hispanic assistance to the American Revolution since the mid-1980's, and recreating the Hispanic troops of General Bernardo de Gálvez since 1993. Mr. Diaz is the author of Maryland's "Senate Joint Resolution 2" adopted in 1997, which recognizes the "Hispanic Participation in the American War of Independence" and of several articles written for COBBLESTONE Magazine. Hector Diaz' e-mail is: hldiaz60@hotmail.com

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No ARRT program was given in January 2004.

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3 December 2003, "The Southern Indian Frontier and its Role in the American Revolution. " The speaker was Mr. Jerry Clark, who presented an overview of the Cherokees during the period of the American Revolution. Mr. Clark reminded the audience that for the Native Americans, this was only a small part of a longer era of Cherokee and Anglo-American conflicts. The speaker's several handouts proved essential to support his array of unusual ‘Indian' names and to orient one to the many geographic locations not found on most maps. Mr. Clark explained some of the unusual characteristics of the Cherokees. They settled along the rivers, spanning out from where modern Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee join, in a mostly northeastward direction along the Tennessee River. The Cherokees covered 4 sub regions and consisted of 7 clans. Sons belong to their mothers' clan; daughters to their fathers'. Chiefs were elected, and there were different ones for various functions: war, managing slaves, and various ‘administrative' affairs . Much of Mr. Clark's talk built upon the influences of European traders [a considerable number of whom were Highland Scotsmen] who lived and married among the polygamous Cherokees. These European traders, called ‘Indian Country Men' often married the daughters of Indian chiefs and their offspring produced an unofficial aristocracy that held considerable influence in Cherokee leadership for years.

As far as impacting the American Revolution, Mr. Clark made the observation that Cherokees failed to conduct coordinated military operations against the European settlers known as ‘the over the mountain men', These European [or immediate descendants of Europeans] on the Colonial frontier were not prone to favor the American rebellion from the English King. However, British policy just before the Revolution was perceived as too pro ‘Indian', and fear of the Indians overcame otherwise tendency to support Loyalists. As the ‘over the mountain men' managed to successfully subdue the ‘Indian' communities on their frontier, they turned their attention in defeating the British Loyalists at the very critical battle of King's Mountain.
Mr. Clark is an Archivist at the US National Archives, and a specialists in Cherokee records and the holdings of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. He has a B.S. in history from West Chester State University in Pennsylvania, and did graduate study at the American University in D.C. He served in the U.S. Navy, and is a registered citizen of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.

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5 November 2003, "Captain Bird's Cannon: the British Expedition Against the Kentucky Frontier in 1780. " The speaker was Dr. Richard Bradford, who described the June 1780 British expedition under Captain Henry Bird and a large force of Indians that attacked American settlements in the western frontier area of present day Kentucky. Dr. Bradford's Talk was a great service to the ARRT in addressing the much ignored western theater of operations in the American War for Independence.

As part of the overall British Western Strategy for 1780 Captain Henry Bird was to capture Ft. Nelson at the Falls of the Ohio, present day Louisville, Ky. The British expedition departed Detroit by water with 2 cannon field pieces [one 3-pounder and one 6-pounder]. These were difficult to take considering the amount of portaging involved, especially to get to the Miami River that led to the main water way, the Ohio River. Cannon, especially 6-pounders or larger, were effective in siege operations against the wood stockade fortresses commonly used in the frontier area. Without gun powder artillery, sieges usually had to resort to the less desirable options of either starving the defenders [involving lengthy operations that were unpopular with the Indians and offered some advantage to the besieged] or deceptive stratagems.
From the beginning, Bird had to compromise his plans to accommodate his Indian allies. Rather than head directly toward the most significant American forts further west along the Ohio, the Indians insisted on picking off some easier, small settlements between the Licking and Kentucky rivers. The British-Indian force ascended the Licking to surprise and force the surrender of Ruddle's Station. The threat of Indians rushing into the compound through a breach in the wooden stockade made by cannon fire influenced the Americans to surrender under the promise from the British that prisoners would not be subjected to capture and plunder by the Indians. As with many similar events in the war, the British commander was unable to control his Indian allies. The next American position to fall was Martin's station, and the scene was repeated.
The savagery of the Indians also had an adverse impact on Bird's overall operation. First, it quickly set off a reaction among other settlements that allowed George Rogers Clark, the American commander to the west, to raise a large expedition to move against the British offensive. Further, the Indians' actions entailed the killing of the settlers' livestock, leaving Bird's force with limited means to feed not only his own troops, but the large number of prisoners. Bird was forced to withdraw back to Detroit, abandoning his cannon so as to keep ahead of Clark's pursuing Americans.
As he pursued Bird's expedition, Clark destroyed important Indian villages: Piqua, on the (Great) Miami River, in August 1780; and Chillichothe, to the southeast on the Little Miami River, in the following November. Clark's burning of the Indian corn fields created considerable hardship for the Indians. However, Clark did not have the forces and support to continue further toward Detroit.
Dr. Bradford added considerable depth to his presentation with background material that placed the military campaign in better perspective. For example, the fighting on the western frontier was an extension of European (or their decedents) – ‘white settlers' – warfare with the Native Americans [‘Indians'] that began long before the American Revolution. In defiance of the British Proclamation Act of 1764, the ‘white' settlers proceeded to push westward into territory that is now ‘Kentucky'. Cherokees and Shawnees responded with raiding excursions in to the ‘Dark and Bloody Ground' – so named because it was the traditional hunting land of the natives. As a result, the British were able to enlist many of the Native American tribes in coalition operations against the ‘white' settlers.
An irony is that these frontier ‘whites' were assumed to be Rebels or Rebel sympathizers, and opponents to the British policies pertaining to the western frontier. However, a good number of the ‘whites' living in the settlements attacked by Bird's expedition were actually German immigrants with no close ties to the independence movement, and Tory sympathizers seeking to escape discrimination in the established colonial settlements to the east – otherwise, persons not disposed to fight against the British.
Dr.. Bradford is a member of the ARRT and a retired as Professor of History at West Virginia University Institute of Technology. After service in the Marine Corps, he received a BA from Penn State and his MA and Ph.D from Indiana University. His primary research interests are in frontier, diplomatic and military/naval history. His first book The Virginius Affair won the National Phi Alpha Theta Award for the ‘Best First Book in History'. He co-edited, with his wife Mary E., An American Family on the African Frontier: The Burnham Letters, 1893 -1896. His articles, primarily in Diplomatic and Naval History, have been published in the United States and Europe. He is the author of three plays dealing with American Frontier History which have been produced in regional theaters. He was twice nominated for Professor of the Year in West Virginia.

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1 October 2003, "Bribes, Moles, Eavesdropping, and Intelligence Surprise: Political and Military Intelligence before the American Revolutionary War, May 1774 to April 1775 ". The speaker was Dr. John K. Rowland (Colonel, USAF Reserve, Retired), Associate Dean and Director of Reserve Affairs at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His Ph.D. in History and Political Science is from Ohio State University, where he also taught undergraduate American history courses. His doctoral dissertation on the origins of the Second Amendment (right to bear arms) and his extensive experience on US Air Force and Defense Intelligence Agency staffs have encouraged his private examination of the intelligence aspects related to the beginning of the War for American Independence. In particular, he has focused on the valuable papers of the British General Thomas Gage, which are at the Clements Library at the University of Michigan. His presentation to the ARRT was an interim report on ‘research-in-progress' of this subject.

The observations of Dr. Rowland suggest General Gage's experience at the start of the American Revolt presents an interesting case study of eighteenth-century military-political intelligence. When Gen Gage assumed command of the British forces in North America in 1763 and as royal governor of Massachusetts in 1774, he could not have imagined the rebellion he would soon face in the north eastern British colonies.
In some ways, the unfolding of events of 1774-75 can be seen as ineffective responses/reactions by British authorities to their assumed knowledge of the colonists' intentions – ‘failures in intelligence'. However, Dr Rowland's research uncovers incidents where the British leaders often did have effective knowledge of the insurgents' plans and intentions, and as a result Gage tried to interdict illegal patriot meetings and undertook raids to confiscate patriot artillery and gunpowder on several occasions. However, there were factors to consider other than mere knowledge of such facts. In addition to faulty assumptions based on fragmentary information or sheer lack of intelligence sources, there was the known bias held by the professional British military toward militias – leading to underestimation of the latter. Further, Gage operated under severe legal restrictions on how he could use British military forces in peacetime and how he could undertake intelligence collection activities. Also, the tendency of British officials to focus their attention on the patriot leaders failed to notice that many of the disruptive actions taken by the rebels were truly initiated at the ‘grass roots' level. When it came to systematic intelligence gathering, the British had well positioned spies and a well financed "Secret and Special Service" ‘bribery' account. However, its effectiveness was somewhat countered by the pervasive surveillance of the rebel populace in Boston and the countryside, which alerted the patriots to the movements of British troops and agents. This allowed the rebels frequently to be a few steps ahead of the actions taken by Gen Gage in attempting to thwart American committee meetings or in executing surprise British military forays to seize rebel gunpowder stores.
Gen Gage's expectations about the severity of the political and military resistance he could expect in Massachusetts in 1774 were probably based on the lack of a noticeable mobilization of patriot crowds or militias following earlier events such as the ‘Boston Massacre' of 1770. He seems to have assumed that the same situation applied in 1774 and that the public statements coming from throughout Massachusetts against the 1774 ‘Coercive' [or ‘Intolerable'] Acts (which were mainly designed to punish the colony for its political disobedience and resistance, especially the ‘Boston Tea Party') were mere bluster and bravado rather than a serious threat to the peace. He was rudely surprised by the size and energy of an armed uprising of 40 to 60,000 New Englanders in September 1774, which quickly dissipated, and again in April 1775, which started the war. While some fault can be found in Gage's almost non-existent intelligence staff – that consisted of himself, and later one other officer – he was certainly hindered by the uncooperative or unsympathetic attitudes of the English government in London.
Dr. Rowland's principal conclusion was that "good intelligence alone cannot guarantee success." For example, Gage knew from a ‘mole' inside the insurgent government that senior patriot leaders had established a policy that the colonial militia would not respond to any excursions by the British army outside Boston unless they took artillery and a baggage train with them, since the patriots had been fooled by earlier field exercises into believing that a punitive expedition was underway. As a result of this ‘insider' intelligence, Gage planned that the march toward Concord in April 1775 deliberately did not have cannon or baggage. The patriot militia, however, did not pay any attention to the ‘policy' of the senior leaders when they saw British troops coming out of Boston on April 19, leading to the shots that "were heard around the world." Gage's insider information proved worthless.

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3 September 2003, "Redcoat Resupply: Strategic Shortcomings and Operational Indecision in the American Revolution". The speaker was Major John A. Tokar, US Army, assigned to the US Army Center of Military History. Major Tokar gave a professional assessment of the fundamental causes for the failure of ‘Gentleman Johnny' Burgoyne's 1778 invasion campaign of the American colonies. His presentation was assisted by excellent visuals, and highlighted some factors that are not always addressed in works that describe the British surrender at Saratoga. While most accounts address the several mistakes in judgment made by Burgoyne, Major Tokar delved further to explain the poor judgment made by the British general Carlton, who was to provide more follow on support for Burgoyne. Too, there was the fact that the British general Howe, in New York, did not join the campaign as was assumed by Burgoyne. However, Major Tokar pointed to the fact that these errors and mis judgments made by the British military commanders in North America at the time were bucking an already inadequate British logistical system for the planned military venture.

This particular campaign broke with the tradition of other successful British schemes in the Rebellion in that it relied heavily on over land and inland water ways for movement and re supply. Whereas, the successful British operations in the American Revolution emphasized the British naval lines of communications -- these being the least affected by American counter actions. Digging deeper into the logistical paradigm, Major Tokar described a British governmental structure that was poorly prepared to deal with planning and directing support for a large military venture so far from the British logistical base in England and Ireland. Sea lines for logistical support required considerable advanced planning for reserves and in anticipation of problems caused by lengthy sea transportation of supplies. Such was not done as the civilian managed ministry responsible for supporting the war assumed that the British armies could be supported by resources available in North America. Such estimates did not take into account the less than wished for Loyalist support, nor the difficulties thrust upon operations for a marching army attempting to ‘live of the land'.
Major Tokar is currently assigned as a 'Strategic Planner' at the US Army Center of Military History. He has masters degrees from Syracuse University and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth. He has published various articles on military history, strategy and defense policy in Parameters, Army Logistician, Army Times, The Journal of Military and Naval History, among others. Two of these articles, in particular, relate to the current topic: ‘Logistics, Saratoga, and Gentleman Johnny' (Army Logistician, July-August 2000), and ‘Logistics and the British Defeat in the Revolutionary War' (Army Logistician, September-October 1999).

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7 May 2003, "The Action at Barren Hill (20 May 1778): Prelude to Monmouth". The speaker was Mr. Vince Hawkins, a military historian and long member of the ARRT. Vince gave an excellent talk on the little covered ‘action' – or ‘maneuvers' – at Barren Hill, Pennsylvania on 20 May 1778. Often dismissed as a little foray undertaken by the very young American Major General, the Marquis de La Fayette, commanding a modest sized force, which was directed by General Washington to perform a screening and reconnoitering operation between the American camp at Valley Forge and British occupied Philadelphia.

The British appeared to have had no thought of further bothering with the Americans at Valley Forge, in late May of 1778, as the British were preparing – even celebrating with their peculiar 'Mischianza' – for their evacuation of Philadelphia and going to New York. However, in the midst of the festivities, on the night of the 19th, the British learned of the deployment of an American force under the relatively famous French marquis volunteer. With ‘fox hunting instinct', the British could not help but be attracted to the idea of bagging this symbol of the French assistance to the rebels, and then exhibit him at one of their dinners in Philadelphia. In fact, The British General Howe even scheduled the dinner as he set in motion a three prong advance of columns to surround Barren Hill, where La Fayette had taken his main position. The total British force was suitably larger than that of the Americans -- by probably more than 4 to 1. Fortunately, La Fayette was alerted to the British advance, and by some adroit maneuvering and finding a little known route of retreat from Barren Hill he managed to escape the trap.
Vince examined the events in more depth. First there was an analysis as to why Washington conceived of such an elaborate operation to merely spy on the British, or why not have just sent out posts to warn of possible attack or raids. Further, there is the question as to why La Fayette was given this command. Vince noted that some contemporaries perceived that the two questions might be best answered when one considers that La Fayette desired to be given a significant operational command and not remain a mere high ranking staff member. The marquis' had just been disappointed in the dissolution of a planned expedition into Canada that he was to lead. La Fayette's appointment was also a result of Washington's personal liking and trust of the young, ambitious, and enthusiastic Frenchman, but who up to this point had never held an independent command. There were high risks in this operation, as Vince pointed out in reviewing Washington's very detailed written orders to La Fayette.
Vince's research led him to discover that not only was the size of the force assigned to La Fayette for this operation larger than is generally believed, but it was of exceptional quality – really the pick of roughly 20 percent (almost 2,500 men) of the Valley Forge contingent. Included were 2 platoons of Washington's own ‘Life Guard' and a company from Morgan's Rifles.
Vince's clear explanation of the intricate maneuvers, in a tight, hilly and wooded area, was well assisted by his map handouts. Vince made the point that Barren Hill even preceded Monmouth, a month later, as the ‘first demonstration' of de Steuben's military instruction at Valley Forge. Alas, La Fayette failed to attend the dinner General Howe had planned back in Philadelphia, and among the British there was considerable casting about of blame as to why the very sizable British force led by several seasoned commanders failed to ‘bag' the marquis.
Vince has spoken to the Round Table several times before on such topics as the 'Organization of the Continental Army', 'Captain John Posey', 'The Commander-in-Chief's Life Guard', and the 'Making of the Movie The Patriot'. He has an M.A. in History from George Mason University and is a contributing author to the books: Understanding Defeat, The Encyclopedia of Military Biography, The International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, as well as the author of several articles for Military Heritage Magazine. He is currently working on a book project with the Army History Foundation on a chronology of the U.S. Army.

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2 April 2003, "Anticipating Newburgh: The Resignation of Nathanael Greene as Quartermaster General". The speaker was Dr. Dennis Conrad, an historian at the Navy Historical Center , who gave a very interesting perspective – ‘spin' if you will – on General Nathanael Greene's resignation in 1780 as quartermaster of the Continental Army. For most who are generally familiar with this famous Revolutionary War military leader, the incident reflected Greene's eagerness to hold an operational command and was an obvious outcome of such ambition coupled with frustrations of dealing with a ‘national' political structure [ie, the Continental Congress and separate colonial states] to equip and supply the needs of the Continental Army. To a degree, Dr. Conrad agreed with such an assessment, but he described a more fundamental, underlying issue that was at play at the time. It was an issue which would surface again with the near coup d'etat by Continental army officers at Newburgh in March 1783 – a most serious incident that was skillfully arrested by the personal appeal of General George Washington.

In Dr. Conrad's view, Greene was confronted by a destructive initiative launched by Congress which threatened to undo much of his commendable organization of the army's logistical base. By every assessment, the army's Quartermaster system that Greene took on had been in abysmal condition. Greene's success was largely due to strong, centralized direction. In 1780, Congress was forcing to supplant Greene's system with a ‘State Supply System' concept which was conceptually opposite to that of Greene's approach. Dr. Conrad identified the opposing concepts as strong central government control [‘Federalist'] versus ‘retention of powers among the separate ex-colonial states' – fundamental philosophical differences that were alive during the Revolution and remain in the American political physic. While these opposing views had not yet formalized into specifically defined factions, it was clear the leading individuals thought along these lines. Certainly Greene, along with Hamilton and their close acquaintances like Schuyler were clearly ‘Federalists'.
Dr. Conrad's thesis is that Greene perceived the Congress' mandated restructuring of the army's logistical system as a personal attack, and a ‘cabal' of individuals fundamentally opposed to centralized – and in his view more efficient – management of military logistics. As Dr. Conrad pointed out, there is some debate whether Greene's perception was correct. There is some evidence that Congress' action was an effort to reduce military expenditures incurred by the ‘Federal' treasury, simply and without due regard to the impact on war fighting capabilities of the army. There is some argument that Greene did not do all that he could have done ‘to work with' Congress to resolve the problem. Further, Greene very likely was influenced by his close friend of strong ‘Federalist' persuasion, Schuyler.
Dr. Conrad compares Greene's 1780 actions – confrontational against Congress – with George Washington's response, in 1783 at Newburg, when the Continental officers prepared to confront Congress's failure to settle payments due the officers. Again, the dismal status of the American finances was the basic cause for Congress' policies being in arrears of paying the officers. While Washington appreciated the emotions of the officers, his famous 15 March address to the assembled officers, denounced any rebellion against the elected, civilian and supreme political authority of the new Nation. Dr. Conrad suggests that there was a fundamental ‘political agenda' connecting Greene's resignation and the Newburg incident of 1782 – namely a hard core of ‘Federalist' activists among the early American leadership who, in both cases, failed to achieve their goals.
Dr. Dennis Conrad, was editor and director of Rhode Island's documentary project on the papers of General Nathaniel Greene; and he was editor of University of North Carolina Press' multi volume study of General Greene's commanded of American forces in the South, l780-l784. Dr. Conrad spoke to the ARRT in February 2002, on "John Paul Jones, the Ranger, and the Worth of the Continental Navy". He contributes to the US Naval Historical Center's 'Bibliography Series' webpage [URL: http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4.htm].

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5 March 2003, "Quest for the ‘Fourteenth Colony' – Canada, and Aftermath (1775-1776)". The speaker was Edwin C. Bearss, Chief Historian Emeritus of the National Park Service, one of the nation's most famous battlefield guides, author of many important works on the wars in North America, and recipient of numerous awards in the field of history and preservation.

Again, the ARRT members and guests were richly entertained by Ed Bearss's famous demonstrative speaking style, characterized by an energetic delivery, commanding grasp of dates and detailed background information on individuals; further complemented by his inserting lively explanations of personal motives and historical influences upon the course of events. All total, Mr. Bearss delivers a richly enhanced narrative that skillfully interweaves a host of detail while maintaining a smooth continuity to the story -- all this without notes, microphone, or podium.
In opening his talk, Ed surprised the audience by beginning with events which occurred much earlier in the American Revolution than the advertized title of the program suggested. After the first five minutes of listening to Ed describe the American motives to acquire a fourteenth ‘state' to their rebellion with an invasion of Canada in 1775, many in the audience wondered how the speaker was going to make the leap to covering the Saratoga campaign of 1777, as implied with the announced title of the program. It was soon obvious that Mr Bearss was taking the speaker's prerogative to structure his talk as he saw most fitting. The ARRT was to hear his account of the 1775 and 1776 early invasions into and from Canada, and arguably these events do provide a meaningful background to the 1777 Saratoga story.
With that, ED explained how the acquisition of Canada was prominent in the minds of many New Englanders even before the Revolution, and was the inspiration for the daring invasion into Canada. Ironically, the Rebels had perceptions that such would be supported by the French inhabitants. Such logic did not take into account that the ‘Quebec Act' which so angered the leaders in the original 13 British colonies was an attempt by the British to placate the Catholic French in the newly conquered realm of Canada. To a considerable degree, the French Canadians were not certain that the fiercely Protestant, Anglo Saxon colonists to the south were not more dangerous than their more benign Protestant British rulers across the ocean. However, the lack of Canadian French support was not so much the reason for the failure of the American 1775 Invasion of Canada. This became evident with Ed Bearss' description of the two prong American advance, one led by Brig. Gen. Montgomery up the Lake Champlain and the other under Benedict Arnold which struggled laboriously in portaging between rivers and endured unseasonable bad weather to reach Quebec. Arnold's badly depleted force finally join up with Montgomery outside the fortified walls of Quebec in early December 1775. Their two prong assault on the city failed, leaving Montgomery killed and Arnold wounded. By May 1776, the British were reinforced and drove the Americans out of Canada, following with an invasion of their own led by Guy Carlton. Arnold's ‘fleet' was able to thwart the British invasion at Valcour Island (October 1776). This effectively deferred the British invasion to the following year. At this point, the speaker set the scene for Burgoyne's Saratoga campaign of 1777. But to hear that story, we must attend Ed's return visit – hopefully when his busy schedule permits this coming fall.

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5 February 2003,"The French-American Alliance Treaty of 1778". The program commemorated the 225th Anniversary of the French and American Alliance signed in Paris on 6 February 1778. The ARRT was honored to have two guests from the French Embassy in Washington, DC: Major General Daniel BASTIEN, the Defense Attaché, and Colonel Patrick TICHIT, Assistant Army Attaché.

General Bastien (left) addresses the ARRT on the continuing spirit of the French-American Alliance, following a presentation by Mr. Jack Bowler (center) of the ARRT 'rocks' -- paperweight mementos with the ARRT's logo -- to the general and to Colonel Tichit (right).
[Photo by Patrick Wamsley]

The speaker was Albert D. McJoynt, who described the Alliance's origins, motives of the participants, essential ingredients, and the nature of its duration. In so doing, the speaker countered some misconceptions and misunderstandings about the alliance that are often repeated in popular literature on the American Revolution.

The speaker made the point that the French began preparing to support a possible rebellion in the British colonies in North America from the time the 1763 Treaty of Paris was signed that ended the Seven Years' War [‘French and Indian War']. At that time, France had written off the loss of Canada, to the extent that it had secretly transferred its remaining Louisiana territory claims to Spain in 1762. Rather than intending to regain the old ‘New France', the French were most concerned about protecting their remaining fishing areas off Newfoundland, and lucrative trading and sugar islands in the West Indies. Both of these possessions were vulnerable to a highly probable conquest by the North American colonists assisted by the resources of the British navy.
Whereas the colonists had an appreciation for the British navy, they saw little need for the payment of taxes to support the retention of British troops in the colonies after the withdrawal of France in 1763. British heavy handed taxation of their North American colonies, followed by thoughtless, coercive acts against the colonists' demonstrations played into the French grand scheme to support a separation of the North American colonies from Britain. French agents kept the Paris court appraised of the state of the emerging rebellion in the colonies. Meanwhile, France launched military reforms and initiated an aggressive warship building program, while British authorities let their naval assets languish, and were slow to appreciate the magnitude of the emerging rebellion as well as the possibility of the American colonies seeking French aide.
In 1775, the rebellion reached a stage where the Second Congress sent Silas Deane as a ‘commissioner' to Paris to obtain military aid. In late 1775, the French deployed an undercover agent to hold secret talks in Philadelphia with Benjamin Franklin and a few other key members of the US Congress' special committees set up to seek foreign war supplies. By early 1776, the French began sending covert military supplies; one robust scheme was through the subterfuge trading entity of Beaumarchais' Hortalez et Cie. The 4 July 1776 Declaration of Independence was a statement not only to the citizens of the colonies, it was a response to the French requests that the Americans make an irrevocable break from England before France commit itself more overtly. By the end of 1776, French military engineers were on their way to join the US Continental Army, while Benjamin Franklin was sailing to France as another commissioner.
While the popular perception is that the American victory at Saratoga (October 1777) ‘brought the French into the war'; the reality is that France had provided about ninety percent of the gunpowder and a significant number of the muskets used by the Americans at that battle. Whereas, Saratoga certainly offered a comfortable moment for the French to commit openly to war with England, some scholars believe that the more important reason in late 1777 was that the French warship inventory had reached its long planned goal for such a challenge. France would have been more comfortable if it were joined by Spain's sizable navy, but the Bourbon sister country was not yet prepared to do so. Throughout 1777, Franklin worked closely with the French foreign minister, Vergennes, to realize the three-part Treaty of Alliance signed in Paris, February 1778. The first treaty was basically an economic trade pact that effectively recognized the united colonies as an independent political entity. The second part was a mutual defense treaty that addressed the inevitable war between France and England that would soon come. The third part was a ‘secret and separate' treaty which allowed for Spain to join the pact at a future time.
The 1778 Treaty of Alliance between France and the American rebels was of significant importance in the winning of American Independence. It provided the vital underpinning of many military operations in North America, and defined the broader, world wide political and economic aspects of the war. Effectively the treaty ended with the Americans winning Independence in 1781. However, it ‘technically' had a formal, non functional, existence until 1800. It's shadow would be resurrected in spirit during the great wars of the twentieth century.
Mr. McJoynt, has spoken to the ARRT previously on several themes that relate to the French participation in the American Revolution. He authors the website for the Expédition Particulière Commemorative Cantonment Society. That site has pages devoted to detailed descriptions of the 1778 Alliance as well as references to internet and printed material on the topic.

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No ARRT program was given in January 2003.

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4 December 2002,"Redefining the Battle for New York in the American Revolution". The speaker was Barnet Schecter, author of a recently published book The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution (Walker, October 2002). Mr. Schecter's presentation explained his motives for writing this book describing that remarkable city's role in the war for American Independence. Employing display maps and handouts, and speaking without notes Mr Schecter summarized his assessment of New York's role in the Revolution. His main theme was that New York City (NYC) was the central focus of a long war; a war which is mostly remembered for the famous military engagements and victories that took place elsewhere in the American colonies – e.g., Saratoga, Cowpens, Yorktown, etc.. Often overlooked is the fact that NYC preoccupied the strategic goals of both the British leaders and of George Washington longer than any other single geographic objective during the struggle. For the British, and so stated by some American leaders such as John Adams, New York was "key to the Continent." Significantly, with its excellent harbor and confluence of major water ways, New York permitted control of, and access to, much on the inland regions of the colonies in the north.

Mr. Schecter described how maintaining their hold on the city, once conquered in 1776, acted like a magnetic for the British. New York became pivotal [a ‘center of gravity'] in most British strategic planning. As such, it drew Washington's attention in his efforts to contain the British there until such time that the rebel army obtained enough capability to launch an offensive. Unfortunately for the American rebels, the surrounding waters favored the British, with their world class naval arm.
Mr. Schecter gave a convincing argument that for military, and possibly for convenience of the officers' life style, New York's defenses were always given first consideration in British strategic operations. This fixation compromised support to the various British expeditions either to the south or to New England and the Hudson Highlands.
Once he made his central point, the speaker expertly fielded a variety of questions dealing with many individuals of the time and events that took place in New York. His explanation for the possible reasons influencing General Howe's restrained operations against Washington's army was quite revealing. Mrs, Murry's role in the British landing at Kips Bay was another interesting twist. For a full 30 minutes, the ARRT members were involved in a most lively exchange with a true expert on the details of New York's role in the American Revolution. The audience was taken in so much that Mr Schecter's supply of his book was sold out at the end of the program, and individuals had to place orders. Also going for the interest in his book were reports of those members who had already read much of the rather large work and praised it highly.
For more on the book and the author, as well as a detailed guide for visiting the Revolution sites in today's NYC, see ‘The Battle for New York' home page on the internet. http://www.thebattlefornewyork.com/home.php

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21 October 2002, "Lafayette". The speaker was Mr. Harlow Giles Unger, author of a recently published book on Lafayette. This particular program was held in the new Mount Vernon auditorium; and was jointly sponsored in conjunction with The Mount Vernon Ladies' Association and The Washington, D.C. Chapter of the Lafayette Alumni Association.

Mr. Harlow Unger gave a very smooth, clear, and comprehensive survey of Lafayette's life as it related to the marquis' remarkable contribution to the American Revolutionary cause and as he attempted to influence democratic interests in the subsequent political upheavals in France. Such a complex story is very challenging within the time limits of an evening lecture. Of necessity, Mr. Unger could only hit upon the highlights of the events in Lafayette's life in ‘two worlds' – Revolutionary North America of 1776-1783, and revolutionary France during the transition from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries.
Mr Unger is described as having been a journalist, who had written on some other historical figures. He is also familiar with France and the language, as he lives in Paris for part of the year. While Mr. Unger's talk was most enjoyable, it has to be noted that his approach reflects that of a polished journalist rather than that of a research historian. His laudatory assessment of Lafayette evidences less measured analysis than one finds in the highly acclaimed works of historians such as Gottschalk, Idzerda, and Kramer. For example, Mr. Unger described Lafayette as ‘a great military strategists', while the evidence is that the marquis had limited military experience, and actually prevailed in his independent operations and in his 1781 Virginia campaign mostly by demonstrating prudence rather than exhibiting any great maneuvers. Lafayette was a careful commander – a trait that he may have picked up from observing George Washington. Further, a suggestion that Lafayette's death may have been mourned more than Washington's [either in the US or in France] is highly questionable.
While the superlatives used to describe Lafayette's military talents or to suggest his almost singular role in instigating French involvement in the American cause may be excessive, Mr Unger rightly describes the personal character of Lafayette that explains the young French marquis' remarkable success in winning the respect of the American rebels. The cultural difference between French nobility and the average American in the colonies should have presented near insurmountable barriers -- as indeed it did for many of the French volunteers. However, it was Lafayette's sincere idealism and personal humility -- ‘to learn' rather than ‘to teach' or ‘to preach' -- that won him respect from both his men and officer peers. Most importantly, it won Lafayette the trust of his hero, George Washington. Lafayette was fortunate to have had the personal wealth that allowed him to practice his idealism (at least during the era of the American Revolution), free of personal economic worries while he served, un paid, as America's youngest major general.
Following the glory of his accomplishments in the American Revolution, Lafayette's fate back in France would see him rise to considerable heights, only to be plunged to the depths in the turbulent turmoil of the French revolution, followed by the Napoleonic usurpation and then the temporary, unstable monarchial restoration in France. Mr. Unger addressed the herorism of Lafaytte's wife, Adrienne, during the marquis' years of imprisonment in Austria and in preserving their lands in France. He also touched on the Lafayette's 1824-25 return visit to the United States, that probably had most to do with imbedding the marquis' legend in American history -- a legend seldom fully understood or adequately addressed in the Nation's general histories. Mr. Unger's recently published book helps to correct this.

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2 October 2002, "A Yankee Mariner: Christopher Prince and the American Revolution". Dr. Michael Crawford talked upon the subject of his recently edited autobiography of Christopher Prince, a Yankee seaman who experienced adventures and exploits during the American Revolution, on board both British and American ships, as a naval enlisted man, as an officer of privateers, and as a master of merchantmen. Prince was born in 1751 and grew up in a colonial Massachusetts seaport town. He forsook the hardships of fishing on the Grand Banks and sought a career as merchant seaman. The era was marked by the rebellion of the English colonies in America and Prince's story becomes a valuable personal account of seafaring during the American Revolution.

Dr. Crawford quickly reviewed what he had covered in an earlier talk to the ARRT and then picked up on Prince's wartime experience after he was freed from being made to serve on a British prison ship and ‘captured' by the Americans. Luckily, the American seamen from New England were able to intervene and Prince was soon participating as an American privateer. Dr. Crawford recounted various narrow escapes from death in Prince's life. Prince was again captured at least twice; once he was immediately released, but another time experienced some travails as a prisoner before gaining freedom again. Another close call was colorfully described by Dr. Crawford where Prince and a few crewman were stranded in the Chesapeake and barely escaped a band of local pirates. The war brought Prince both financial gains and losses. While away at sea, Prince's home was burnt and close friends killed during Arnold's raid on New London, Connecticut. In 1806, Prince retired as a merchant sea captain, began writing his story, and became a religious activist. He died in 1832. His autobiography was donated to the US Naval History offices soon after WWII. Dr. Crawford's edited version is its first publication.
Dr. Crawford's edited work: The Autorbiography of a Yankee Mariner, Christopher prince and the American Revolution (Brassey's, 2002) can be obtained through the website of Brasseys: http://www.brasseysinc.com/Books/1574884409.htm
Michael J. Crawford, Ph.D., is the head of the Early History Branch, Naval Historical Center, where he is the editor of two major historical documentary series, Naval Documents of the American Revolution and The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History. He is co-editor (with William S. Dudley) of The Early Republic and the Sea: Essays on the Naval and Maritime History of the Early United States (Brassey's, Inc., 2001). He has has spoken to the American Revolution Round Table (of District of Columbia) on: ‘Battle of Valcour Island -- 11 October 1776' (6 May 2001); ‘How the Queen of France Came to America in 1778' (November 1997); ‘Christopher Prince, New England Mariner of the American Revolution' [covering only Prince's early career] (May 1996); ‘Revolution and the Bay: Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution' (February 1993); ‘The French Naval Campaign of 1778 in North America' (October 1989), and ‘The Barbary Wars' (March 2002). He contributes to the US Naval Historical Center's 'Bibliography Series' webpage. [http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4.htm].
On 2 October, Dr. Crawford received the ARRT's Certificate of Appreciation, awarded to individuals who have provided sustained support to the organization.

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4 September 2002, "George Washington's Journey to Barbados". Mr. Jack D. Warren, Jr. launched the ARRT's 2002-2003 season with another of his scholarly and most interesting assessments of George Washington. Having covered ‘the last years' of Washington in a January 2000 presentation to the ARRT, Mr. Warren, this time, explored Washington's early development. Specifically the speaker reviewed how the nineteen-year old Washington's first [and only] trip outside the English colonies [now the United States], stimulated his interest in higher public service and a military career.

Washington's 1751 Barbados trip is given only brief coverage in the popular, general biographical studies of his life. As Mr Warren pointed out, the reason is most likely that there is little recorded of the event, other than a poorly preserved diary Washington kept during the visit. Nevertheless, Mr. Warren has reason to make the effort to ‘decipher' the blurred script of the diary in light of having studied most every other aspect of Washington's life and writings, and with the added perspective of having been invited by the Barbados National Trust to visit the island and inspect its remaining eighteenth-century structures.
Having dealt with many of Washington's documents, Mr. Warren is familiar with the writer's tendency toward ‘the controlled understatement'. The speaker detected that some of Washington's subtlety takes on meaning when one views it in context of an ‘on location' familiarity with the island, as well as an understanding of the Barbados' historical significance in the eighteenth century. Mr. Warren discerns an array of interesting details as to the teenager George Washington's views and impressions during the 1751 visit. Much of Mr. Warren's insights will be covered in a forthcoming book.
Mr. Warren's fundamental theme was that the Barbados trip had a dramatic impact on the young gentleman from a relatively mid-level plantation society in the Virginia colony. At Barbados, Washington was exposed to an urban culture, probably the most sophisticated community in British North America. Barbados was ‘the jewel' of English trade in the New World, supporting a wealthy and lively social structure, and drew a concentration of senior officials interested in worldly issues. The island's geo-economic importance also meant the substantial presence of professional military officers and the maintenance of an impressive fortification system -- certainly unlike anything in the North American colonies south of Canada.
Sifting from remaining, near readable passages of Washington's diary, Mr Warren constructs a convincing argument that the Barbados trip was a ‘pivotal event' in Washington's life. The impressionable teenager returned to Virginia with awareness of a larger horizon than that which centered around Williamsburg. Soon after his return, Washington noticeably turned from his land surveying endeavors and began to ‘stake out' his future in political offices and military service.
Jack D. Warren, Jr., is historical advisor to many institutions associated with United States' founding era, including George Washington Birthplace National Monument, Gunston Hall, and the George Washington House Project of the Barbados National Trust. He is also Director of History and Education for the Society of the Cincinnati. His published works include four edited volumes of The Papers of George Washington, numerous monographs on George Washington, John Adams, and other Founding Fathers, as well as The Presidency of George Washington, published by the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association in 2000. It is available at Mount Vernon Book store, as well as from some on-line sites. [See http://www.hslda.org/bookstore/items/washington.asp.

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